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Democratizing Oriental Despotism

China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989
and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990

C. L. Chiou



DEMOCRATIZING ORIENTAL DESPOTISM

By the same author

ASIAN POLITICAL CULTURE (*in Chinese*)

CHINA AND TAIWAN: Towards Separate Political Roads (*in Chinese*)

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DEMOCRATIZING CHINA AND TAIWAN: Cultural and Institutional
Paradigms

MAOISM IN ACTION: The Cultural Revolution

Democratizing Oriental Despotism

**China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989
and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to
28 June 1990**

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*For my family and my friends who have fought for democracy in
Taiwan and China*

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Preface

As a political scientist who was born, raised and educated to the university level in the beautiful island-state of Taiwan, then went to the United States to carry out graduate studies, and finally came to teach here in Australia for the past twenty-two years, I have been very lucky to be deeply concerned with and able to follow closely and study, even occasionally participate in, political developments, especially democracy movements, in China and Taiwan. From 1980 to 1988, during the post-Mao reform period, I made ten research-lecture tours in China. I met and talked with many Chinese intellectual political elites, such as Zhao Fusan, former vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Su Shaozhi, former director of CASS's institute of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, Yan Jiaqi, former director of CASS's institute of political science, and their staff, Zhao Baoxi, former head of the department of international politics, Beijing University, and his staff, and the professors and lecturers of political science at the Chinese People's, Fudan, Hangzhou and other universities. I held two long discussion sessions with Yan Jiaqi when he was advising former premier and party general secretary Zhao Ziyang on political structural reform. I had come to know well Professor Fang Lizhi, the most famous Chinese human-rights fighter, and discussed with him his struggle for democracy in China, and spent many days and hours talking reform and democratization with young students, particularly postgraduate students, in Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan and Hangzhou.

Just six months before the 4 June incident, I held lengthy discussions with Bao Zunxin, Wang Luxiang, Yuan Zhiming and their group of culturalist reformers who wrote and produced the soul-searching and thought-provoking television series, the *River Elegy (He Shang)*, and with Zhang Bingjiu, Yang Baikui, Wang Juntao and other young scholars who advocated neo-authoritarianism. I learnt a great deal from them and came to understand better the problems and difficulties, successes and failures, of China's political reform and democratization, not just in the last ten, but over the last seventy years.

In October 1991, attending a conference on human rights and the legal system in China at the University of California, Berkeley, I spent seven days and nights (we were room-mates in a motel) with Yan Jiaqi and many hours with Chen Yizi, former reformist adviser to Zhao Ziyang, and was able to meet Liu Binyan, Ruan Ming, Hu Ping, and other Chinese pro-democracy activists. We talked about nothing but democratization in China

and Taiwan. I sensed the fundamental change of Yan's position in terms of intra-party (within the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]) democracy and two- or multi-party systems. In June 1992, I went to Paris to visit Yan and, acting as our guide, Yan and his wife, Gao Gao, co-author of their famous book on the Cultural Revolution, took good care of me and my family. At Yan's exile home, I again met Chen Yizi and Huan Guocang, a Chinese scholar in international political economy who taught at Columbia University, both of them had previously visited Australia and spent some days with me in November 1991. Day and night again we discussed the difficult issues, struggles and disappointments in China's pro-democracy movements. They gave me a great deal of information and thought on the central concern of my scholarly life and contributed enormously to the writing of this book.

From the other side of the Taiwan Straits, I have been even luckier. As a young PhD who had just left school to start his academic life, in 1972 I was invited by Chiang Ching-kuo, then the premier of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, to attend the first National Construction Conference. Almost two decades later, in 1990, I was again invited by President Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo, to take part in the National Affairs Conference. Both conferences were called by the two Kuomintang (KMT) leaders at critical junctures of Taiwan's democratization process to push new reformist programs. In between, I had returned to Taiwan every year, except during the 1976–78 period when I was banned from going back because of my involvement in the 1975 *Taiwan Political Review* affair. I have been there often two or three times a year, doing research, teaching in universities, observing elections, attending academic seminars and conferences, acting as the chief editorial writer for Kang Ning-hsiang's *Capital Morning Post*, and even campaigning for the opposition candidates and supporting the student pro-democracy movements. My two-decade-long friendship with Kang, one of the most prominent opposition politicians, has helped me to develop close contacts with most, if not all, famous political dissidents and oppositionists, certainly including the top leadership in the *tangwai* (literally "outside of the ruling KMT", or nonpartisan) movement and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). I have followed closely and sometimes been involved in their struggles for democratizing Taiwan in the last quarter of the century.

Although my support of the opposition and democracy campaigns in Taiwan is well known, I have maintained open channels with the KMT ruling elite. KMT leaders such as Lee Huan, former premier and party secretary-general, and James Soong (Sung Ch'u-yu), governor of Taiwan and a former party secretary-general, have always frankly answered my

inquiries and helped me to understand their policies, problems, and efforts to bring Taiwan into modernity. With various groups of overseas scholars, I have met President Lee Teng-hui four times since he took over power from Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. On each occasion, he spent hours explaining to us his views and policies on why democracy was important to Taiwan, how to democratize Taiwan, what he had done, and what the difficulties were that he had encountered. I did not agree with many things he said but was always impressed by his sincerity and commitment to democracy.

In addition, I have of course benefited immensely from my academic friends, such as Professors Chang Chung-tung, Li Hung-hsi, Hu Fu, Fu Cheng, who died of cancer in mid-1991, and many others, whose involvement and experience in, and ideas and writings on, Taiwan's march toward constitutional democracy have been an inspiration to me.

For more than three decades the question of how China and Taiwan, these two authoritarian nation-states, might be democratized, together with what has happened in their long struggles for democratization and modernization, has fully and richly occupied my academic life. It is now time to give an account of myself, to present a sort of summary report on my hard and long study, my views and thoughts, on this important question; hence the writing of this book. I believe that between the orthodox cultural and economic determinist theories on oriental despotism and Chinese political development, my institutionalist democratization theory could add a new perspective, a new dimension, or a new interpretation to the existing works. The theory has fermented in my mind for many years, but I am sure it still has many problems that need further attention. I feel, however, it is ready to make its appearance before my peers, particularly the Chinese and Taiwanese intellectuals who are concerned with democratization struggles in the Middle Kingdom and the newly industrialized country, the island-state of Taiwan.

My colleague Dr M. D. Fletcher has read the first draft of this book, corrected many mistakes, suggested some ideas, and complained that there were too many long quotations. I have accepted his advice but still kept a few long quotations from Chow Tse-tsung, Lucian Pye, Andrew Nathan and Harry Harding. The reasons are, first, they are sinologists I respect; second, the quotations from their authoritative works support part of my argument; and third and most important, I am presenting a somewhat different view, a different explanation, on the democracy movements in China and Taiwan from theirs, and thus to cite them correctly and at length for comparative purposes is necessary.

Professor Colin A. Hughes, who hired me more than twenty years ago

and edited my first book on Maoism, read my second draft and again gave it a thorough editorial treatment. Afterward, he simply said, "It's good stuff." I took it as a great compliment.

From Zhao Fushan and Yan Jiaqi, to Kang Ning-hsiang and Fu Cheng, and to Don Fletcher and Colin Hughes, they all have contributed to the birth of this book. I thank them all. I, however, am solely responsible for any mistakes and shortcomings that remain.

Since China uses *pinyin* while Taiwan uses Wade-Giles, and for reasons of familiarity, practicality and usefulness, names, including names of persons, places, events, institutions, books, journals, etc., from China will be transliterated in *pinyin*, while those from Taiwan will be in Wade-Giles throughout the book.

On the 4 June Tiananmen incident, the documents translated by Han Minshu's *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* were extensively used. Descriptions of recent events, particularly day-to-day developments of major affairs narrated in the book, are based primarily on the author's personal involvement and experience and on four Taiwanese newspapers and one journal, namely, the *China Times*, *Ming Chung (Commons) Daily News*, *Capital Morning Post*, *Independence Evening Post*, and *Hsin Hsin Wen (The Journalist)*. Due to the frequency of their appearances, no footnotes are given to acknowledge these sources.

Part of Chapter 7 was earlier published by *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, No. 1 (1993) and entitled "The 1990 National Affairs Conference and the Future of Democracy in Taiwan"; some of the ideas of the book are contained in a discussion paper, "Democratizing China and Taiwan: Cultural and Institutional Paradigms", published by the Department of Social and Political Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University.

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List of Abbreviations

CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
KMT	Kuomintang
NAC	National Affairs Conference
NIC	newly industrializing countries
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China

1 Introduction

Maoist militant revolution died with Mao on 9 September 1976. Deng Xiaoping's political reform, in spite of the great expectations it raised and the promises given by the 1979–89 ten-year modernization push, met an equally tragic death on 4 June 1989, when he sent in his tanks to crush the peaceful pro-democracy demonstration in Tiananmen Square. Before 3 June, no one foresaw that the 1989 pro-democracy movement would end up more disastrously than its equally famous forerunner, the May Fourth Movement, exactly seventy years earlier in 1919. Of course, there are many differences between the two movements, but there are also many fundamental similarities. The most salient and remarkable similarity between the two historic events, which should cause the most soul-searching among the Chinese people, particularly the intellectuals, is the tragic, almost fatalistic, way that intellectuals' attempts at democratizing China met the same ignoble fate at the hands of similar traditional Chinese despots. In terms of democratization, which was one of the principal modernization goals of the May Fourth Movement, the Chinese reformist elites, both cultural and political, achieved very little in their seventy-year long and painful struggles.

On the other hand, on the other side of the Taiwan Straits, the defeated Nationalist government, with the same, if not greater, traditional Chinese authoritarianism and oriental despotism on their backs and led by Mao's and Deng's two contemporaries, the two Chiangs, by the time the son, Chiang Ching-kuo, died on 13 January 1988, had not only made an impressive economic miracle, but also guided Taiwan toward a democratization process that seemed to be working and succeeding. It has not yet succeeded but certainly has reached a point of no return.

Two years after the KMT government took over Taiwan after fifty years of Japanese rule, on 28 February 1947, the Taiwanese people, particularly the students and the intellectuals, rose up in an attempt to overthrow the oppressive regime of the corrupt Chiang dynasty. Disappointed by ruthless and corrupt officials from the mainland, the Taiwanese people wanted freedom, democracy, and self-government. In the following month-long uprising, the Nationalist army killed about twenty thousand of the Taiwanese economic, political, cultural and social elite. It was a massacre much bloodier, in terms of the number of people killed, than the 4 June Tiananmen killing. Consequent upon the deep suspicion, hatred and mistrust created by the 28 February Uprising and the subsequent defeat of the

KMT government by the Chinese Communists on the mainland, Taiwan became a deeply divided society.

Democratization in Taiwan became a struggle of Taiwanese-versus-mainlander, as well as Nationalist-versus-Communist and Taiwan independence-versus-reunification with China, an exceedingly complicated and messy affair. Under the martial law regime imposed on Taiwan from 1949 to 1987, any democratization activities, even demands for freedom of the press and association, could be easily condemned as treason in the name of anti-Communism or anti-national unity, or simply as anti-government.

Nevertheless, the opposition movement in Taiwan continued to push on, and by 28 June 1990, just one and a half years after Chiang Ching-kuo died, the new Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, was able to convene a National Affairs Conference (NAC) to invite the opposition party, the DPP, and other liberal and democratic forces to start a political-constitutional reform process. Although Taiwan still has a long way to go to be a functional institutional democracy, the NAC as quasi-party politics in action was a good start. Since the 1990 NAC, Taiwan has gone through three fairly open and fair elections. Democratization in Taiwan has not yet succeeded, but it has certainly taken a solid and promising great leap forward. The process has taken off and the expectation of most concerned scholars, as well as the Taiwanese people, is that Taiwan will be a functional democracy in the early twenty-first century, if not earlier.

Why is it that two oriental despotisms, two traditional Chinese authoritarian political systems – the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the ROC in Taiwan – with so many cultural similarities, started at more or less the same historic point, have gone down such different paths and ended up seemingly at different ends of the political spectrum? In the last decade of the twentieth century, China is as authoritarian as ever while Taiwan is rapidly becoming a democratized polity. The simplest and most obvious answer is that the former has been a communist while the latter a capitalist society. Standing at the momentous watershed when communist governments in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have collapsed like a house of cards, that is an attractive answer. However, clearly it is too simplistic and can only partially answer the question. The long capitalist Republican period, from 1911 to 1949, did not really see much hope for democracy in China. During the 1940s, with Shanghai-style capitalism dominating the Republic's industry, commerce, finance and other economic fields, China became even more despotic and authoritarian.

Most democracies have been created primarily by elites. People's revolution and Maoist mass-line movement are attractive as revolutionary

concepts but rarely work in reality, even less in bringing about a functional-institutional democracy. In China between 4 May 1919 and 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990, most revolutionary actions, particularly the pro-democracy movements, were initiated and carried out mainly by the intellectual political elite, often in alliance with students, following almost exactly the 2000-year Confucian scholar-official tradition. This study tries to answer the above question as to why democracy is coming into being in Taiwan but not China, and to do so from the perspectives and behavioural patterns of the Chinese and Taiwanese cultural-political elites. In short, the question it tries to answer is "Why have the Chinese intellectual political elite failed while their Taiwanese counterparts have succeeded in democratizing their respective countries?"

Although this study mainly deals with the intellectuals' and students' role in China's and Taiwan's democratization processes, it of course does not mean they are solely responsible for the successes or failures of the processes. Especially in the case of Taiwan, a civil society, all sorts of "citizens' movements" participated in by workers, farmers, businessmen, industrialists, labour unionists, consumers' advocates, women's organizations and other social interest groups have long made their presence felt in Taiwan's socio-political landscape (Hsiao, 1990; Ngo, 1993). The support, both direct and indirect, of these people's and citizen's groups to the oppositionist movements in Taiwan have been crucial. Even in China, such as before and during the 4 June Tiananmen demonstrations, a civil society had begun to emerge and play an important part in China's political reforms and democracy struggles (Ostergaard, 1989; Strand, 1990; Bonnin and Chevrier, 1991; Sullivan, 1990; Kelly and He, 1992; White, 1993). Moreover, in addition to the critical role played by the intellectuals and students, there are of course other complex economic and socio-cultural factors that must have contributed to the failures of the democracy movements in China, as well as to the successes of those in Taiwan.

The central theoretical framework for this study is the concept and application of the "democratic method", democratization technique, based on Joseph A. Schumpeter's classic *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1962). According to Schumpeter (1962, p. 250), the eighteenth-century classical doctrine of democracy could be defined as "the democratic method" that "is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the elections of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will". The "common good" and the "will of the people" are the central focus of this theory. They have attracted a great deal of criticism ever since the mid-nineteenth century when rationality in human nature

was questioned and the theory of utilitarian rationalism was discredited. Schumpeter (1962, pp. 269–283) thus presents “another theory of democracy” which he believes is “much truer to life and at the same time salvages much of what sponsors of democratic method really mean by this term”.

Schumpeter (1962, p. 269) defines and explains this other theory of democracy in the following terms:

It will be remembered that our chief troubles about the classical theory centered in the proposition that “the people” hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion – in a democracy – by choosing “representatives” who will see to it that that opinion is carried out. Thus the selection of representatives is made secondary to the primary purpose of the democratic arrangement which is to vest the power of deciding political issues in the electorate. Suppose we reverse the roles of those two elements and make the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding. To put it differently, we now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a national executive or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.

A fair and open institutional arrangement for competitive struggle for political leadership is the methodological foundation of a functional democracy. In this democratic methodology, freedoms of expression and the press, two- or multi-party systems, and free, fair and open elections are the essential component parts. Without them, the democratic institutional arrangement can never be achieved.

Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Robert Dahl (1971), Deane Neubauer (1967), and Samuel P. Huntington (1991) talk about basically the same thing. Lipset states that a democratic system is one which makes possible regular and institutionalized or constitutionalized opportunities for changing the set of officials who are responsible for governing the political system. Dahl refers to democracy as “polyarchy”, in which government shows continual responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens, who are viewed as political equals. He (1971, p. 3) stipulates that a reasonably responsive democracy can exist only if at least eight institutional guarantees are present: (1) freedom to form and join organizations; (2) freedom of expression; (3) the right to vote; (4) eligibility of citizens for public office; (5) the right

of political leaders to compete for support and votes; (6) alternative sources of information; (7) free and fair elections; and (8) institutions for making governmental policies dependent on votes and other expressions of preferences. Neubauer emphasizes electoral competition in which all adults should be free to participate under the principle of "one man, one vote", whilst Huntington (1991, p. 7) gives his "procedural" definition of democracy as follows: a nation's political system is democratic "to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote".

This study does not involve itself with the perennial debates on the pros and cons of democracy. It accepts that democracy is the best political system we human beings have had so far. It also accepts the democratic "technique", those features of functional-institutional democracy applied by New York's Freedom House for more than twenty years to assess the degrees of freedom and democracy in the world's nation-states, as a useful theoretical as well as practical "method" to discuss, measure and compare the democratization processes in China and Taiwan. Although it may not have been very successful, I have tried hard to avoid ideological arguments on "isms".

As amply shown by the studies of transition from authoritarian rule in Latin America and Southern Europe by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (1986), the process of transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic system, although consisting of two simultaneous but to some extent autonomous processes (a process of disintegration of the authoritarian regime, which often assumes the forms of liberalization, and a process of emergence of democratic institutions), is immensely complex, diverse and dynamically varying according to each individual country's different historic, economic and socio-cultural backgrounds. Moreover, although China and Taiwan have similar socio-cultural backgrounds, their historic and economic developmental experiences are not the same. Taiwan's rule by the Dutch and then, later, Japan has given the Taiwanese somewhat different perspectives and has left behind a more developed economic infrastructure, as well as legal system. The economic developments since 1949 on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits, China with collective ownership of the means of production and Taiwan with private ownership of property, have also been very much different. Even in the two authoritarian states (authoritarian in terms of their degrees of political control), such arguments about "hard" and "soft" authoritarianism that will be further discussed later, do have subtle and important variations also. They all inevitably have had different impacts on both countries'

liberalization and democratization processes. Still, while not dismissing the importance of those historic, economic and other socio-cultural variables at all, I believe that to single out the role of intellectuals and students and to apply the Schumpeterian "democratic method" and my institutionalist framework to study democratization processes comparatively in China and Taiwan is a valid and, I would even argue, the most useful and meaningful, approach. As will be shown in the following chapters, my approach centred on intellectuals and students is by no means unique and has also been applied by other scholars in the field.

2 The May Fourth Movement, the KMT and the CCP

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL DETERMINISMS

In the last seventy years, in China as well as in the West, many theoretical treatises have been written as to why “Mr D” (Democracy) of the May Fourth Movement has failed to arrive and make his presence felt in the Central Kingdom.¹ Among the various theories on offer, the two most persuasive ones are the economic and the cultural deterministic arguments. Economists stress that, in Western experience, capitalism and democracy have developed hand in hand; without industrialization and high economic development there would have been no democratic political development and China simply has been too poor. With its per capita GDP in 1990 still less than US\$300, measured against the scale of Walt Rostow’s (1962) economic-growth-based developmental theory, China just has not been, and is still not, in a position to become democratic.

This economic argument has been used often by the Chinese ruling autocracy against rapid democratization. The argument in China has never reached the level of sophistication of the Austrian school of Ludwig von Mises and Friederich Hayek, the Chicago school led by Milton Friedmann, or the recent neo-conservative thought of Robert Nozick (1974) and Irving Kristol (1983). Nevertheless, it has been just as effective. Even as late as 1989 on the eve of the 4 June incident, the neo-authoritarian advocates (Liu and Liu, 1989) put up a strong intellectual argument, calling for the Huntingtonian (1968) model of social order and political stability to be applied in totalitarian China to create an “enlightened” neo-authoritarian political leadership and system to push for economic reform and modernization. And, in their neo-authoritarian eyes, only after a market economy is firmly and highly developed, rapid economic growth is under way and a strong middle class has been created, can cultural pluralism and political democratization evolve (Petracca and Mong, 1990).

This economic determinist developmental theory is difficult to refute but is certainly far from infallible. A less vulnerable sub-theory would be that a stable democracy requires high economic growth, while low economic development makes democratization more difficult and democracy

less secure and stable. Even accepting this economic developmental theory and bearing in mind democratization successes in Taiwan and failures in China in the 1980s, Andrew J. Nathan (1990, p. 51) stresses:

Social Scientists have identified no absolute threshold of development required to qualify a people for democracy, but China is now clearly above the minimum level in simple economic terms and far above it with regard to social development and communication facilities. China's gross national product (GNP) per capita in 1980 was already above the level found in the three poorest stable democracies of the 1970s. By the end of the century, the figure may match or exceed the level enjoyed by the eight poorest democracies in the early 1970s (India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkey, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Chile, and Uruguay in ascending order of wealth).

China is far more industrialized than the other poor and lower-middle income countries as measured by the proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) attributable to industry (nearly 50 per cent). China's urbanites constitute between 12 and 32 per cent of the population, depending on the definition used. Most of China's villages have schools, however, rudimentary. The level of literacy revealed by the 1982 census was as high as or higher than that of India and Turkey. In 1985 the government extended the period of compulsory schooling to nine years, a measure that should gradually raise the average of education even higher. Mass communication in the form of wired loudspeakers, radio, television, and newspapers penetrates into virtually every village and effectively reaches illiterates and people living in deserts or on steppes, and rivers.

In addition, despite recent trends toward increasing concentration of wealth, China still has a relatively equitable distribution, which is generally considered a helpful condition for democracy.

Since 1970, New York's Freedom House has put out a Comparative Survey of Freedom (democracy) in the 160 or so (in 1993 about 180) nation-states in the world. The main standard by which freedom and democracy are judged is rather simplistic. While it accepts that democracy is not static and must adjust to changing conditions, it considers that "at minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals not chosen by the government". Its check-list consists of political rights and civil liberties, with the former items asking whether the head of State and the legislative representatives are elected through free and fair elections and whether, once elected, they have genuine power, and the latter

concerned with freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the State. The political rights sought for take into account the opportunities for opposition and minority groups to increase their support and gain power through elections, as well as a country's right of self-determination and its citizens' freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or other powerful groups. The civil liberties include free and independent media, the right to have open public discussion and free private discussion, and freedom of assembly and demonstration.

With this set of simple criteria, as shown in Table 1, Freedom House in 1990 listed 164 countries: 49 as "not free", 50 as "partly free" and 65 as "free" and democratic (Cohen, 1991, pp. 21–3).

Among the 65 "free" states, there are more than half of the poor, underdeveloped, or developing countries in the world, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Namibia, the Solomon Islands and Uruguay. Although they were not all stable democracies – such as Thailand, which in 1990 was deemed a free democracy but in early 1991 was upset by its latest military coup and then after the student demonstration against the military regime in March 1992, a non-military government was popularly elected in September 1992 – they were nevertheless free and democratic. Even Pakistan, one of the poorest nations in the world, in spite of its status as a partly free state in 1990, did have a democratic election in 1989 in which a military-supported authoritarian regime was rejected by the voters and then held two more elections in 1990 and 1993, in which power changed hands twice, thus qualifying it to be a full democracy. In all, they make a case against the Rostowian economist theory of development and democratization. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that virtually no "not-free" states are wealthy, thus the importance of economic development for democratization should not of course be ignored.

The second developmental theory, that of the culturalist model, is more difficult to assess objectively. Particularly in the case of China, with a 2000-year-old Confucian cultural tradition, the argument that the traditional, even feudalist, authoritarian culture, constituted such a heavy burden and left such a deep imprint on the psycho-cultural structure of the Chinese people that to destroy "Confucian shop", as the slogan of the May Fourth Movement advocated, and to cultivate new modern, Western democratic attitudes and value and belief systems is (if not impossible) certainly very difficult, is a powerful culturalist argument. From Karl Marx's concept of the "Asiatic mode of production", Max Weber's "familistic state" and Karl Wittfogel's "oriental despotism", to Lucian Pye's paternalistic authoritarian

Table 1 Freedom in the World

<i>Key</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>	<i>Freedom ratings</i>
Not free states				
1	Afghanistan	7	7	7.0
2	Albania	7	6	6.5
6	Angola	7	7	7.0
28	Brunei	6	5	5.5
30	Burma (Myanmar)	7	7	7.0
31	Burundi	7	6	6.5
102	Cambodia	7	7	7.0
32	Cameroon	6	6	6.0
37	Central African Republic	6	5	5.5
38	Chad	7	6	6.5
41	China (PRC)	7	7	7.0
47	Congo	6	6	6.0
50	Cuba	7	7	7.0
54	Djibouti	6	5	5.5
61	Equatorial Guinea	7	7	7.0
62	Ethiopia	7	7	7.0
74	Ghana	6	5	5.5
82	Guinea	6	5	5.5
83	Guinea-Bissau	6	5	5.5
92	Iran	6	5	5.5
93	Iraq	7	7	7.0
103	Kenya	6	6	6.0
105	Korea (N)	7	7	7.0
107	Kuwait (OCC)	7	7	7.0
108	Laos	7	7	7.0
109	Lebanon	6	5	5.5
110	Lesotho	6	5	5.5
111	Liberia	7	7	7.0
112	Libya	7	7	7.0
118	Malawi	7	6	6.5
120	Maldives	6	5	5.5
121	Mali	6	5	5.5
125	Mauritania	7	6	6.5
134	Mozambique	6	6	6.0
143	Niger	6	5	5.5
150	Oman	6	6	6.0
161	Qatar	7	5	6.0
163	Rumania	6	5	5.5

Table 1 (Cont.)

<i>Key</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>	<i>Freedom ratings</i>
164	Rwanda	6	6	6.0
172	Saudi Arabia	7	6	6.5
174	Seychelles	6	6	6.0
178	Somalia	7	7	7.0
183	Sudan	7	7	7.0
188	Syria	7	7	7.0
189	Tanzania	6	5	5.5
191	Togo	6	6	6.0
202	United Arab Emirates	7	7	7.0
209	Vietnam	7	7	7.0
216	Zaire	6	6	6.0
Partly free states				
3	Algeria	4	4	4.0
14	Bahrain	6	5	5.5
15	Bangladesh	5	5	5.0
20	Benin	6	4	5.0
22	Bhutan	6	5	5.5
29	Bulgaria	3	4	3.5
35	Cape Verde Island	5	5	5.0
45	Colombia	3	4	3.5
46	Comoros	5	5	5.0
59	Egypt	5	4	4.5
60	El Salvador	3	4	3.5
65	Fiji	6	4	5.0
70	Gabon	4	4	4.0
81	Guatemala	3	4	3.5
84	Guyana	5	4	4.5
85	Haiti	4	4	4.0
91	Indonesia	6	5	5.5
98	Ivory Coast	6	4	5.5
101	Jordan	5	5	5.0
116	Madagascar	4	4	4.0
119	Malaysia	5	4	4.5
128	Mexico	4	4	4.0
131	Mongolia	4	4	4.0
133	Morocco	4	4	4.0
136	Nepal	4	4	4.0
142	Nicaragua	3	3	3.0

Table 1 (Cont.)

Key	Country	Political rights	Civil liberties	Freedom ratings
144	Nigeria	5	5	5.0
151	Pakistan	4	4	4.0
152	Panama	4	2	3.0
154	Paraguay	4	3	3.0
155	Peru	3	4	3.5
156	Philippines	3	3	3.0
171	São Tome/Principe	5	5	5.0
173	Senegal	4	3	3.5
175	Sierra Leone	6	5	5.5
176	Singapore	4	4	4.0
179	South Africa	5	4	4.5
182	Sri Lanka	4	5	4.5
184	Suriname	4	3	3.5
185	Swaziland	6	5	5.5
42	Taiwan	3	3	3.0
193	Tonga	3	3	3.0
196	Tunisia	5	4	4.5
197	Turkey	2	4	3.0
200	Uganda	6	5	5.5
201	USSR	5	4	4.5
73	Yemen	6	5	5.5
215	Yugoslavia	5	4	4.5
217	Zambia	6	5	5.5
218	Zimbabwe	6	4	5.0
Free states				
8	Antigua/Barbuda	3	2	2.5
9	Argentina	1	3	2.0
10	Australia	1	1	1.0
11	Austria	1	1	1.0
13	Bahamas	2	3	2.5
16	Barbados	1	1	1.0
18	Belgium	1	1	1.0
19	Belize	1	1	1.0
23	Bolivia	2	3	2.5
25	Botswana	1	2	1.5
26	Brazil	2	3	2.5
33	Canada	1	1	1.0
40	Chile	2	2	2.0

Table 1 (Cont.)

<i>Key</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Political rights</i>	<i>Civil liberties</i>	<i>Freedom ratings</i>
49	Costa Rica	1	1	1.0
51	Cyprus (G)	1	1	1.0
52	Cyprus (T)	2	2	2.0
223	Czechoslovakia	2	2	2.0
53	Denmark	1	1	1.0
55	Dominica	2	1	1.5
56	Dominican Republic	2	3	2.5
58	Ecuador	2	2	2.0
66	Finland	1	1	1.0
67	France	1	1	1.0
71	Gambia	2	2	2.0
72	Germany	1	2	1.5
76	Greece	1	2	1.5
78	Grenada	2	2	2.0
86	Honduras	2	3	2.5
88	Hungary	2	2	2.0
89	Iceland	1	1	1.0
90	India	2	3	2.5
94	Ireland	1	1	1.0
96	Israel	2	2	2.0
97	Italy	1	1	1.0
99	Jamaica	3	2	2.5
100	Japan	1	1	1.0
104	Kiribati	1	2	1.5
106	Korea (S)	2	3	2.5
114	Luxembourg	1	1	1.0
122	Malta	1	1	1.0
126	Mauritius	2	2	2.0
180	Namibia	2	3	2.5
135	Nauru	1	2	1.5
137	Netherlands	1	1	1.0
141	New Zealand	1	1	1.0
148	Norway	1	1	1.0
153	Papua New Guinea	2	3	2.5
224	Poland	2	2	2.0
159	Portugal	1	2	1.5
166	St Christopher/Nevis	1	1	1.0
167	St Lucia	1	2	1.5
169	St Vincent/Grenadines	1	2	1.5

Table 1 (Cont.)

Key	Country	Political rights	Civil liberties	Freedom ratings
177	Solomon Islands	1	1	1.0
181	Spain	1	1	1.0
186	Sweden	1	1	1.0
187	Switzerland	1	1	1.0
190	Thailand	2	3	2.5
195	Trinidad/Tobago	1	1	1.0
199	Tuvalu	1	1	1.0
203	United Kingdom	1	2	1.5
204	United States	1	1	1.0
206	Uruguay	1	2	1.5
140	Vanuatu	2	3	2.5
208	Venezuela	1	3	2.0
212	Western Samoa	2	2	2.0

Note: The Freedom House assesses both political rights and civil liberties in each country. Points are awarded for each of the freedoms. In the table, countries whose category numbers 1 to 2.5 are considered "free"; 3 to 5.5 "partly free"; and 5.5 to 7 "not free". Those with a category 1 rating come closest to the ideals of the organization while those with a 7 category "include places where political rights are absent or virtually non-existent, due to the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or extreme oppression in combination with war" and where they have "virtually no freedoms".

SOURCE: *The Australian*, 6-7, April 1991, pp. 22-3.

political culture (Fairbank, 1979, pp. 24-28; Pye, 1985, pp. 1-30), Western sinologists have built up a wealth of impressive literature in support of culturalist developmental theory. They have had an immense impact on the political and intellectual elites, from Hu Shih, Chen Duxiu, and their May Fourth generation to the "River Elegy" (*He Shang*) and neo-authoritarianist reformers, and to the 4 June Tiananmen pro-democracy generation as well.

Confucianism, as the foundation of Chinese traditional authoritarian political culture, became the national ideology of imperial China during the Han Dynasty, approximately 200 BC-AD 200. Through an effective, persistent, and consistent education-socialization process, reinforced by meritocratic examination and bureaucracy systems, and supported and

maintained by scholar-official-gentry-class ruling elites, for more than two millennia it has functioned as more than just an effective political ideology. It has indeed become a philosophy as well as a way of life for the Chinese people (Fairbank, 1979, pp. 53–68).

Lucian Pye (1985, p. 61) puts it simply: “Confucianism upheld the ideal that rulers should be exemplary people who possessed greater skills and talents than those they ruled. Out of this belief in rule by the elite grew an imperial bureaucratic system that was one of the great achievements in human history.” He then proceeds to point out that “the basic sociological and psychological patterns of Chinese culture also emphasized stability and order over action and achievement. One of the most extraordinary features of Confucianism was the way in which it elevated government and family to be the two key institutions of society, with each reinforcing the other. . . . Thus Confucianism explicitly directed that children should be taught to have proper respect for all forms of authority.”

Shaped by this total ideology, the Chinese have always made their leaders into larger-than-life figures; they have looked for wise, virtuous and strong leaders to lead them and to solve problems for them. In contemporary China, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, just like their ancient predecessors, Han Gaozu and Tang Taizhong, were regarded by their subjects as “sons of heaven”, “*tian zong ying ming*” (enlightened leaders from heaven). The second important cultural influence is that the Chinese have generally internalized with the conviction that all power should reside in a central authority. That conviction “has been one of the most powerful factors in shaping Chinese history. It has preserved a unitary political system in China, and it has made the Chinese uneasy whenever their cultural world has been sundered by contending political authorities” (Pye, 1985, p. 184).

With the father of the family and the emperor of the middle kingdom psycho-culturally embedded in the Chinese psyche as the same one-and-only highest authority on earth, Chinese paternalistic authoritarian political culture became the most powerful determinant in shaping Chinese political behaviour and the political system.

While accepting the general argument that many elements of traditional Chinese political culture are detrimental to China’s democratization, a “River Elegy” culturalist who has extensively studied works by Pye, He Baogang (1992) points out that some parts of the culture are favourable to democratization; to blame the Confucian culture totally for the failure of democratization in China is not fair, and thus the relations between culture and democracy in China are much more complex than generally argued by scholars in the field, be they Chinese or Western.

CULTURALIST DEMOCRATIZATION

Of course even a convinced "culturalist" like Pye, who believes culture is the best social science theory to explain human behaviour, does not agree with the argument of the "mechanistic culturalists" that, under the strait-jacket of Confucian oriental despotism, East Asians in general and the Chinese in particular could not modernize and democratize their countries. As Pye (1985, p. 55) puts it, that the Confucian tradition presents no barriers to modernization is indicated by the striking successes of Japan, followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, all model examples of "newly industrializing nations". More importantly, by 1990, Japan and South Korea had already become functional democracies and Singapore and Taiwan, in spite of some apparent defects, were on the verge of institutional democratization, with the latter looking a more promising case than the former.

Then the inevitable question must be "why not China?" In his study of Asian political development, when dealing with the relationship between the distinctive political cultures of each Asian society and the policy choices of their respective leaders in seeking modernization, Pye (1985, p. 29) explains:

On this matter there are two diametrically opposed views: one holds that the policies of governments tend in the main to reflect the characteristics and predispositions of their cultures; the other is that leaders can be either wise or foolish in using features of their nation's culture in their strategies of modernization. The first view is highly deterministic and presupposes that policy choices are essentially dictated by cultural predispositions, while the second suggests that there is scope for rational choice, and room for accidents, and therefore the test of government is how skilful leaders are in taking advantage of, and avoiding the obstacles inherent in, the basic characteristics of their national cultures.

He indicates that, on balance, his study will be tilted toward the second. This book will try to demonstrate that in the Chinese case the first view seems to explain better China's developmental approach and experience in the past seventy years, while in the Taiwanese case the second better fits the way political elites have dealt with their democratization problems for the past forty years.

This book will argue that, for seventy years since the May Fourth Movement, most, if not all, Chinese intellectual political elite's modernization-democratization attempts have been largely dictated and determined by the

characteristics and predispositions of Chinese Confucian authoritarian political culture. Therein lie their continuous frustrations and failures.

THE MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT

For Chinese intellectuals, the May Fourth Movement started the real, intensive and extensive push for Westernization, democratization and modernization in China. Motivated by furious anti-foreignism and the strong new nationalism, students and scholars from Beijing, Qinghua and other universities, led by Chen Duxiu, Hu Shih, Li Dazhao, Cai Yuanpei, Lu Xun and others, tried to destroy, once and for all, the Confucian old China and to create an industrialized, modernized and democratized new China. Their catch-cries were "Mr S" (Science) and "Mr D" (Democracy). However, the May Fourth Movement was much more a "New Culture", "New Literature", or new enlightenment movement than it was a democracy movement.

Moreover, the "Mr D" of the May Fourth generation was much more a culturalist than an institutionalist democracy. What May Fourth intellectuals and students proposed was to cultivate, educate and socialize the Chinese people with new democratic culture, attitudes, beliefs and values, rather than to revolutionize the traditional authoritarian Confucian political system by establishing new democratic, rational, legal and institutional political structures and processes. As Chow Tse-tsung (1960, pp. 358-9) explains it:

The May Fourth Movement was actually a combined intellectual and sociopolitical movement to achieve national independence, the emancipation of the individual, and a just society by the modernization of China. Essentially, it was an intellectual revolution in the broad sense, intellectual because it was based on the assumption that intellectual changes were a prerequisite for such a task of modernization, because it precipitated a mainly intellectual awakening and transformation, and because it was by the intellectuals. . . . The most important purpose of the movement was to maintain the existence and independence of the nation, a goal which had actually generated all of the major reforms and revolutions in China since the latter half of the nineteenth century.

From the beginning, many intellectuals, including the liberal Westernizers led by Hu Shih, the radicals or "leftists" led by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao,

and the reformists in between led by Liang Qichao, were reluctant to become involved in political affairs, or even to talk politics. As Chow (1960, p. 222) points out, "This was true even in the case of Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu), who was so much disappointed by warlordism and the old bureaucracy that he thought at this time the hope of saving China lay not in political action but in a cultural renovation of the entire nation."

At the other end of the continuum, the liberals' abhorrence of practical politics was based "on the one hand upon their pessimistic views of the warlord and bureaucratic government, and on the other upon their assumption that political reforms could be achieved only after a social and cultural transformation which must be promoted by way of education" (Chow, 1960, p. 223). In the middle of the continuum, Liang Qichao and his supporters in the *Jinpu dang* (Progressive Party), whilst appreciating the importance of "political movement" but not institutionalist democratization, were still very much constrained by culturalist determinism. Liang "realized that to nurture a political movement in a country without freedom of speech and assembly and among a people largely illiterate would engender the following dangers: The movement might be manipulated by politicians and political parties for their own ends." He believed the majority of the people would not be interested in politics, "Or if they did join it, it would be dominated by mob emotion and not by rational considerations." For these reasons, he thought "it seemed better to build first a foundation for future political reform by way of a cultural movement or of an economic and social reform movement" (Chow, 1960, pp. 226-7).

John K. Fairbank (1979, pp. 232-3) puts it simply:

The scholars of this revolutionary generation debated and discussed the application of Western ideas to China's ancient culture. Hu Shih stood for critical attitude toward all things and the necessity of persistent, long-term efforts to change Chinese thinking bit by bit, solving problems, not marching to slogans. Ch'en Tu-hsiu (Chen Duxiu), in the name of human rights and social equality, attacked Confucianism. Like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (Liang Qichao), these scholars pointed the way toward an ethical revolution at the very roots of China's ancient society.

According to Fairbank (1979, pp. 234-5), the startling thing about the movement was that it was led by intellectuals who brought both the new cultural ideas of science and democracy and the new patriotism into a common focus in an anti-imperialist programme. More than ever before, the intellectual and student class assumed responsibility for China's fate. Fairbank says of Lu Xun: "He leaped into prominence only in 1918 by

publishing in *New Youth* his satire 'The Dairy of a Madman', who finds between the lines of 'benevolence, righteousness, truth, virtue' in his history book two words repeated everywhere: 'Eat men'."

In subsequent years the radicals, led by Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Lu Xun and others, with Mao Zedong the late-comer, were attracted by Lenin and his Russian October Revolution. Although supported by the Comintern, they began to call for more militant political involvement and action – including forming and joining the CCP; most of them had gone through long personal struggles under the cultural deterministic dark clouds. Just as the internecine warlordism had divided China, so the intellectuals also quickly degenerated into nihilistic cultural and ideological squabbles and splits in the period between 1919 and 1927, when the KMT under Chiang Kai-shek managed to purge the Communists and, by reaching accommodation with the northern warlords, attained a nominal national unification.

In terms of institutionalist democratization, both Sun Yat-sen and Chen Duxiu had missed an opportunity to establish a meaningful two-party democratic political system in China in the early 1920s before Sun's death in 1925. Instead, they wanted the two parties to merge into one. But by the time Chiang's militarist forces got the support of some liberals, achieved control of the KMT, began his Northern Expedition, and purged the Communists in Shanghai in 1926, it was too late for either Liang Qichao's or Chen Duxiu's intellectual followers to start any functional-institutional democratization process in China. This was a great pity for when the meaningful democratic party system, particularly the two-party system, failed to materialize, the earlier appearance of democratic local elections, which have been impressively researched and documented by John H. Fincher (1981), became meaningless. Pye (1985, p. 188) notes: "For all of Fincher's sympathetic account of efforts at widespread local elections, the fact remains that the democratic movement failed in China; it failed because the culture favored a centralized form of power."

Because of that failure, over the next two decades, Chiang Kai-shek with his KMT and Mao Zedong with his CCP, became more and more like Han Gaozu, Tang Taizhong, Ming Taizu, and other dynastic founders, whose struggle was to overthrow the previous dynasty and annihilate any political opponents, to create their own "mandate of heaven" and to establish their own "Middle Kingdom". In a fundamental Confucian Chinese way, there was no room for democratic party politics in their psycho-cultural frame of mind. Between Chiang and Mao there could only be one "son of heaven"; one of them had to be proven to be only a pretender and eliminated. When Chiang was militarily and politically more powerful in the 1930s, he would not tolerate Mao and wanted intensely to get rid of

Mao and his Communists before he would fight the invading Japanese. In the late 1940s, when the tables had turned and, both militarily and politically, Mao had become more powerful, he would not tolerate and accept Chiang and his Nationalists either. In the Confucian heaven, there just could not be two suns. Although some "third force" independent intellectuals did try to mediate and talk Chiang and Mao into accepting each other, their effort was futile. The "court scholars" on both sides, on the other hand, were too busy trying to justify and rationalize either the Nationalist or the Communist ideology and "mandate of heaven" so that very little, if anything at all, of institutionalist democracy was on their minds. Even less was it seen and advocated as a viable alternative to China's civil war and a solution for its internecine political struggles.

"THE ABORTIVE REVOLUTION"

Most liberal intellectuals joined or supported the new central polity in Nanking set up by Chiang Kai-shek, hoping that the new Nationalist government would unify and make China strong to meet the emerging militarist threat from Japan. During the ten-year (1927–37) Republican period, Chen Duxiu was expelled from the CCP and Li Dazhao died in 1927. Other radical leftists spent their lives aimlessly in Shanghai's foreign concessions in the early 1930s and then made the clandestine trip to Yanan to join Mao's Communist revolution, after the historic Long March, in the late 1930s, whilst the liberals withdrew even further into their futile "cultural renaissance" wilderness, failing totally not only in their new cultural movement but even more in their hope of bringing liberal democracy to China.

Because of the incompatibility between the content and form of their liberal political doctrine and the political culture of China in the 1920s and 1930s, personal factors, the specific traits of liberalism which made it unsuitable for the social and historic conditions then prevailing in Republican China, or simply because of the immense authoritarian political pressure from Chiang Kai-shek's despotic rule, the liberals, led by Hu Shih, Lo Lonqi, Ting Wenjiang, Fu Sinian, Zhang Boling, and Jiang Menglin, most of them famous professors of Beijing University who had been involved in the May Fourth Movement, went as far as to vow to abstain from any further engagements in political activities and to concentrate on scientific and educational tasks instead (Halbeisen, 1988, p. 1). Although they, particularly Hu, still believed China needed democracy, the May

Fourth generation of liberal scholars felt at the time that unity of the nation, "unity of thought" and stable and strong government were more important than individual freedom, freedom of the press and other human and political rights advocated by Western liberal democrats. As Halbeisen (1988, pp. 8–11) notes, "All intellectuals shared a deep dislike of politics as a form of struggle for power. . . . They rejected the programs of all political parties in China." At the time, very little common understanding could be found among the liberal intellectuals concerning the role and importance of political parties, and most were barely willing to concede that parties might have some useful functions. The liberal intellectuals as a group had only very hazy ideas concerning the workings and the structures of different forms of government. Although they were in favour of democracy, very little attention was given to explaining its characteristics and procedures. The intricacies of a democratic system were reduced to the act of voting, an act that was presented by Hu Shih as being more of a process of adult education than a decision as to the composition of national government.

Hu Shih did advocate a national parliament as a political institution to create "public loyalty" and achieve national unification. However, his parliament was for only a limited number of highly qualified members specially selected, an institution comprising the intellectual cream of the nation rather than the representatives of political or economic interests. His "primary stage" of democracy in China was merely an elitist "guided democracy" of the sort later quite popular in post-Second World War third-world countries. Indeed, some of the liberal intellectuals thought China needed not only an elitist political system but an enlightened dictatorship, a sentiment to be echoed half a century later in post-Mao China by the neo-authoritarianists.

Lloyd E. Eastman (1974) reaches basically the same conclusion and calls the attempts of Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT and Hu Shih and his liberal intellectuals to modernize China an "abortive revolution". Eastman's in-depth study of the Nationalist Nanking government from 1927 to 1937 finds two powerful anti-democratic political and ideological dimensions in Chiang Kai-shek's despotic rule. The first one was a continuation, or rather an extension, of Chiang's anti-Communist purge into the leftist as well as liberal intellectual elite. Assassinations, midnight arrests, prison tortures and summary executions as means of political persecution were extensively used by the Nationalist secret agents against dissident writers and professors. The "white" terror was so prevalent in the early 1930s that Soong Qingling, widow of Sun Yat-sen and sister-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, was angered to the point that she formed a Chinese League for the

Protection of Civil Rights to fight against the indiscriminate persecutions of intellectuals. The League included avowed leftists like Lu Xun, Harold Issacs and Agnes Smedley, as well as liberal scholars such as Lin Yutang, Jiang Menglin and, of course, Hu Shih and Cai Yuanpei, the influential president of Beijing University. On 18 June 1933, Yang Qun, secretary of the League, was gunned down in broad daylight before the gates of the highest academic institution in China, the Academia Sinica, by KMT assassins. After that, the League was forced to disband and the dissident intellectuals were effectively, though not permanently, silenced.

The second dimension of political reality was the world-wide resurgence of ideological authoritarianism and political dictatorship in the aftermath of the Great Depression. In China, in addition to the prevailing economic and cultural factors, the total failure of the half-hearted attempt at democratization in post-1911 China had further damaged, if not completely eliminated, the prospects for institutionalist democracy. The intellectuals' disillusionment with farcical, mostly pseudo-democratic, elections, concepts like the separation of power or the functions of parliament, and the political activities of the *Beiyang* (Northern Warlord) government, was understandable. However, their rationalization that such failure was inevitable because China had attempted to institute democratic government before the Chinese people had been prepared for the responsibilities of democracy was certainly not convincing. The views expressed by highly respected scholars such as Liang Shuming, a famous philosopher and reformer, and Wu Jingchao, a prominent sociologist at Qinghua University, should be noted. Most were critical of the KMT government but nevertheless warned that inauguration of democratic rule in China at this time would further weaken the nation and increase instability. Wu Jingchao cautioned that "another premature and disastrous experiment with democratic institutions, like that after 1912, would provoke such a popular reaction that it would be difficult in the future – when cultural conditions had improved – to institute democracy" (Eastman, 1974, p. 143).

Scholars like Jiang Tingfu (Tsiang Ting-fu), a well-known professor at Qinghua University and later Nationalist ambassador to the UN, and Qian Duansheng, a Harvard-trained political scientist, were even more direct and vocal in their open support of Liang Qichao's enlightened despotism, the benevolent dictatorship. Jiang said that China could be transformed into a modern nation only by means of "personal dictatorship". As a historian, he argued that the long autocracy in China had not fulfilled its historical function of creating the basis for a modern nation because of "special circumstances", which he did not specify. He insisted that because history had once failed China, China now had again to traverse the

historical stage of government by a personal despot. He even admitted, "I do not demand that this government be enlightened, although the more enlightened it is the better." In Eastman's view (1974, p. 145), Jiang's political weariness and despair were characteristic of virtually all Chinese intellectuals at the time, although Zhang Hung, a former student of Hu Shih, would explain that the despotism he envisioned "must not be a barbaric despotism, lawless despotism . . . a stop-freedom-of-speech despotism, but an enlightened despotism, a meaningful despotism, a put-public-welfare-first despotism". Qian Duansheng also said, "What I call a totalitarian state must have a dictator . . . who had ideals, who plans for the real benefit of the people." As will be further discussed in the following chapter, in many ways these despotic intellectuals of the 1930s sounded remarkably like the neo-authoritarian intellectuals of the late 1980s. "To save the nation" and "to make China strong" were their foremost concerns, while institutional democracy, freedom and human rights were very low in their priorities. Initially, liberal democrats such as Hu Shih did express reservations and even voiced criticisms against Jiang Tingfu and Qian Duansheng. But increasingly they found that, while some of their more radical colleagues were persecuted and thus effectively silenced by the KMT's oppressive measures, most of their moderate fellow liberals either changed their minds or toed the Nationalist line for various reasons, or simply withdrew into the voiceless ivory tower again as hundreds, if not thousands, of Qu Yuans had done in Chinese history in the past.

QU YUAN AND CHINESE REMONSTRATORS

Qu Yuan was born in 343 BC, during the period of Warring States. He was an official of the state of Chu, one of the major kingdoms of the period. The state of Qin sent Zhang Yi as an emissary to persuade King Huai of Chu to cut ties with the state of Qi. If King Huai accepted the proposal, Qin would give Chu 600 *li* of land around the place called Shang Yu. It was a Qin plot to divide and eventually conquer Chu and Qi. Qu Yuan pleaded the king not to go ahead with the deal. King Huai ignored his plea and severed relations with Qi. Afterward, when Chu demanded Qin to fulfill its promise, Qin refused. Chu sent troops to attack Qin but was defeated by the combined forces of Qin and Qi.

Later when Zhang Yi and other court officials of Chu tried to arrange a meeting between the kings of Chu and Qin to settle their differences, Qu Yuan again saw the sinister nature of the arrangement and remonstrated

against the planned meeting. His advice was again ignored. King Huai went to the meeting and was forced by Qin to sign an "unequal treaty" to cede his land to Qin. King Huai was taken prison and later died in Qin.

King Huai's son, Qing Xiang, was also surrounded by disloyal and corrupt officials and was very irresponsible in dealing with state affairs. Qu Yuan continued to remonstrate and urge the new king to reform and take good care of the people. The king treated Qu's advices as nuisances and irritations, and had him exiled to a remote region in southern China. For years, Qu Yuan wrote many poems to express his worries and concerns about the future of his kingdom. One of his poems is the immortal *Li Shao*. When he heard the news that the capital of Chu had fallen and his people had been massacred, he was so saddened that he drowned himself in the Mi Lo River on the fifth day of the fifth month of the Chinese lunar year, in 278 BC.

Qu Yuan has since become the most revered Confucian scholar-remonstrator in Chinese history. The day of his drowning has become the famous Dragon Boat Festival, one of the most celebrated festivals that has been part of Chinese life for more than two thousand years.

In the first half of the 1940s, whilst fighting a national war against Japan, most intellectuals, even the radical ones, supported or acquiesced in Chiang Kai-shek's despotism. The liberal intellectuals' acceptance of traditional Chinese authoritarianism certainly played into the hands of Chiang Kai-shek when, in the early 1940s, he started his "New Life Movement" to revive neo-Confucianism in China to try to rationalize and consolidate his personalistic-paternalistic despotic government.

Once the Sino-Japanese war started in 1937, and with the KMT government moved to Chongqing and the CCP led by Mao settled down in Yanan, the ideas of "Mr S" and "Mr D" of the May Fourth Movement had become, if not completely irrelevant, at least rather remote and unimportant in the minds of the KMT, the CCP and the intellectuals associated with each party. In the next decade, while the liberals were increasingly isolated and alienated by the despotic and corrupt Nationalist administration, the radical leftists, who had gone to Yanan, under the "revolutionary" cultural policy of Mao's 1942 "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art", did not do much better or attain much more in terms of individual freedom, freedom of speech, the press and creativity. In turn, they paid even less attention to, and achieved even less, institutionalist democratization. Mark Selden's (1971), or rather Mao's, "Yanan Way" of "New Democratic politics," although evidencing mass participatory democratic features, had more to do with Maoist "united front" politics to consolidate his power and the CCP dictatorship than with real electoral democracy.

The Maoist Yanan Way did not really allow anti-Marxist, anti-Maoist political dissent and opposition, and Mao's experimental local elections in the Shan-Gan-Ning border region did not permit an opposition party or parties to challenge the dictatorship of the CCP, the vanguard of the proletariat.

As soon as the Second World War ended in 1945, a civil war commenced that was essentially a dynastic power struggle between two dictatorial parties led by two basically traditional Chinese authoritarian leaders, Chiang and Mao. There was little possibility that the two charismatic despots would allow "two suns in the sky" and democratically accept each other, thereby creating an institutionalized two-party system in China. The Marshall mediation was doomed to failure from the very beginning. Chinese intellectuals, either on the right or left, were unable to produce a meaningful "third force" as advocated and attempted by liberal democrats, Hu Shih, Zhang Junmai (Carson Chang), Zuo Shunsheng, and others. In his interesting investigation of the Chinese Youth Party led by Zeng Qi, Li Huang, Zuo Shunsheng and Chen Qitian, Edmund S. K. Fung (1991) sought to point out that between 1937 and 1949, the liberal democratic intellectuals of the Chinese Youth Party had attempted to establish a sort of "loyal opposition" party that would be a "loyal friend" to the Nationalist government, which would "criticize, exhort, and persuade" and at the same time would be an alternative government. In Fung's view (1991, p. 261), the Chinese Youth Party "opened up the possibility of changing the political system by working within it" which was an alternative to class war and armed struggle at a time when Chinese life was steeped in violence and when the minor parties were unable to compete for power with the two major parties (the KMT and the CCP). And it was both organized and unorganized: organized in the sense that political action was taken and unorganized in the sense that it did not seek either to replace the government in the short or medium term, or to challenge the right of the KMT to exercise political authority, provided there was a real role of the minor parties in the political processes.

Fung quoted at length throughout his work Chen Qitian's writings on democracy. In a Laskian (1930) sense, Chen seemed to make some democratic sense on paper. However, except to the extent it was a "friend" of the KMT, there was little chance his "loyal opposition" party formula would work. The war was one of the reasons. More importantly, the Chinese Youth Party was such a narrow elitist intellectual party that it lacked any meaningful popular support and, thus, from the very beginning it accepted the dominant party model and did not really try to get mass support and to challenge the authoritarian rule of the KMT. In short, the

Chinese Youth Party, just like its cousin the Democratic Socialist Party, was an oppositionist democratic party only in theory, not in practice. Even Fung (1991, pp. 281–2) admits, during the period the democratic reforms suggested by the Youth and other parties were all eventually rejected by the KMT, and as early as 1941 when the KMT–CCP conflict intensified, the minor parties, in spite of their united action to form a “third force” to mediate, failed to bring the two protagonists together. “This spelled the end of a third force in Republican politics.”

After the second Chinese civil war, having retreated with the Nationalists to Taiwan, the Youth Party, led by Chen Qitian for many years (Li Huang and Zou Shunsheng having stayed in Hong Kong for more than two decades – Li later in the 1980s did go to Taiwan to pick up his co-chairmanship of the party), became a political “flower vase” in the totally new Taiwanese political environment and completely irrelevant. Fung asserts that in the late 1930s, the efforts of the Youth Party to project itself as a loyal democratic opposition, particularly Chen Qitian’s ideas, were more than just remonstrance in the traditional Confucian sense. They amounted to meaningful modern democratic party politics. The facts seemed to suggest otherwise. In more ways than one, the Youth Party failed to be a substantive functional–institutional oppositionist party. All that Chen Qitian had written was only a culturalist democratization proposal. He and his colleagues were less than the Qu Yuan sort of remonstrators. In Taiwan, for four decades, both Chen Qitian and Li Huang did not even attempt to be other Qu Yuans; they and their party did nothing to democratize the ROC political system in Taiwan. Totally subsidized by and dependent on the Nationalist regime, they, just like their counterparts, the so-called “*minzhu dangpai*” (democratic parties and factions) on the Chinese mainland, have been political parasites upon the KMT authoritarian government.

Although Zhang Junmai and his fellow intellectuals, with reluctant support from Chiang Kai-shek, did manage to write the 1947 ROC Constitution and the Nanjing government did follow this up by staging a series of rather farcical elections to produce the first ROC constitutional parliament. The CCP, which was fighting a civil war with the Nationalists, boycotted the stage-managed political manoeuvre and the whole exercise to build a democratic constitutional government was doomed to failure from the start. The civil war ended in 1949 with Mao, standing on Tiananmen, declaring the birth of his PRC and Chiang, totally defeated and humiliated, retreating to Taiwan to continue his discredited “mandate of heaven” to rule the “whole China”. It was only the “untimely” Korean war that prevented Mao from crossing the Taiwan Straits and pushing Chiang and his demoralized army and government into the Pacific Ocean.

THE MAO-DENG DYNASTY

In Mao's New China, his New Democracy in the early 1950s was merely a rerun of the united front politics of the Yanan Way. Intellectuals who were not CCP members were allowed to exercise their "democratic" rights by maintaining, forming, or joining the eight "democratic parties" which officially supported the CCP dictatorship and were meant to play the role of "loyal friends of the party" and to contribute to the national construction by "political consultative process". Their leaders were appointed to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, chaired by Zhou Enlai, and their "democratic parties" were financed and controlled by the CCP's department of united front. For the next four decades, the "democratic parties", including a KMT Revolutionary Committee and a Taiwan Self-Government Alliance, have continued to play the same "flower vase" decorative role, without any democratic meaning or effect. During the political relaxation periods, such as the 1956 Hundred Flowers Campaign and the 1978-88 "four modernizations" open and reform period, they did play a sort of reformist advisory, though not oppositionist, role and tried to help the CCP carry out some reform programmes. However, in the periods of tension, such as the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, they inevitably suffered the rage of the radical Maoists or the rampaging Red Guards and were purged. So far as the Maoists or Dengists were concerned, so long as they adhered to their "united front" supportive role, they were useful and thus would be allowed to play their minor parts in the CCP political games. As M. D. Fletcher (1989, p. 48) puts it, in 1988 all eight democratic parties held national congresses that were highly publicized. However, many members of the parties were also members of the CCP and many of the rest were by then very old. They had never presented any threat to the ruling power of the CCP and were even less of a threat now. Therefore, even after the 4 June incident, a role for the aging democratic parties was still envisioned, confirming the old "united front" context in which their participation was originally perceived. The harmless nature of these organizations is attested to by the rapid reassurance of continued participation they were given by the CCP after the events of June 1989.

In a detailed study of the "democratic parties," James D. Seymour (1987) concludes that they are neither democratic nor parties, although they do perform some political functions, such as "broadening privileges at the top rather than at the bottom", that may have made China less authoritarian.

Mao's Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist Campaigns and the Cultural Revolution saw the suffering and persecution of the intellectuals, most of

them for merely trying to exercise their limited basic human rights of freedom of thought and speech. The two rectification campaigns were similar in nature to the literary purge of revolutionary writers such as Wang Shiwei in Yanan in 1942. Most of the radical intellectuals who had gathered around Lu Xun in Shanghai in the 1930s to form the leftist literary circle joined the CCP and went to Yanan during the long anti-Japanese war. Most were committed communist revolutionaries, although some of them at times did not agree with Maoist mass-line literary policy and even resented the rigid party control of their creative life by Mao's literary czar, Zhou Yang.

Disagreements with Zhou Yang's thirty-year domination in the Chinese Communist literary and artistic circle did at times flare up into "line struggles" and political purges. However, the literary dissent by these revolutionary writers and the subsequent political purges against them had nothing to do with political dissent, even less opposition to CCP rule. The most famous literary dissidents in this long period who were purged were Wang Shiwei in 1942, Xiao Jun in 1948, Feng Xuefeng in 1954 and 1957, Hu Feng in 1955, Ai Qing and Ding Ling in 1957, and He Qifang in 1959 and 1960. They were the best literary talents of their times, revolutionary writers who supported radical Marxist ideology. Yet because they did not agree with the CCP's rigid control and wanted more creative freedom, they were all harshly persecuted and purged. In her study of these literary dissidents, Merle Goldman (1971, p. 276) sympathetically points out that their disaffection with Mao's literary policy did not mean they were an organized opposition; that would have required a leadership capable of providing an alternative ideology and able to organize mass support, both of which were impossible in Communist China. In fact, the dissidents were not even united, much less organized, among themselves: "They were unable to find a formula to reconcile the humanistic values they found in Marxism with the restrictive organizational apparatus inherent in the party. Moreover, their moral exhortations and reforming zeal did not inspire any institutional changes within the party." They did unmask the differences between party propaganda on the one hand and the reality of life and art on the other. The integrity of their vision exposed the party's betrayal of truth, stimulated questioning and helped to keep the spirit of inquiry alive. However, in the end, in spite of their Western Marxist worldview, they acted more like a Chinese Confucian Qu Yuan than any Western literary dissident. They were not political oppositionists, even less oppositionist democratizers.

What the intellectuals had done during the twenty-seven-year rule of Mao had nothing to do with culturalist, even less institutionalist, democratization

of China. Even after having been treated by the Maoist Red Guards in the most inhuman way, intellectuals like Liu Binyan, Fei Xiaotong, Ba Jin, Ding Ling, Zhou Yang and others, continued to express their "second kind of loyalty" to Mao, Deng Xiaoping and their Communist Party (Liu, 1985). Lao She, the most respected literary giant in the post-Lu Xun China, was already more than eighty years old when he was brutally persecuted by the Maoist Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution. When he jumped into a lake in a Beijing suburb in 1968 and drowned himself, just like Qu Yuan more than two thousand years before, he was reported to have said: "The Party understands me."

Liu Binyan's "*Di Er Zhong Zhongcheng*" (the second kind of loyalty), which was originally published in the *Fazhi Wenxue* (*Legalist Literature*, May 1985), was a unique piece of contemporary Chinese literature. As the most famous and influential investigative reporter who had suffered numerous bitter purges, particularly during the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, and had been twice expelled from the party, Liu's long unwavering faith in Marxist ideology, the communist revolution, Chairman Mao and the CCP was incredible and can be understood only in the context of traditional feudalistic paternalistic Confucian social and human relationships.

LIU BINYAN'S "SECOND KIND OF LOYALTY"

Liu's article uses more than thirty thousand colourful Chinese characters to describe two men, Chen Shizhong and Ni Yuxian, and how they respectively expressed their intellectual remonstrators' loyalty, what Liu called "the second kind of loyalty", to Mao, Deng, the CCP, and the Chinese Communist revolution. In the mid-1950s, Chen Shizhong was a promising young orphan who performed well in Shanghai's high school and communist youth league, and consequently was selected to be sent to Moscow to further his studies. In Moscow he became the chairman of the Chinese students association, won many awards, and in 1960 graduated with highest honours. With great expectations, he returned to China only to find that Maoist China had split with Khrushchev's Soviet Union, and that a "leftist" tendency now dominated part of the CCP leadership. He was extremely worried and in 1963 wrote a letter to Chairman Mao and asked him to be careful in his domestic and foreign policies. He advised Mao not to make mistakes that would make the enemy happy and the friend sad. After two months without a reply from the chairman, he wrote an article,

"A Critique on the CCP Centre's Proposal on the General Line of International Communism", and brought it to Beijing. He was arrested on a charge of "active counterrevolution" and that abruptly ended his promising future. In jail, he wrote slogans on his prison cell walls: "Long Live Marxism-Leninism!"; "Long Live Communism!"; and "Long Live the Solidarity of Brotherly Parties and Youth Leagues!"

In 1964, whilst in jail, Chen Shizhong again wrote a "*jian dang*" (literally advice or remonstrance to the party) letter to Chairman Mao. In the letter, he began by saying: "I do not know if I will die or not. Nevertheless, I decide to ignore my situation and make my last honest and loyal advice to you. I am a man who has committed serious mistakes. I wrote an article defending the Soviet Union at the important juncture of the Sino-Soviet dispute." He went on to say: "I am, however, still a young intellectual who has been raised up by the party. All I have is given to me by the party. I have a deep and strong affection for the party and I will always sacrifice myself for the party's Communist construction. Therefore, after having admitted my mistakes, I would regard the party's affairs as most important and would like to give you some comradely criticism and filial kind of advice." He sharply pointed out that the CCP centre was making a fundamental error in creating a personality cult around the Chairman. He accused Mao of intolerance of criticism. "In essence, you *lao ren jia* (old master) do not allow others to criticize your shortcomings or mistakes. If someone makes some criticism concerning the principles, you immediately get angry and start a cruel purge against him. That way, who dares to speak truth any more? In the end, you will not have anyone to correct your mistakes and will have only little yes-men around. You will end up like Stalin. . . . Without the liberation of China by the Communist Party and you Chairman Mao, I, Chen Shizhong, as an orphan would have died long time ago in freezing cold or hunger in the street. I keep telling myself that I really have no reasons to be against you. What I am against is only your *lao ren jia*'s mistakes." At the end of the letter, he added: "In my life, I have had the great honour of meeting you *lao ren jia* three times. When writing this letter in jail, I have dreamt you four times. I deeply remember you."

After serving an eight-year prison term, he was sent to a corrective farm in bleak northeast China for another six years. In the jail and on the farm, he continued to fight injustice and to help many of his inmates to survive the harsh punishment. In 1977, he was allowed to return to work in Harbin. He worked hard and eventually became a lecturer in a workers' university. With his tainted background, he inevitably continued to suffer political persecution. Still, he did not give in to the pressure and persisted in seeking

justice for others who had suffered like him. In 1984, in order to bring to trial the soldiers who had murdered one of his fellow inmates at the corrective farm in 1969, after many attempts through regular legal channels had failed, he went to Liu Binyan to seek help. In the liberal open atmosphere of 1985, Liu was able to publicize his "loyalty" story.

Ni Yuxian's story is somewhat different but in essence quite similar. Liu Binyan called Ni another "crazy man". Ni joined the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1960 immediately after he graduated from high school. In the army, he bought and read everything available written by Marx, Engel, Lenin and Mao. However, he was not easily indoctrinated by the CCP propaganda. The great famine caused by the 1959 Great Leap Forward shocked him badly. He investigated the famine and discovered it was not caused by natural disasters as claimed by the party but a man-made calamity created by the party's "extreme leftist" policy. Like Chen Shizhong, as an eighteen-year-old young man, Ni wrote a thirty-page *wan yan* (ten-thousand-character) letter to the CCP and advised the party to change its economic policy. He suggested a massive liberalization programme to let the farmers have more private plots and sell their produce to free markets. He was luckier than Chen Shizhong. He was not persecuted and instead got an honourable discharge. After leaving the PLA, he went to study at the Shanghai Naval College and quickly became a controversial student activist. He organized the students to fight against the indiscriminate purges carried out by rampaging Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. He even tried to lead Shanghai workers to fight against the "Shanghai mafia" headed by Wang Hungwen and Zhang Chunqiao, two of the notorious "Gang of Four". By the time Lin Biao, former minister of defence and heir-apparent to Mao, had become dominant in Chinese politics, Ni did not like the way Lin used the famous little red book, *Quotations of Chairman Mao*, to advance his political ambition and secretly published another little red book, *Quotations of Lenin*, to discredit Lin. This time he was arrested and persecuted badly at the hands of the followers of Lin first, and later by the "Gang of Four".

In 1977, Ni openly advocated the second return to power of Deng Xiaoping and called for an immediate rectification of the 5 April 1976 Tiananmen incident, in which a mass demonstration was spontaneously mounted to commemorate the death of Premier Zhou En-lai in clear defiance of the wishes of the "Gang of Four". He was again arrested and condemned as a "counterrevolutionary". He wrote a letter to Marshall Ye Jianying that probably saved his life. He was released in early 1979 and allowed to go back to work at the library of the Shanghai Naval College. He, however, "did not learn the lesson", according to some of his colleagues.

He continued to make waves and to fight against injustice and bad policies of the party, and thus showed his "second kind of loyalty" to Deng Xiaoping and the CCP.

Liu Binyan concluded his report by saying: "Both Chen Shizhong and Ni Yuxian have suffered a great deal and paid a heavy price for their political struggles. They almost lost their lives. But neither did they withdraw and become passive, nor did they become bitter and hateful because of the wrongs done to them. On the contrary, 'even after nine deaths, they do not regret.' They continue to put aside their personal losses and faithfully maintain their support of the party line set down by the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee. They continue to offer their lives for the four modernizations and the reforms." Liu Binyan explained:

Loyalty like beauty has different kinds. To work hard, accept hardship, obey orders, and have no dissent is one kind of loyalty. One may have to make some personal sacrifices but will be relatively safe and secure. It will not cause trouble. In officialdom, that way, one will climb the ladder step by step. The second kind of loyalty is like what Chen Shizhong and Ni Yuxian have done. People do not like it. Those who try to pursue this kind of loyalty may have to pay for it with their freedom, happiness, and even their precious lives. For many years, the first kind of loyalty has enjoyed special love and attention. With a lot of water and fertilizer, it has grown well. While the second kind of loyalty has been very rare on our political landscape. In our dry and poor soil, that it has survived and not yet become extinct is almost a miracle.

Andrew J. Nathan (1985, p. 25) explains Liu's "second kind of loyalty" in terms of Qu Yuan's remonstrance tradition: under Mao the duty of remonstrance remained, but its exercise became more dangerous than under even the most despotic of the Chinese emperors. According to Mao's "five fear-nots", a party member should speak the truth fearing neither removal from his post, expulsion from the party, imprisonment, divorce, nor "the guillotine". Mao chided his colleagues for treating him too timidly, inviting them to "criticize me day and night" in one speech and insisting elsewhere, "It is right to rebel", a declaration that was to become the loudest war cry in the Cultural Revolution. Yet he also regarded anyone who disagreed with him as a traitor, and millions were accordingly punished as "rightists", "revisionists", and "counterrevolutionaries" in the last twenty years of his rule.

Bearing this heavily in mind remonstrance political culture of Qu Yuan,

Nathan (1985) talks about “Chinese Democracy” in his study of the 1978–81 democracy movement in China. According to Nathan (1985, p. 24), from Wei Jingsheng, Fu Yuehua, Wang Xizhe and Ren Wanding, to Liu Qing, Fu Shenqi, Xu Wenli, Hu Ping and Wang Juntao, all famous democracy fighters, few challenged socialism, Marxism, Maoism or Dengism. “They angrily rejected the label of ‘dissidents’ as implying antagonism to the state. Instead, they saw themselves in a traditional role – as remonstrators, not only loyal to the state but forming an integral part of it.” They formed literary societies and study groups, published “people’s periodicals”, put up impressive wallposters on Xidan Street’s “democracy wall”, demanded freedom of speech and the press and assembly, and even contested the meaningless 1980 local elections for people’s congresses – and won, like Hu Ping and Liang Heng. However, they were at most Liu Binyan’s “second-kind loyalists,” the supporters of the Dengist power struggle against Maoist “whateverists”. They did advocate economic–political reforms; in their writing, they also asked for freedom and democracy. But they were mere culturalist democratizers, not a real democratic political opposition to the CCP dictatorship, even less were they genuine institutionalist democratizers.

Once they had served Deng Xiaoping’s power-struggle purposes, they met their tragic fate:

In October 1979, the government brought Wei Jingsheng to trial on the dual charge of leaking secret information to foreign reporters and publishing counterrevolutionary statements. “Our constitution,” the prosecutor told him, “stipulates that you have freedom of belief, and that you may believe or disbelieve Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, but it also states that you are definitely forbidden to oppose it – for opposition is a violation of the constitution.” Wei was convicted on both charges and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. His appeal was expeditiously rejected. Fu Yuehua, the leader of the January 8 petitions’ demonstration, was also tried in October and sentenced to two years for violation of public order. (Nathan 1985, p. 34)

Nathan (1985, pp. 220–1) found that among more than 2500 county-level elections in 1980, there were dozens of places where democracy activists had participated in the elections. However, in December 1980, Deng Xiaoping began to attack “bourgeois liberalization”, and specified among the targets of concern “illegal organizations and illegal magazines”, which he said were publishing anti-party and anti-socialist ideas and agitating for support. The party ideologist Hu Qiaomu charged: “A small number of

people have abandoned the basic principles of Marxism and spread the prejudices and cherished illusions of bourgeois democracy. They advocate the so-called natural rights favored by bourgeois ideologists and try to practice bourgeois multipartyism and the election contest system in socialist China." To avoid these perceived problems and to assure better arrangement of future elections, the National People's Congress in 1982 adopted several amendments to the election law. These made clear once again the official view of what the limits of Chinese democracy should be: "The voters needed to know only which candidates had a good labour history and a commitment to socialism. They could learn who best embodied these qualities at officially sponsored meetings in the few days just before an election. Democracy did not require the hurly-burly of rallies, wall posters, and question-and-answer forums: elections should not be seen as occasions for contests of ideas. As intended, the 1984 county congress elections were carried on throughout China without a single reported incident of dissent or disruption" (Nathan, 1985, p. 223).

In 1988, after being expelled from the CCP and helped by Harrison Salisbury, Liu Binyan was given permission to leave for a lecture tour in the United States. Even then he did not find the West appealing. He preferred to "spend two years in some remote area of China, perhaps right in the heart of Daxinganling, for during the past few years, I had spent so little time at the grass-roots level". He believed that "it was at that level that all the momentous changes taking place in China were most forcefully reflected, changes that were of historical significance, since they concerned the fate of one billion people" (Liu, 1990, p. 277).

In his memoirs, Liu (1990, p. 278) cites a young writer's reply to his question, "Yes, but what about the political situation?" The writer answered, "I'm just as optimistic about that. Do let me tell you a piece of news. In the recent election of the people's representatives for Lucheng County, all the official candidates were wiped out. It's a real anarchist vacuum there as far as government is concerned. And it happened this way: Lucheng County was scheduled to hold elections last because of the deplorable state of things there. But the delay had only helped fan the flames of democracy among the masses. With the examples of elections in other counties in which many official candidates lost before their eyes, the voters of Lucheng took matters into their own hands and broke the record by voting against all the official candidates."

That was the grass-roots democracy movement that Liu hoped would sweep through China. It sounded really like Mao's mass-line model. Even after he was bitterly shocked by the 4 June Tiananmen massacre, he did not say anything about organized opposition to the CCP and institutionalist

democratization in China. He wanted to read more books to find solutions to China's historic problems.

At a gathering of the Chinese pro-democracy activists at the University of California, Berkeley, in November 1991, Liu Binyan was asked to lead a political party that Yan Jiaqi and his supporters wanted to form. He refused and explained that the time was not ripe for organizing such an opposition party. In addition, Liu spoke to the meeting and expressed his doubts about the applicability of Western democracy to China. His "loyalty" to Marxism-Maoism, although no longer so clearly and strongly committed, was still felt among the conference participants.

In mid-1992, on the eve of the pending integration of two major Chinese pro-democracy organizations in the West, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy and the Federation for a Democratic China, Yan Jiaqi proposed that Liu Binyan should emerge from his "ivory tower" to lead the new movement which he hoped would evolve into a political party, that they would eventually bring back to China to challenge the CCP party dictatorship. Liu again rejected the call.

When Liu Binyan was an influential investigative reporter for the *People's Daily*, Wang Ruoshui was the newspaper's deputy chief editor. Wang (1986) wrote his article on "Defence of Humanism" in 1983 thereby causing Deng Xiaoping, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun and other Maoist ideologists to react violently, calling for Wang's expulsion from the CCP and starting an anti-intellectual "spiritual-pollution" campaign. All that Wang had done was try to explain that humanism is not the exclusive property of bourgeois capitalist society, that Marx was a humanist, and that socialism needs humanism. Liu Binyan together with Fang Lizhi and Wang Ruowang were expelled from the party in early 1987, while Wang Ruoshui was "persuaded" to quit the party in August 1987. They were accused of spreading "spiritual pollution" and creating "bourgeois liberalization".

Both Liu Binyan and Wang Ruoshui joined the CCP in the 1940s and had been faithful Marxist-Maoists ever since, in spite of having gone through the painful rectification campaigns in the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s, based at the *People's Daily*, they emerged to become two of the most influential reformist intellectuals in China. They suffered purges again in 1983 and 1987. Still they supported the 1989 pro-democracy movement. However, they did not really understand the West and Western democracy. They tried to be effective modern Qu Yuans to urge and push the CCP into reform and China into modernity. Their "second kind of loyalty" invariably prevented them from going further than attempting to reform and democratize the party from within.

3 Fang Lizhi and Yan Jiaqi

“CHINA’S SAKHAROV”

In a series of lectures at Beijing, Jiaotong, Tongji, Zhejiang and other universities in late 1986, Fang Lizhi, then vice-president of the Chinese University of Science and Technology, Hefei, Anhui, and world-renowned astrophysicist, suddenly emerged from obscurity to become “China’s Sakharov”, the leading fighter for democracy in China. The messages of Fang’s speeches were simple and straightforward, powerful but sometimes demagogic. He talked about knowledge being higher than authority, of intellectuals as the vanguard of the society, and that China was still a feudalist society. He said that from Marx to Mao socialism had failed, the “four cardinal principles” (upholding Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought, people’s democracy, party dictatorship and the socialist road) should not be a superstitious, authoritarian, or conservative ideology, and the CCP should be reformed. He stressed that China needed pluralism, and that democracy would not be handed down from above. He believed that modernization is not just economic development, and that democracy has to be based on human rights and to start from each individual. He explained that democracy is a political system of separation of power and checks and balances. His strongest condemnation was directed at the corruption and special privileges of the party cadres and government officials, and expressed anger at the soaring prices and poor living standard of the people. He called on Deng Xiaoping to be “China’s George Washington” (Fang, 1987).

Fang always emphasized that he was not a politician but a scientist. Even in his many “political” speeches, he often began with the explanation that when he made a “political” speech, he had never prepared with a written paper as he would have done if it had been an astrophysics lecture. In August 1988, when he visited Australia, he was invited by the *Australian Chinese Herald* to speak to the Chinese community, especially the Chinese students (Chiou, 1989, pp. 241–53). In a Sydney auditorium filled to capacity and with some of the audience standing outside in the rain, Fang Lizhi again repeated his opening note that he had no written paper to deliver, that he had always wanted to be a scientist, never wished to be involved in politics, but had been unwillingly sucked into the political “whirlpool”. For about an hour, he made a rambling speech on “opening and democracy in China” to a captive audience, basically repeating what

he had said to Chinese students in Beijing, Shanghai and other places. What he said made a great deal of political common sense, but there were no specific and concrete democratization programmes. He again emphasized his belief that knowledge was important, intellectuals were the vanguard class of modern society and democracy is the same everywhere in the world. On the question of the importance of knowledge and the leading role intellectuals played in the modern world, although his was scientific and technological knowledge and his intellectual elite were scientists and technologists, he sounded exactly like Confucius when he talked about "great learning", "great way" and "great scholars" more than two thousand years earlier, although Confucius was referring to moral knowledge and virtuous scholars.

On the question of modernization and democratization, he spoke of the ideas of the separation of powers, checks and balances, and political parties in very general and vague terms. He said: "I believe the goal of reforms is clear; that is to become an advanced developed society. We regard the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as advanced countries, because they have attained the following three common characteristics: (1) a strong economy; (2) a high educational standard with more than 30% of the population having tertiary education; and (3) a democratic form of government such as US two-party or Western Europe's multi-party system." He continued to emphasize that China was too poor, and therefore democracy was still a far-away dream that would require everyone in China to work hard to achieve. At present the Chinese people did not know what their rights were and how to fight for their basic civil liberties. The Chinese people did not even have their basic human rights to live, to think, to speak, to travel, and to get education. That was why in China democracy and human rights were inseparable. "Since we went to the university", he said, "our slogans have been that the university is to cultivate the 'tool' of the party and the 'instrument' of class struggle. We are not really human beings. Thus, the first thing we have to do is to declare ourselves human beings. Then we can claim our citizen's rights, be equal with the government leaders, and tell them whatever political rights they have we also have. With that kind of political consciousness, I think the open and reform policies, as well as democratization, will advance forward."

When answering questions from the audience, which lasted more than two hours, Fang Lizhi became very lively, exciting and at times inspiring. The spontaneity and rapport between him and his audience created by his quick wit and colourful language was electrifying. He confirmed the contribution of the 1986-7 student demonstrations. The demonstrations had forced the CCP's 13th Party Congress and the 7th National People's

Congress to hold elections with more candidates than seats and to allow party members to vote against the party and the state. He did not agree with the view that Chinese students who have gone to study overseas should return to China. He said that if the conditions in China did not change and the highly educated graduate students could not apply their talents, they might as well continue to stay overseas to work and to carry out their research. He said: "If the political structure in China does not reform, other socio-economic conditions will not change either. Then, when the younger generation take over the leadership, although they may dress, speak, and think differently from their elders, they will turn out to be the same in essence. That is why it is so important that the new generation, especially the intellectuals, should cultivate new ideas and new political consciousness. That is more important than building a new social system." Again, Professor Fang sounded very much like Professor Hu Shih of the May Fourth Movement.

As regards the Dengist "four cardinal principles", he did not openly advocate their abolition. He merely pointed out that Mao's communism was already different from Deng's, as well as Gorbachev's, communism. The name was the same but the contents could be changed and be totally different. It was just a national symbolism which could mean anything. When asked how to reform the Chinese system which he had so powerfully condemned, he was not very sure but admitted that it would not be easy. He mentioned the need for the democratic process to carry out research on reform programmes and the importance of letting more autonomous socio-economic organizations appear in Chinese society. When asked whether the ownership question was the critical question in China's reforms, he answered: "What we have practiced in China for forty years is not the socialist public ownership of the means of production. Public ownership should mean that everyone has a share of the property. You have a share and I have a share. However, on the Chinese mainland you do not feel that you own a share at all. China's public ownership is not really public ownership. It is the ownership of some leaders. Now we of course need to change that. To change it into private ownership, to make the 'big (CCP leaders) private' ownership into a small but more egalitarian private ownership can only be an improvement." When asked to comment on the concept of "primary stage of socialism", he quoted a joke being widely circulated among the overseas Chinese students: "We have worked hard for forty years; yet when we wake up in the morning we find we have returned to the pre-liberation life." When asked about the successes of Asia's "four little dragons" and whether the dragons' experiences could be applied to China, clearly he did not understand the East Asian developmental

model. He said the conditions of the "four little dragons" (South Korea, Hongkong, Singapore and Taiwan) were so different from China that their modernization experiences could not be applied to China.

Finally, when asked whether he would participate in politics and, since he had been expelled from the CCP, would he contemplate organizing a political party, he laughingly answered: "I would not give up my teaching to go into politics. I have not thought about forming a new political party at this time." He believed that to educate and raise political consciousness among China's youth, according to him not only this new generation but also the next new generation, was the most immediate and important task. After that, political democratization might then be possible in China.

Clearly his refreshing speeches, coupled with his charismatic manner of delivery, had a great impact on students. On 9 December 1986, the students of the Chinese University of Science and Technology marched in the streets of Hefei and shouted the same slogans of freedom and democracy that their predecessors of the May Fourth Movement generation had shouted nearly seventy years earlier. The student demonstrations spread quickly to Beijing, Wuhan, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and other cities. The demands for political reform, freedoms of speech and the press, and control of inflation and improvement of their living condition were the same. They received some sympathetic response from Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the CCP, but not from Deng Xiaoping. The conservatives' reaction was hard and swift. Just about a month later, Hu Yaobang, regarded as too soft on the bourgeois spiritual polluters, was purged and Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan, the three most famous reformist intellectuals at the time, were summarily expelled from the party and relieved of their respective positions.

With Hu's purge, the conservative old guards led by Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun, two Maoist ideologists, embarked on a Cultural Revolution style anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign. However, because Zhao Ziyang, then the premier and a pragmatic reformist, quickly took over the general secretaryship, the reformist liberalization process started by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang in the first half of the 1980s was not seriously frustrated. In fact, under Zhao the process increased pace and developed into a new "hundred flowers" liberalization movement. With fresh and lively new ideas and approaches, Wang Meng, minister of culture, Liu Zaifu, director of the institute of literature, the CASS, and Li Zehou, a famous literary theoretician, spearheaded fundamental ideological-philosophical as well as policy changes on the cultural front. Bao Tong and Chen Yizi, Zhao Ziyang's personal assistants, famous reformist scholars such as Su Shaozhi in Marxism-Leninism, Yan Jiaqi in political science,

Yu Haocheng in law, Li Honglin in economics, Bao Zunxin in Chinese history and culture, and Qin Benli, chief editor of Shanghai's *World Economic Herald*, and the many young liberal, even radical, economists, sociologists and political scientists who wrote for the *Herald*, enthusiastically pushed for substantial economic-political reforms. Before the 4 June Tiananmen blood washed away everything, and particularly in 1988-9, Chinese intellectuals were in a cultural-political "Beijing Spring" that was certainly more colourful, exciting and substantial than its internationally renowned counterpart in Prague twenty years before, even more than its own predecessor, the May Fourth Movement in Beijing almost seventy years earlier.

Although these intellectuals' "hundred flowers" reformist voices had made a great impact on Chinese intellectuals, particularly on young students, and even persuaded Zhao Ziyang and his reformists to pursue some substantial economic, cultural, and even some political reform programmes, most of them were really only Dengist remonstrators, with a strong "second kind of loyalty" to the CCP and the socialist-communist revolution, and in the end they were only culturalist liberalizers, not culturalist, even less institutionalist, democratizers.

POLITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORM

Most observers would probably agree that the Dengist "four modernizations", initiated in the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, had achieved remarkable success in their initial stage, 1979-83, when the household responsibility contract system was widely implemented in the Chinese countryside. However, when in 1984 Deng tried to extend the economic reforms from the countryside to the city, he immediately faced resistance, reluctance and even opposition, particularly in the large state enterprises, from party cadres and government officials whose vested power and interests were threatened by the reforms. The modernization programmes bogged down and Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both generally regarded as genuine Dengist reformers, were given the unenviable task of carrying out political structural reforms to change the Chinese Communist political system in order to remove the political hindrances to the economic reforms.

To be fair to Dengist reformists, under very difficult post-Maoist political circumstances and the rigid doctrinal constraints of the "four cardinal principles" formulated by Deng Xiaoping himself, they tried hard and

attained some limited successes. The direct election of people's congresses had been extended to the county-district levels and the National People's Congress was made more "democratic" in the sense that more different voices, even debates, were heard. As Harry Harding (1987, p. 179) sees it, by the spring of 1986, some members of the National People's Congress were actually voting against nominations of officials and government reports presented by the State Council. Although not whole-heartedly enforced, the elections for the people's congresses by law were now no longer without any competition. At least the number of candidates should be more than the vacant seats, and the people could nominate their own candidates, thus giving the voters some choice.

Zhao Ziyang and Yan Jiaqi were particularly interested in increasing electoral competition for party positions and generally democratizing internal CCP politics. Following this approach, Liao Gailong, one of the most respected ideologists of the CCP, made an intriguing proposal to the party: Liao suggested establishing three coequal central decision-making bodies, each of which could examine and veto one another's decisions. The establishment of the three bodies – the Central Committee, a Central Advisory Committee and a Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee – was confirmed by the party constitution of 1982, but with the provision that the latter two would be subordinate to the leadership of the Central Committee. The party proved unwilling to establish a system of institutionalized checks and balances to monitor its own organizational hierarchy (Harding, 1987, p. 181).

Although Liao's idea was not really implemented, the same checks-and-balances and separation-of-powers ideas were to be further pursued, not just in terms of intra-party reforms but also of political structural reforms advocated by Bao Tong, Chen Yizi and Yan Jiaqi.

In mid-1986, it became clear to the reformists that their economic-cultural-political reforms had reached a dead end. They, particularly the radical reformers, were increasingly frustrated, and began to call for more radical political structural reform. According to Harding (1987, pp. 191–2), the radical leaders reinserted the question of political reform into the Chinese political agenda for the following three reasons. For one thing, they wanted to sustain the momentum of their broader reform programme at a time when economic reform seemed to be faltering. If the radical reformers were to maintain the impression of continued progress, they would have to shift their focus from economic policy to political matters. Second, the radical reformers had concluded that increasing economic efficiency and productivity would require a new wave of even more far-reaching economic reforms, including the extension of the marketplace to

govern an increasing number of economic activities, the growth of private entrepreneurship, and changes in the structure of state ownership of industry. If these economic reforms were to be seriously considered, let alone adopted, there would need to be widespread agreement to reduce further the ideological constraints on the formulation of economic policy. Finally, many of the radical reformers believed that a new round of political reforms was necessary as an end in itself. Further political liberalization would be needed to prevent abuses of power by party and state officials, create greater stability, and make government more representative of the will of the people. Many radical reformers were aware that the crisis of confidence of the late 1970s had not been completely resolved, and they concluded that a new round of political reforms would be required to restore the confidence of the Chinese people in their government.

It was Hu Qili, a Politburo member in charge of ideology and culture who was later purged with Zhao Ziyang in the aftermath of the 4 June incident, who in a May Day speech initiated this new radical reform push. In his speech he proposed a more creative and less dogmatic approach to ideological matters and, in somewhat more cautious terms, advocated further progress toward democratization and legalization of the Chinese political system. He called on the intellectuals to insist on greater freedom of inquiry about both the subjects that could be explored and the conclusions that could be reached. As Harding (1987, p. 192) describes it, Deng's endorsement of a second round of political reform, and the formation of the party's small working group on the subject, soon led to an outpouring of discussion of political restructuring in academic conferences and in the pages of the official press. The central leadership did not present views on this aspect of political reform. But hints were given in a series of articles and interviews in mid-1986 by two individuals involved in the political reform process: Wang Zhaoguo, a member of the party secretariat apparently responsible for the drafting of the party's proposal for political reform, and Yan Jiaqi, director of the institute of political science of the CASS. Their comments helped launch a debate over political reform through the summer and early autumn of 1986 that ran along two parallel tracks: calls for greater freedom of inquiry and discussion, and proposals for the further development of "socialist democracy". Together, the new ideas introduced during this period constituted a design for an ideological and structural pluralism unknown in the history of the People's Republic.

Before a detailed examination of Yan Jiaqi's more institutionalist reform ideas is made, it should be pointed out here that there were a few more radical students who later marched the streets in late 1986 and early 1987, demanded more radical political reform and eventually caused the

downfall of Hu Yaobang. There were also some prominent scholars, such as Su Shaozhi and Hu Sheng, a leading CCP historian and the president of the CASS, who advocated substantial reexamination and reinterpretation of Marx, Lenin and Mao. To cite Harding (1987, p. 194) again: some radical reformers went even further, suggesting that Chinese culture itself – not simply the world of scholarship – should draw more heavily on Western ideas and values, as well as Western science and technology. Publicly, some intellectuals began to attack the traditional distinction between “culture” and “technology” and the related concept that China should import Western technology but not Western culture such as individualism, basic human rights and capitalist democracy. China, they implied, should study and adopt some foreign cultural values and social institutions, as well as Western science and technology. Privately, some radical reformers were said to have called for the complete “Westernization” of China, on the grounds that there was little in traditional Chinese culture that was worth preserving.

This looks and sounds almost exactly the same as the debate that had gone on before, during and after the May Fourth Movement. But still it was more a culturalist modernization than an institutionalist democratization with which these radical reformers were concerned.

FAILURE OF “SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY”

After heated debates in late 1986, some younger intellectuals did begin talking about the feasibility and desirability of a multi-party system with real democratic competitive elections to local and national legislatures, and in the late 1986 street marches, in addition to repeating the sixty-six-year-old slogans of “freedom” and “democracy”, the radical students also expressed their desire for a multi-party system. However, it must be stressed that not only were they merely slogans at the time but also these were not the mainstream reformist ideas and demands. Moreover, they talked about a multi-party system, but did not think it was possible and thus did not actually pursue such an institutionalist course of action.

At a more realistic structural–functional level, which was also the principal concern of Yan Jiaqi and his colleagues in the CCP inner circle of political structural reform, there were certain local-level experiments in institutionalist democratization that Yan and other reformers pointed to and emphasized. Harry Harding (1987, p. 195) describes them as follows. The Party never systematically spelled out what it meant by the development

of "socialist democracy", but the term was apparently meant to include measures to increase the degree of legislative oversight over administrative officials, and the establishment of mechanisms to increase the accountability of both legislators and administrators to their constituents, the people. Experiments with political reform were launched in three coastal cities that, over time, developed close ties with the radical reformers. In the Shekou Industrial Area, part of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone near Hong Kong, a management committee was chosen through direct elections and was subjected to annual votes of confidence by staff and workers. In the Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Zone officials were subject to recall by voters. In Wenzhou, a port city in Zhejiang, the communist youth league conducted experiments in which its officers were elected through more democratic procedures.

The experiments in Shekou, Tianjin and Wenzhou, which Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi and other radical reformists visited, were exciting and widely discussed. Although small in scale and limited in nature in terms of democratization, they were good tries and as catalysts did create some impact on the Dengist political structural reform programme. Nevertheless, they were carefully controlled and in the end failed to have the snowballing effect some radical reformists had hoped for. The party conservatives, led by the powerful Long March revolutionary, Chen Yun, one of Deng's contemporaries, were vigorously against them. Chen insisted that these "small bird cages" of reform had to be confined strictly within the "large bird cage" of socialism.

Many intellectuals, even pro-reformists, had doubts. They still believed that pluralism might promote chaos and, in accordance with Chinese political culture, a more unitary form of politics was necessary to ensure unity and harmony. A senior intellectual even asked: "What good would there be in having opposition parties here? What the Chinese people want is common goals" (Harding, 1987, p. 201). Clearly these intellectuals, although many of them claimed to be supporters of democracy, did not really understand the fundamental principles, even less the detailed structure and function, of a democratic socio-political system.

Below the level of the populist democracy tried in Shekou, the Dengist reformers did carry out extensive structural reforms in the party and the government. A number of reformist ideas, such as systems of rotation, fixed terms and mandatory retirement for top party, military and government leaders, and competitive elections at the people's and party congresses, ideas cherished and advocated by Yan Jiaqi, did receive Premier Zhao Ziyang's approval and were partially implemented. The suggestion that the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the largest

united front organization in China, could be made into the second house, an upper house or a senate, advocated by Yan Jiaqi and Fei Xiaotong, China's foremost sociologist, did not go very far but attracted some interest. Still, the institutionalization of political structural reform was piecemeal and fragile.

The dismissal of Hu Yaobang in early 1987 dramatized the limits to political institutionalization in post-Mao China. The confrontation between Hu and the party veterans revealed the absence of clear and accepted norms defining the authority of the general secretary, specifying the power of senior party cadres who had retired into advisory positions, establishing terms of office for high party officials, or providing for the removal of a general secretary when he had lost the confidence of most of the Politburo. The removal of Hu Yaobang also illustrated how much the Chinese political system centred around the personal authority of Deng Xiaoping. Although Deng had withdrawn from active involvement in the details of policy-making in China, he remained the final source of authority in Chinese politics, the one who made or approved the most important decisions on policy and personnel.

This personalistic and paternalistic political system and behaviour have continued to trouble the process of democratization in China. Deng Xiaoping's authoritarian power was unquestioned, even after he left all his official party and government posts, chairmanship of the CCP Central Advisory Commission first and then later the all-powerful chairmanship of the CCP Military Affairs Commission. After the December 1987 13th Party Congress, although he became merely an "ordinary" party member, he has continued to exercise the highest decision-making power in Chinese politics, including the dismissal of Zhao Ziyang and sending in troops to crush the student pro-democracy demonstration in the 4 June Tiananmen affair. In 1994, when he turns ninety, it seems that he will continue to hold the highest decision-making power until the day he dies, just as most of the emperors in imperial China have done.

YAN JIAQI'S PRE-4 JUNE INSTITUTIONALIST REFORM

Under such "son of heaven" authoritarianism, during the "hundred flowers" liberalization period of 1987-8 the Chinese intellectuals did have a good time. For once they were a bit more than just traditional scholar-remonstrators and some, such as Yan Jiaqi, Chen Yizi, Zhao Fusan and

even the Marxist scholar Su Shaozhi, were actively involved in Zhao Ziyang's structural reform decision-making process.

At the second "Conference on the Future of Taiwan", held at Xiamen in August 1985 and chaired by Zhao Fusan, then reportedly the most powerful man in the CASS, questions on constitutional-institutional reforms were raised. A proposal was made that some institutional arrangement to attain separation of powers, checks-and-balances, separation of the party and the state, a two- or multi-party system, and open and fair elections be adopted by the CCP before the unification of China and Taiwan could be contemplated (Zhao and Quo, 1986, pp. 445-64). Interestingly, it was Su Shaozhi who was assigned to deal with these issues. Su not only did not ideologically or theoretically reject the proposal, but actually expressed interest in and qualified acceptance of the ideas. However, he could not see the proposal being accepted and implemented in the present or near-future China, not because of faults in the theory but because of the difficulty of practical application in China's political circumstances.

His response made a deep impression on the conference attendants, particularly those from overseas. During the week-long conference, Su presented his new interpretation of Marx, a pragmatic approach to the application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought to contemporary China, and an emerging theory of the "primary stage of socialism" in China, which was later adopted by Deng Xiaoping to be the official CCP line. In the autumn of 1988, a few months before the Tiananmen affair erupted, Su's works on economic, political and ideological reforms, most of them published in Shanghai's *World Economic Herald*, had just been voted top prize-winner by the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, but were in trouble with the conservative party ideologues.

In addition to his ideological explanation that a market economy could and should be increasingly applied in socialist China, he argued strongly for economic, social, cultural and political pluralism. He actually believed institutionalized diverse and pluralistic interest groups were good and necessary for China's political reform and socialist democracy. However, he stopped short of supporting and advocating viable opposition parties, or a two- or multi-party system. He was clearly an influential reformist theoretician in the Dengist camp, who strongly advocated drastic economic reform but cautiously refrained from calling for more extensive political change. Su maintained this position until the 4 June incident. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen tragedy, he stayed on in the United States in self-imposed exile. Since then, he has withdrawn back into his scholarly "ivory tower" and has not openly supported or participated in the overseas pro-democracy movements.

Yan Jiaqi meanwhile, was heading in a slightly different reformist direction. Having already served as the founding director of the CASS's new political science institute for a few years, by 1986 Yan had become one of the most influential political scientists in China. His book, *Wen Hua Da Ge Ming Shi Nien Shi (Ten-year History of the Great Cultural Revolution)*, co-authored with his wife Gao Gao, had just come off the press and created a political-cultural storm in China, and his new book on world heads of state and government, *Shou Nao Lun (On Heads of State and Government)*, had also just been released and become a best-seller overnight. In late November, in two in-depth interviews, he explained his master plan of political reform. He was very impressive. More importantly, at the time he was deeply involved in the work of then-Premier Zhao Ziyang's political structural reform programmes.

In his headship book, he systematically studies more than 460 of world's kings, queens, presidents and prime ministers, most of them past and none of them socialist-communist, and comes out with some provocative ideas and theories. He starts with the question of power and authority: how the heads obtained, used and maintained their power. Then he goes on to look at the manner of leadership changes and successions. After assessing and categorizing different types, qualities and levels of efficiency of different headships, he concludes his work by listing a series of behavioural patterns and ten rules for good headship. The rules include: (1) there must be a higher basic law to restrain the head's power; (2) the basic law, or constitution, must be permanent and not subject to change or amendment; (3) the head who holds the highest executive power of the state should not be life-tenured, but under a strict fixed term; (4) the highest executive power, unlike "personal authoritarianism" that holds legislative, judicial and executive powers in one person's hands, should be unitary; (5) those who hold the highest authority and the head who holds the highest executive power should hold and leave their offices at the same time; (6) there should be clearly specified "power differentiation" between those who hold the highest authority and the head who holds the highest executive power; (7) there must be a strict legal procedure for headship succession so that the transfer of power can be made peacefully; (8) there should be checks-and-balances between the state organs; (9) the highest executive power exercised by the head should be clearly specified; and (10) under certain conditions, there should be a mechanism to recall the head who holds the highest executive power (Yan, 1986, pp. 309-16).

Although Yan's constitutional-institutional reformist approach toward separation of powers, checks-and-balances, fixed tenureship for the head of government, etc., was clear and firm, he avoided dealing with power

and authority questions in socialist-communist countries. More importantly, he does not directly raise the issues of the election of the head by the people and the role and function of the two- or multi-party system in elections. There was no real institutional arrangement for competitive political leadership in his reformist paradigm.

In the 1986 interview he began and ended by quoting passages from the book. He pointed out proudly the elimination of the CCP chairmanship in 1982 and establishment of the fixed-tenure system for the top government and party leaders. He was full of praise for Deng Xiaoping, quoting him as asking the question why the problems that do not exist in the capitalist countries are plaguing the socialist countries. He mentioned that in China for a long time people placed their hope on the "*qing guan*" (clean official), the "*ming qun*" (good king), and moral man; but Deng Xiaoping was different. He stressed that Deng once said that good systems could prevent bad men from doing bad things at will, while bad systems would prevent good men from doing good things, even force them to do bad things. He agreed in 1986 that the Chinese economic reform was in trouble and China was in need of political structural reform.

He emphasized that China must build a high-degree democratic socialist system. However, he cautioned that politics is the art of the possible and realistically in China the immediate possible political reform agenda included only the separation of the power of the party from that of the state, the separation of the government and the enterprise, the establishment of the fixed-tenure system for top political leaders, giving more self-government powers to the local authorities, and streamlining the party and state organs. He admitted that the Western style of separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers and the two- or multi-party system were good but not yet appropriate and applicable to China. He used the Shekou experimentation with mass participation to illustrate his belief that the separation of powers question could be easily achieved in China, even under the CCP dictatorship.

His cherished idea was to make the people's congresses in fact, not just in name, the highest state power organs at various levels of government. He emphasized the point that the people's congresses in China have both legislative and judicial powers which, if properly exercised, could easily check-and-balance the corrupt use of power by the executive as well as the party. He believed that all they would need was to make the congresses more representative and efficient and suggested that, in addition to having more candidates for the congress elections to make them more representative and responsive, the congresses could be made more like the Western-style parliament which is in session all year round to deal with the

day-to-day affairs of the nation. He would like to change the people's congress into the people's parliament (Chiou, 1988, pp. 183–206).

By October 1988, Yan Jiaqi had become internationally very well known and was invited to give lectures and attend conferences all over the world. He had also just refused to serve a third term as the director of the institute of political science, in spite of an overwhelming vote he received in the institute's election. Most importantly, some of his moderate reformist proposals had been adopted and implemented by Zhao Ziyang. Undoubtedly he was a rising political star.

He was still moderate, optimistic and full of praise for and confidence in Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. He condemned the neo-authoritarianism that was going around and was well aware of the difficulties of separating power between the party and the state, and between the party and enterprises, and more importantly even agreed that he had seen no major advancement in democratizing the organizations of the CCP and the government of the PRC. Nevertheless, he continued to stress patience and urge a long-term evolutionary view, and was unwilling to push for more substantial democratization programmes. He had further refined and improved his moderate structural reform proposals, such as to change the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress into a full-time professional legislative–judicial state organ. The only new idea he advanced was a substantial amendment to the state constitution to make it the real legal source of the highest state authority. This would eliminate the CCP as the “government above government”, the “authority above authority”. He had no specific and workable ideas and programmes on how to do it, however. He mentioned constitutional reform, but when asked about the inconsistency between democracy and Deng's “four cardinal principles” and about the need to guarantee real democratic opposition parties in the state constitution, he hesitated and painfully avoided the issue (Chiou, 1989, pp. 232–6).

In late 1988, it seemed that Yan Jiaqi had lagged behind the tide of change that was sweeping the Chinese mainland and was unable to break out of the authoritarian constraints of the dictatorship of the communist party. His political structural reform within the one-party system would not really work and he did not really understand the fundamental nature of institutional democracy. He understood and appreciated much better than most other Chinese intellectuals, the necessity for institutionalization of political reform, but he failed to see the inevitable need for democratic institutions, such as a two- or multi-party system and truly open, fair and competitive elections of not only the legislative but also the executive branches of government, to achieve real constitutional–institutional

democratization. His support, praise and advocacy of making the national people's congress effective both as a legislative and a judicial body was naïve and simplistic. Such a course would not work in socialist China. Moreover, it was both in theory and in practice inferior, not superior as he claimed, to the rigid and rigorous separation of the legislative and judicial branches of government in the West.

Still, looking around China in the reformist years of 1979–89, Su Shaozhi did substantially dismantle the myth of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought as a political ideology and provide Deng Xiaoping with a new flexible socialist ideology. He was an impressive intellectual remonstrator but was never an institutionalist democratizer. Yu Haocheng and Li Honglin, two other prominent reformist intellectuals, were to some extent institutionalists but actively concerned and involved in words and deeds mainly in China's legal structural reform. Thus, among the Chinese intellectual elite, only Yan Jiaqi was really an effective institutionalist reformer both in terms of theory and practice. Although only to a limited extent, Yan was an institutionalist democratizer. However, under Dengist authoritarianism Yan Jiaqi seemed fatalistically to have no choice but to prove to be another Qu Yuan. As will be further discussed in the following chapter, it took the Tiananmen massacre to make him denounce the "Chinese new emperor" and see the futility of his limited institutionalist reform efforts.

Exiled in Paris after the 4 June incident, Yan served the first-term chairmanship of the Federation for a Democratic China, then left the active involvement of the movement and went back to his "study and research" work. Yan, Su Shaozhi and "China's Sakharov", Fang Lizhi, all refused to lead the pro-democracy campaign and they, more or less, withdrew from active participation in the movement in the early 1990s. They looked increasingly like Qu Yuans. However, different from the others, Yan was trying very hard not to be just another Qu Yuan. He was constantly concerned and wanted to be part of the movement. More importantly, by late 1991, he had begun to advocate openly, though still hesitantly, the formation of a democratic opposition party which would eventually challenge the CCP's dictatorial power in China.

At the November 1991 Berkeley meeting and subsequent formal and informal gatherings of the Federation for a Democratic China, Yan started his campaign to get support for his attempts to transform the Federation into a political party (Chiou, 1992). He repeatedly called on both Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan to come forward to lead the new party. He was turned down on all occasions. In June 1992, with the pending merger of the Federation for a Democratic China and the older Chinese Alliance for Democracy, Yan was anxious that the new pro-democracy organization

would quickly become a political party rather than continue to be just another “citizens’ movement” or “mass organization”. He was determined that, if allowed to return to China, he would establish an opposition party to fight the CCP dictatorship, if not to seize power immediately, at least to present a meaningful challenge to CCP’s monopoly of power. In early 1994, based at Columbia University, he was involved in a project to draft a workable democratic constitution for China, an institutionalist constitution-making exercise. By then Yan had become, in theory if not yet in practice, an institutionalist democratizer who advocated full application of Western democratic systems to China.

4 The “River Elegy” and the 4 June Tiananmen Massacre

THE YELLOW RIVER AND YELLOW EARTH

During the 1987–8 reform campaign period, on the cultural front the “River Elegy” controversy probably created the most heated debates and attracted the most attention and strongest response from the conservative old guard. Written and produced by six young intellectuals, Su Xiaokang, Wang Luxiang, Yuan Zhiming and others, and with Bao Zunxin as its chief advisor, the six-episode television series “River Elegy” was broadcast by the Chinese national television network in June 1988. It immediately caught fire, in terms of both popularity and controversy. The “River Elegy” reformists, in powerfully emotional words, called for total refutation and rejection of traditional conservative authoritarian Chinese culture based on, and limited by, the poor and backward Yellow River and the yellow earth on the banks of the Yellow River, the mythical and superstitious power of the Dragon, the symbol of the Chinese emperor, and the anachronistic Great Wall, which failed miserably to defend China but succeeded in preventing the Chinese from breaking out and getting in touch with the outside world to learn and absorb the new modern culture from the West. They echoed the calls for “Mr S” and “Mr D” of the May Fourth Movement and advocated complete Westernization of China (Su *et al.*, 1988).

The first and second episodes of the “River Elegy” are entitled “Looking for a Dream” and “The Fate”. The authors begin by quickly and critically pointing out that Chinese civilization has been in decline for a long time, resulting in a deeply disturbed and distorted national psychoculture. The Chinese people could no longer accept defeat even in sport contests. Thus, although they had already won five world championships, the Chinese women’s basketball team still had to carry on their shoulders the heavy thousand-year-old national and historical responsibility. They just could not lose. The Chinese people still held their four-century-old dream that they were the centre of the world, although in reality the dream had ended when the first emperor of the Qing dynasty, Kang Xi, entered the Great Wall and declared the wall was a total waste of money and manpower. The episodes explain that the Yellow River, in spite of its periodical floods, has, since the Yao-Shun period (about 2300 BC), tied down the Chinese people along its two yellow-earth banks. The Chinese

people's acceptance of this earth-bound fate was further reinforced by the Qin Great Wall built by the first emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang (246–214 BC), and the Ming Great Wall built by the Ming dynasty in the fifteenth century. The authors say that if the Qin wall was a great achievement that showed the vision and strength of the *Han* civilization, the Ming wall was a total failure that only indicated the defeatist withdrawal mentality of the Chinese people. They ask why it was that in spite of the Great Wall that was even extended to the East China Sea, the "*wei kou*" (Japanese) of the island nation could cross the sea and attack China, while the Chinese people could only defend themselves on the coasts and did not even think about going to the island nation to see for themselves what the "*wei kou*" were doing. Why, when the Westerners were using their gunboats to invade the rest of the world, the Chinese people knew only how to build their Great Wall, and even extended the wall to the sea. The authors assert that the Yellow River, the yellow earth, the Great Wall, and the conservative Confucian ideology were used so effectively by the emperors who wore yellow (gold) robes to control the Chinese people that they just could not break loose to understand the meaning of freedom and grasp the opportunity to develop trade and other contacts with the outside world. Therein lay the self-imposed isolation and resulting backwardness of Chinese civilization.

The third and fourth episodes deal with the question of why China invented gun powder, the compass, paper-making and printing as early as the eleventh century, but could not further develop its science and technology and was overtaken by the West in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The authors blame the conservative feudalist Chinese culture which, they think, made the Chinese peasant population non-innovative, unwilling and incapable of taking risks, fatalistic in their outlook and totally dependent on the "will of heaven". As regards the economic disaster of post-1949 China, they clearly blame this on the "utopian" economic policy of Mao, in particular his Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.

The fifth and sixth parts express the authors' thoughts on the future of China. They point out that from 602 BC to AD 1930 the Yellow River had broken its banks and flooded the yellow-earth central plains 1590 times and changed its course twenty-six times. They believe the Chinese future lies neither there along the Yellow River, nor on the yellow earth of the Chinese "*da yi tong*" (great unitary) Confucian culture. They tell the stories of *Bao Gong* and Liu Shaoqi. About eight hundred years ago, *Bao Gong* was a "*Qing Tian*" (literally "blue sky", namely an honest and just official) in Kaifeng, an old capital city on the Yellow River in Henan. He was a selfless and tireless magistrate who tried to right wrongs for everyone, especially the poor. His legendary deeds became a perfect embodiment

of Confucian benevolent scholar-officialdom. After his death, there was a temple built to worship him. Not far away from *Bao Gong's* temple in Kaifeng, there was an old small bank. In 1969, during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi, chairman of the PRC, who had chaired the drafting of the Republic's constitution as well as the CCP constitution, was put under secret house arrest in that dark old bank. After twenty eight days, Liu died with a full head of white hair about one foot long. The authors say that when the law could no longer protect the common citizens, it would in the end not be able to protect the chairman of the People's Republic. If Chinese society was not reformed, if Chinese economic, political and cultural systems were not modernized, the national tragedy of incidents such as the illegal and inhuman persecution of the PRC chairman, would certainly be repeated time and time again. They refer to the economic and political structural reforms which were being carried out in 1988 and say that the fact that there was, for the first time, a delegate who raised his hand to vote against the government decision in the National People's Congress was an improvement.

Then the authors turn to Chinese intellectuals. They use Yan Fu as an example. The Qing government sent Yan Fu to study the navy in England but after returning home, Yan did not become a warship commander. Instead he became a cultural enlightener. When the One-Hundred-Day Self-Strengthening Campaign of the Guangxi Emperor which Yan supported failed, the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan was succeeding. As this great new-cultural enlightener of modern China came increasingly under pressure and attack from traditional feudalistic forces, he gave up reformist ideas one by one, and finally withdrew back into the arms of Confucianism and Mencianism, his classmate at the British naval military academy, Ito Hirobumi, became Japan's prime minister and led the island nation quickly into the ranks of world's great powers. Yan Fu, just like other great thinkers of modern China such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Zhang Taiyan, met the same tragic fate. They all proved that even the best Chinese intellectuals, after a period of revolutionary radicalism, inevitably returned to the 2000-year-old house of Confucianism. Even in the 1980s, the authors say, a "Chinese cultural craze" continued to be the central topic of discussions. People were still engaged in debates on the good and bad points of the Eastern and Western cultures. Those Chinese intellectuals who were for complete Westernization and those who were trying to create the "third period of Confucian renaissance" all seemed still to be living in a dream, all standing on the same ground. The authors agree with the Chinese youth who felt that the rich Chinese culture had become a heavy burden, that the huge Chinese cultural superiority had become

a painful cultural guilt feeling, and that Chinese culture had become a powerful psychological handicap to China's search for modernization.

The authors complain that the Chinese yellow earth has failed to teach the Chinese people the spirit of science and the harsh Yellow River has never raised the Chinese people's democratic political consciousness. The Confucian culture for two thousand years failed to produce a progressive national mentality, a cultural renewal process, and a rational-legal social system. They cite the data of the massive empirical opinion survey on political culture carried out by the Beijing Institute of Economics, the first private research organization set up by Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming and other young political scientists and economists in 1986 (Ming, 1989) to prove how underdeveloped the Chinese civic culture has been. "Mr S" and "Mr D" of the May Fourth Movement, and the powerful tides of Western ideas and thoughts, including Marxism as well, have not been able to dissolve the feudalist Confucian legacy which so deeply penetrated China's economic, political, and psycho-cultural structures.

They are disappointed in Chinese intellectuals and pin their hope for the future of China on the "new entrepreneurs", the "*ge ti hu*" (individual enterprises) and the "special economic zones" along the newly-opened Chinese coasts. They see China's new future in the blue oceans of the world and new countries and new markets overseas. They urge the Chinese people to break out of the bondages of the Yellow River, the yellow-earth central kingdom and the Great Wall.

In spite of its simple message and highly emotional tone, the "River Elegy" got an immediate, spontaneous and enthusiastic nationwide response from other young liberal reformists. However, the conservatives were stunned and angered by the extent of the condemnation of traditional Chinese culture and the implicit but clear criticism of the failures of the Maoist and Dengist Communist revolution. Wang Zhen, vice-chairman of the PRC and an ultraconservative, was reportedly so enraged that he called the "Elegy" authors unfilial sons and traitors to the nation. He complained that the "River Elegy" cursed the Yellow River and the Great Wall and defamed the great Chinese race. He was reported to have said: "I have struggled for many years so that I could administrate the national affairs. Now I have met these bunch of useless professors and graduate students. They have really driven me crazy. I have never been so angry before. The intellectuals are very dangerous."¹ The programme was quickly banned from having a rerun and the associated book banned from publication.

In a simplistic yet rather clumsy way, the "River Elegy" repeated the ideas, slogans, dreams and hopes of the May Fourth Movement, nothing more. As a "culturalist" who believes in a cultural approach to explain

socio-political behaviour and culturalist reform to “modernize” Confucianism and China, Tu Wei-ming (1991, pp. 5–6) of Harvard University points out that in the aftermath of the devastating Cultural Revolution, the Chinese intelligentsia returned to the May Fourth Movement’s argument that since China’s backwardness had deep roots in the Chinese polity, society and culture, “a total transformation of Chineseness is a precondition for China’s modernization”. For the “River Elegy” intellectuals, strategically, “the most painful and yet effective method of this transformation is to invite the modern West with all of its fruitful ambiguities to ‘decenter’ the Chinese mentality”. Tu does not agree with them, but appreciates the great psycho-cultural impact the “River Elegy” has made on the Chinese people. He says: “From top Party leaders and intellectuals to workers, soldiers, and farmers, from the metropolitan areas of Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan to the sparsely populated Great Northwest, several hundred million citizens were affected by the central message: China, behind even western Africa in per capita income, would soon be disfranchised as a player in the international game.” The Chinese intellectual community was again stunned by the poignancy of the question, Whither China? Tu believes that overwhelmingly siding with the radical Westernizers, the Chinese intellectuals have accepted that reform requires the courage to restructure China fundamentally by importing proven models of success. Tu sees, and is bothered by, the paradox embedded in the message of the “River Elegy”. He says the paradox evokes memories of the May Fourth intellectual dilemma: the intertwining of nationalism (patriotism) and iconoclasm (antitraditionalism). This, according to Tu, leads inevitably to a whole set of thought-provoking questions:

If Chinese intellectuals in China proper are so thoroughly disgusted with Chinese culture, can they define their Chineseness as an exclusive commitment to wholesale Westernization? If their condemnation of things Chinese is total, does this mean that they have voluntarily forfeited their right to be included in a definition of Chineseness? For Chinese intellectuals living in China proper, can the meaning of being Chinese be sought in the limbo between a past they have either deliberately relegated to a fading memory or been coerced into rejecting or forgetting, a present they have angrily denounced, and an uncertain future, since they insist that the promise lies wholly in the alien unknown?

It seems that these are exactly the same questions the Chinese intellectuals have been arguing in a circle since the May Fourth Movement, for more than seventy years. This culturalist straitjacket, or what Tu Wei-ming calls

"Chineseness", is basically the same straitjacket in the May Fourth Movement and the "River Elegy".

However, the young liberals in 1989 faced a much more powerful, ruthless, oppressive and authoritarian government than did their predecessors in 1919. In the 4 June incident, most of the "River Elegy" authors and supporters were actively involved in the pro-democracy movement and suffered severely in the tragedy. Su Xiaokang and Yuan Zhiming managed to escape to Paris first and then went to study in the United States and to continue their culturalist "anti-Chineseness" struggle, while Wang Luxiang was arrested and sentenced to a long prison term.

NEO-AUTHORITARIANISM AND "GUAN DAO"

The second important intellectual debate and campaign was the sudden and forceful appearance of neo-authoritarianism in 1988. Started by a group of young economists and political scientists, including Wu Jiaxiang, Xiao Gongqing, Zhang Binjiu and Yang Baikui, the neo-authoritarian advocates put up a strong argument for some sort of "enlightened dictatorship" (Liu and Liu, 1989; Petracca and Mong, 1990; Oksenberg *et al.*, 1990, pp. 123–50). Most of them agreed with the "River Elegy" culturalist picture of China. They believed in a massive injection of capitalist market economy into China but did not perceive any possibility of political democratization at present or in the near future. They used, or rather misused, Huntington's theory of political change and political decay (Petracca and Mong, 1990), as well as the developmental experiences of Asia's newly industrializing countries (NICs), South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore to support their argument that, deeply steeped in traditional authoritarian culture, China needed a strong man, a powerful political leader, such as Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo or Lee Kuan Yew. Such a leader would be committed to rapid economic modernization and more than that, would be able, willing and ready to apply maximum dictatorial forces, including military ones, to maintain socio-political unity and stability and to mobilize total national resources to attain high economic growth. They believed that "modernization and democratization are impossible in China, given its past, without a neo-authoritarian regime and period of transition" and that "neo-authoritarianism is a stage through which China's political development must pass as it moves from totalitarianism to democracy". They stressed that the authoritarian leader must advance market-oriented reforms to bring China's economy in line with dominant trends throughout

the world and that democracy rests on the foundation of a market economy (Petracca and Mong, 1990, pp. 1106–8).

They believed that market economy and authoritarianism could be combined and work effectively. They regarded high economic growth based on a market economy as the goal, while the authoritarian leadership was only a means to that end. They regarded the latter as a necessary evil which would disappear once the former was attained. They did not say how, but vaguely expressed the thought that high economic development would lead to socio-cultural diversity and pluralism which, in turn, would eventually lead to political liberalization and democratization. They did not want to, or rather could not really face Lord Acton's famous dictum: "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely". They simply brushed such considerations aside by insisting a market-economy-based, growth-oriented developmental strategy would "naturally" take care of the power-corrupt political phenomenon. To them, Marx's theory of material determinism, or rather economic determinism, as well as his historic determinism, would still work provided they followed "original Marxist ideas".

To them, economic growth was so overwhelmingly important that official corruption by authoritarian leaders should be condoned, not only allowed but welcomed. Their logic ran: large enterprises in China in 1988 were all state-owned and, since the mid-1950s, had had almost total control of the means of production, especially the raw material for industries, while the small private, particularly "individual", enterprises did not own any means of production and had to obtain their raw and other production materials through official government sources, generally their "parent units" to which they were nominally attached or state enterprises which had "surplus" material to sell to them. Most state enterprises were annually allocated certain amounts of production material, such as steel, oil, timber, cement, etc., for which they did not have to pay or had to pay only nominal prices and which in most cases they could not efficiently use and thus were available for resale to other enterprises, usually at higher prices. Consequently a new political phenomenon was created after more and more "individual" enterprises emerged and began to find increasing difficulties in finding production material for their companies. It was a god-send opportunity for the party and government officials who were in charge of state enterprises to make a great deal of money by reselling, either legally or illegally, their "surplus" material to hungry clients in the struggling and small but booming "private" sector. The good, "*qing tian*" (clean heaven) officials would then use the extra incomes to subsidize their workers' worsening living standards caused by the double-digit inflation,

while bad cadres would pocket the money and substantially improve their own living styles. The acts of high officials who applied this method to enrich themselves were called "*guan dao*", literally "official resale of government property", and the officials were named "*dao ye*" (resale "master"). By 1988, it was widely reported that the sons of Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo and Yao Yilin, were all involved in this shady "*guan dao*" business (Shi, 1990). The reported corrupt practices by the "*tai zi dang*" (gang of the princes) of the top CCP leaders greatly upset the students and the "*guan dao*" phenomenon was generally regarded as one of the major causes of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.

The neo-authoritarian reformers seriously argued that the "*guan dao*" as part of their developmental strategy was necessary and good. They said only through this kind of high official corruption could the small "individual" enterprises survive and prosper. Without the "*dao ye*", because the means of production were subject to such a rigid state control, "individual" enterprises, even with money, just could not obtain their production material. They claimed that shortage of material became so serious in the mid-1980s that many small and medium "individual" companies had gone under and many were saved only by the help of the corrupt "*dao ye*". Therefore, they regarded official corruption as another necessary evil in their neo-authoritarian developmental process. They praised the "*guan dao*" and said China needed more of them rather than less. It was a strange argument, but they were quite convinced that this was the only way to go.

Although he was not openly named, clearly the neo-authoritarianists looked toward Deng Xiaoping and, if not Deng, Zhao Ziyang as their immediate hope for providing such an enlightened dictatorship. Some of them, such as Wug Jiaxiang and Yang Baikui, worked for Zhao's economic structural reform programmes and became a part of Zhao's think-tank group. They were young dynamic political economists who had gone through the tumultuous Cultural Revolution and intensely disliked what China had become in the twenty-six years of Maoist rule. Yet, incredibly, not only did they not blame Mao's authoritarianism for China's serious problems of underdevelopment, but they advocated more, not less, authoritarianism to solve those problems. They did read Samuel Huntington, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, Robert Dahl, Adam Smith, John Maynard Keynes, Paul Samuelson and John Kenneth Galbraith, whose writings became very popular in China in the 1980s. Yet it seemed that they had never broken out of the iron straitjacket of the traditional Confucian paternalistic authoritarian culture. They were just as much Confucian scholar-remonstrators as Qu Yuan and Sima Guang (Sung dynasty) of

imperial China and Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Hu Shih (Chiang Kai-shek's number one intelligentsia) and Guo Moruo (Mao Zedong's number one intellectual) of modern China. Liang Qichao's "enlightened despotism" seems to have been the only answer they could come up with to deal with China's perennial modernization difficulties. Although some of them did go deeply into Western culture, and were even attracted by Western science and democracy, often after a long intellectual struggle they all returned to the "philosopher-king" concept that Confucius had propagated more than two thousand years earlier. In essence, their neo-authoritarianism was the same as the old authoritarianism of Confucius, the most eminent *lao fu zi* (old master) of China.

On the other hand, there were moderate liberal democratizers who did not believe neo-authoritarianism would work and instead advocated that political reform should be pursued simultaneously with economic reform. They argued that the "four modernizations" in industry, agriculture, defence, and science and technology had not gone well, because of the authoritarian political system that, constantly reinforced by the traditional Chinese authoritarian culture, had severely hampered China's economic reform programmes and other modernization agenda. They believed that without political reform China would not have economic development. This group of democratizers included Su Shaozhi, Yan Jiaqi, Yu Haocheng, Bao Zunxin, Rong Jian and Yuan Zhiming (the last two were popular young scholars at the Chinese People's University). This group should, of course, include the more radical Fang Lizhi.

Among them, while the young political scientists tended to argue for idealistic mass-participatory democracy, pragmatic realists such as Yan and Yu, as was described in the previous chapter, placed greater emphasis on the concepts of the rule of law, the separation of powers and separation of the state and the party, democratization of intra-party politics, more open and competitive elections of the people's congresses and making the congresses more effective as authoritative state organs, limited tenureship and rotation of ministers and other high government officials, and other more institutionalist democratic reforms. However, none of them challenged the CCP's dictatorial rule and the "four cardinal principles". Indeed, their democratization programmes were so "Dengist", so "socialist-democratic," that even had they been fully implemented, China could not have become a real institutional democracy. Their political structural reforms were so rigidly "inside the system" or "inside the CCP" that even if the democratization processes were totally successful they would not basically change the authoritarian nature of Chinese politics. None of them, including Fang Lizhi, talked about, much less advocated, formation of opposition parties

and a two- or multi-party system, fair and open elections based on such party politics, or overthrowing the CCP regime. The "democratic" elections they had in mind just involved having more candidates, more competition and more representation within the CCP one-party dictatorship but did not really push for a fundamental change of the rules of the game.

Although the neo-authoritarian versus democracy debate in 1988 was extensive and had some impact on the rapidly changing political landscape in China, leading directly to the 4 June Tiananmen demonstrations, for both groups the time was too short and the debate too academic to make their ideas and theories into a viable concrete reform agenda, much less policies and actions. Thus, their intellectual attempts to modernize and democratize China had not reached much further than their May Fourth predecessors had seventy years before, and their democratization efforts were still much more of a culturalist than an institutionalist political movement.

THE TIANANMEN TRAGEDY

From Hu Yaobang's death on 15 April 1989, which triggered the Tiananmen pro-democracy demonstrations, to 4 June, the students and the intellectuals, eventually supported by millions of Chinese people, mounted a peaceful and fairly rational economic-political reform campaign. They asked for basic human rights, freedoms of speech, the press and assembly, and for democratic political rights to have fair elections and more open channels to take part in government decision-making processes. Their voice, "cries for democracy", did become louder, more intense and desperate as the demonstrations went on during the 50-day period, echoing the cries for "Mr S" and "Mr D" of the May Fourth Movement. As the collection of writings and speeches from the Tiananmen demonstrations, *Cries for Democracy* (Han, 1990), puts it: many Chinese were angry at rampant corruption in the government and the petty arbitrariness of CCP bureaucrats. Many were highly sceptical that the current leadership was capable of leading the nation out of its morass of corruption, double-digit inflation, stalled economic reforms and perceived breakdown in social order. And many were unhappy, though often they would not admit it, that a neighbour or some uneducated riff-raff down the street had become yet another one of the successful "10 000 yuan (dollar)" entrepreneurs of the vaunted reforms, while their own state-fixed incomes remained at a few thousand yuan a year. Nowhere was this potent combination of dissatisfaction and

despair more evident than on China's university campuses. Here the cream of Chinese youth studied amid appallingly crowded and uncomfortable conditions. A good number were not even interested in their studies: China's outmoded and inflexible educational system was characterized by static teaching and the peculiarity that many students, desperate to gain admittance to any university, enrolled in departments they were little interested in. Seeing no answer to China's woes and little prospect of meaningful change, they turned cynical and rebellious. Better to go abroad to study, they reasoned, or have a stab at making a bit of money while they could rather than fret about matters beyond their control. Young teachers were no less disgruntled: they worked and lived under conditions that ranged from barely acceptable to dismal, while their freedom to teach was often restricted by arbitrary department heads or school authorities. But, then, as had happened in China in the past, such as the 1986 Tiananmen mass demonstration to commemorate Zhou Enlai, the death of a popular leader jolted Chinese consciences and provided an emotional charge that ignited long-contained resentment.²

Although when the students marched on the Beijing streets, they did shout the slogans "down with corruption!", "long live democracy!" and "long live freedom!", their initial demands to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress were: (1) reevaluate Hu Yaobang and his achievements; (2) renounce the 1987 anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign and the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign; (3) allow citizens to publish nonofficial newspapers and end censorship of the press; (4) reveal the salaries and other wealth of party and government leaders and their families; (5) rescind the Beijing municipal government's "ten provisional regulations" on public marches and demonstrations; (6) increase state expenditure for higher education; and (7) provide objective news coverage of the students' demonstrations.

On 26 April the CCP official press, the *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*) published its first threatening editorial, "We Must Take a Firm Stand Against Turmoil", that called the student demonstrations "*bao dong*" (a riot). The Provisional Students's Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges released its "Letter to Compatriots Throughout the Nation", demanding a dialogue with government leaders, an investigation by the minister of public security of the 20 April incident in which students were beaten, and an apology to students from the editor of the *New China News Agency* (*Xinhua She*) for its distorted reports on the movement. The letter also listed thirteen "unified slogans", including (1) support the Communist Party and socialism, support reform; (2) long live democracy; (3) oppose corruption in government; oppose special privileges; (4) pledge to defend

the constitution to death; (6) the press must speak truth; (8) stabilize prices; (11) oppose violence; (13) reform, patriotism, enterprise, progress.

On the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, Wuer Kaixi, chairman of the Beijing Students' Federation, read a "New May Fourth Manifesto" to the demonstrators at Tiananmen. He said: "Due to the socio-economic conditions in China and the shortcomings of intellectuals, the May Fourth ideals of science and democracy have not been realized. Seventy years have taught us that democracy and science cannot be established in one fell swoop and that impatience and despair are of no avail. In the context of China's economy and culture, the Marxism espoused by the Chinese Communist Party cannot avoid being influenced by remnants of feudal ideology. Thus, while New China has steadily advanced toward modernization, it has greatly neglected building a democracy."

He further declared:

This student movement has but one goal, that is, to facilitate the process of modernization by raising high the banners of democracy and science, by liberating people from the constraints of feudal ideology, and by promoting freedom, human rights, and rule by law. To this, we urge the government to accelerate the pace of political reform, to guarantee the rights of the people vested in law, to implement a press law, to permit privately run newspapers, to eradicate corruption, to hasten the establishment of an honest and democratic government, to value education, to respect intellectual work, and to save the nation through science.

The government consistently ignored student demands that an open dialogue be staged between the authorities and the Beijing Students' Federation (an independent student union that the government had strenuously refused to recognize since its establishment), and on 13 May about 2000 students under the gentle, but charismatic and effective leadership of Chai Ling began a hunger strike. The hunger strikers asked the government to promptly carry out "a substantive and concrete dialogue based on the principle of equality of parties" with the Beijing Students' Dialogue Delegation. They also demanded that the government set straight the reputation of the student movement and affirm it as a patriotic student democracy movement. By then, it should have been quite clear that in Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun's paternalistic psycho-cultural mentality such student demands for equality and reciprocity were totally out of the question. The paternalistic manner in which both Premier Li Peng and Yuan Mu, general secretary of the State Council, held the so-called "dialogues" with the student leaders should have indicated that the despotic Beijing authorities

were not going to tolerate the increasing insubordination and defiance of the students. It was a tragic mistake that the students, bathing in the euphoria of their initial successes, failed to see the clear signal coming from their authoritarian elders.

On 14 May, twelve leading intellectuals, including Dai Qing, a famous journalist-writer, Yu Haocheng, Li Honglin, Yan Jiaqi, Su Xiaokang, Bao Zunxin, Wen Yuankai, a fellow professor of chemistry of Fang Lizhi at the Chinese University of Science and Technology, Liu Zaifu and Li Zehou, urged the CCP Central Committee to accept the hunger-strike students' demands that the government recognize the student movement as a patriotic democracy movement and the legality of student organizations that had been elected and formed by the majority of students through democratic procedures. They also advised the students that democracy is constructed gradually and cannot be created in one day, and that in order to protect the long-term interests of reform, to avoid incidents that would harm their cause, and to let the Sino-Soviet summit meeting between Gorbachev and Chinese leaders proceed smoothly, they should temporarily leave Tiananmen Square. Again, the students did not pay enough attention to the advice from their intellectual elders and "*jian hao ji shou*" (seeing the situation is good, withdraw).

The students did not accept the intellectuals' advice and the first summit meeting between the two communist giants for three decades took place in a most inauspicious political atmosphere. When Gorbachev met Zhao Ziyang on 16 May, it became increasingly clear that the liberal-conservative power struggle in the CCP had reached a decisive point with Zhao and his liberal reformists on the verge of total collapse. Thus, Zhao's disclosure to Gorbachev that although Deng Xiaoping had officially retired from all party and government posts in 1987, he was still in charge of all important policy-making was an ominous sign of the fatal event that was to unfold. Under such an omnipotent, paternalistic authoritarian political culture, the reformists seemed totally helpless.

On 16 May, more than one thousand Beijing intellectuals signed another declaration asking the government to accept those two demands of the students. On 17 May, Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin and other ten increasingly alienated and radicalized scholars, clearly in support of Zhao Ziyang, declared that:

Since 2:00 P.M. May 13, over three thousand of our students have been in Tiananmen Square on a hunger strike that has lasted nearly one hundred hours; up to this time, over seven hundred students have fainted. This is a tragic event that has never before occurred in our history. The

students have demanded that the April 26 *People's Daily* editorial be repudiated and that the government hold a dialogue with them that is broadcast live. We are facing a situation in which, one after another, our motherland's sons and daughters are falling even as their just demands meet with repeated delay [on the government's part] and go ignored; this [failure by the government to respond positively] has been the reason why the students will not end their hunger strike. Now our motherland's problem has been fully exposed to people in all of China and throughout the world. It is that due to the absolute power enjoyed by a dictator, the government has lost its sense of responsibility and its humanity. Such a government is not truly the government of the Republic – it is a government whose existence is possible only because of the power of a dictator.

They continued: "The Qing Dynasty has already been extinct for seventy-six years [sic]. Yet China still has an emperor without a crown, an aged, fatuous dictator. Yesterday afternoon, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang publicly announced that all of China's major policy decisions must be reviewed by this decrepit dictator, who is behind the times. . . . The Chinese people no longer can wait for the dictator to acknowledge his mistake. Now all depends on the students themselves and on the people themselves. Today, we declare to all of China, to all of the world, that from now on the great fight the students have been waging, their hunger strike of one hundred hours, has won a great victory. The students have used their own actions to proclaim that this student movement is not turmoil but rather a great patriotic democracy movement to bury forever dictatorship and an imperial system."

RADICALIZATION OF THE MOVEMENT

With this militant announcement, not only the moderate reformists, such as Yan Jiaqi and Bao Zunxin, indicated their apparently more radicalized stand, but more seriously, they had clearly sided with Zhao Ziyang's liberal faction in the vicious power struggle within the CCP top leadership. In a serious sense, they were no longer just intellectual remonstrators. Neither were they true institutionalist democratizers, although their harsh words did express strongly their sentiment against the traditional Chinese authoritarian political culture and system. Probably unwittingly or unwillingly, they were trapped in a sort of "palace coup" power struggle of the

party, in which apart from naked power there was little real democratization substance.

At that time, Chinese intellectuals in general fell into three distinct groupings. The first included those more radical reformists who started their pro-democracy activities in the 1979 Beijing Spring, such as Ren Wanding and Wang Juntao. They were committed dissidents who wished to "see the movement create the basis for a new political force or party that would eventually challenge the one-party system of Communist Party rule". The second group was composed of liberal reformists, such as Chen Yizi and Yan Jiaqi, who had worked in one of the many structural reform think-tanks or other organizations set up by Zhao Ziyang and his party-government functionaries. At the beginning of the Tiananmen demonstrations, they were moderate, trying to mediate and maintain balance between the students and the authorities, but by 20 May when martial law was proclaimed by Premier Li Peng, they had become much more radicalized and tried to walk a tight wire to support Zhao and force Li and his conservatives into substantive concessions to the students' demands. After 20 May, they became desperate and threw their fate in with Zhao to openly oppose Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping. The third grouping, loose but the largest, included "a large, amorphous group of intellectuals who generally supported the students' demands but did not link the movement to any specific political agenda". Some of these intellectuals, such as Dai Qing, the *Guangming Daily* reporter, sympathized with the students but at the same time feared that their radical acts would only provide party conservatives with an excuse to initiate a sweeping crackdown that would roll back the liberalizations won by intellectuals in recent years.

It must be pointed out that, although the first and second groups of intellectuals did become increasingly radical and acted more like political oppositionists against the CCP authoritarian rule, they were not yet ready and capable of organizing institutionalist opposition, such as political parties, and of carrying out effective structural reformist struggles against the CCP one-party dictatorship. Nevertheless, they did begin to show that they would require more than just culturalist democratization heightening the Chinese people's democratic political consciousness to bring about functional-institutional democracy in China.

On 17 May, Zhao Ziyang was ordered to step down by the CCP Politburo. On 18 May, the new hardline leader, Li Peng, met the students, including Wuer Kaixi and warned them that all sorts of "idlers and riff-raff" from many parts of China were descending on Beijing, that Beijing had already fallen into a state of anarchy and that the government could not sit by and watch idly. On 19 May, on the eve of the imposition of

martial law, Zhao Ziyang's liberal reformists for the first time attempted to mobilize the constitutional, and thus institutional, power of the National People's Congress, a power that had never been properly exercised in the past, to step in and solve the worsening crisis. They called on the Congress to convene a special session to dismiss the hawkish premier, Li Peng and accept the basic demands of the hunger striking students. The attempt did not get off the ground but it was a worthwhile attempt. It signified at least a belated awareness of the importance of constitutional-institutional power and the process of the People's Congress as the "highest organ of state power" by some of the intellectuals. As a last straw, they hoped the Congress would exercise its legitimate power and stop the party hardliners from declaring martial law and cracking down on the students. Of course that was wishful thinking. The National People's Congress or its Standing Committee just could not react in such a way. Even the chairman of the Standing Committee, Wan Li, who cut short his visit to the US and tried to return home to help resolve the crisis, was "retained" in Shanghai by Li Peng's security forces, put in a hospital, and prevented from going back to Beijing.

When martial law was announced on 20 May, the students and intellectuals were stunned, angered as well as bewildered, and fearful. Some young staff members from the Chinese People's University in desperation proposed that "the broad masses of intellectuals unite and withdraw, in groups and stages, from the Communist Party to which we have hitherto dedicated our lives" and that "our intellectuals build a new organization representing the interests of the people, to be called the Association for the Promotion of the Chinese Democracy Movement". To quit the party was one of the most drastic actions a CCP member could do. To set up an opposition organization, though not really a political party, would have certainly been regarded as "anti-party" and "counterrevolutionary". The call, however, did not meet with wide enthusiasm and mass support. It was a futile call in Beijing's political wilderness that just could not be carried out under the circumstances.

When some of the Beijing Students' Federation members called for the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, the head of the state, from their party and government posts, and for the expulsion of Deng from the party, undoubtedly the most militant gesture up to then, they split the federation. Others appealed to Deng to "shoulder a great historical task: to bring about the peaceful resolution of this movement for democracy in this country of ours where real democracy still has not been completely realized". There were still many students who sincerely hoped that Deng's "handling of this matter will greatly advance Chinese

democratization in a nonviolent way" and that Deng "can once again perform a great deed for the Chinese people, enabling China to soon become a truly democratic, free, prosperous and strong nation".

With the threat of military action against the students hanging over their heads, the radicalized intellectuals, such as Yan Jiaqi, Bao Zunxin and Su Xiaokang, could only make a Qu Yuan-style vow: "As intellectuals, we solemnly swear on our honour, on our entire conscience, on our bodies and souls, on every shred of our dignity as human beings: we shall never betray the struggle for democracy built on the lives and blood of the patriotic students; never seek any excuse whatsoever for our own cowardice; never again allow our past humiliations to be repeated; never sell out our own conscience; never surrender to dictatorship; and never acknowledge the present last emperor of China as our lord and master."

On 30 May, the students put up the famous Goddess of Democracy. On 3 June they inaugurated a democracy university on Tiananmen, with Yan Jiaqi as its honorary president. Their vision was to invite people from all walks of life and all parts of China, including Taiwan and Hong Kong, to meet, teach and learn about ideas of democracy, freedom and reform in China. It would be a sort of New Culture Movement, a culturalist democratization campaign. Again, how sad were the poor Chinese intellectual elite! All that they could do was to teach the Chinese people the ideas of human rights and democracy, exactly the same cry the Chinese people had heard from the May Fourth Movement, on the eve of a bloodbath by Chinese despots.

On the same night the "Emperor" sent in his troops. With tanks and machine guns, he displayed his displeasure by carrying out a ruthless massacre on Tiananmen Square, the gate of heavenly peace. Deng Xiaoping's massacre of the students, intellectuals and other pro-democracy citizens of Beijing in 1989 outdid his imperial predecessor, the first emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang, more than 2000 years before, as well as the Beijing warlords just seventy years earlier. The intellectuals suffered much more than the most famous remonstrator in Chinese history, Qu Yuan, who lived two centuries before Qin Shi Huang during the Warring States period.

Briefly, in the aftermath of the massacre some of the 4 June student leaders and intellectual elite managed to flee China. Unfortunate ones, such as Bao Zunxin, Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, Ren Wanding and Wang Dan, were arrested and after being in custody for more than a year, hastily tried during the Gulf War and sentenced to long prison terms. Those in exile, under the leadership of Yan Jiaqi, Chen Yizi, Wan Runnan, Wuer Kaixi, Su Xiaokang and others, formed the Federation for a Democratic China in Paris on 22 August 1989. Its founding declaration says: "China's

catastrophe demonstrates that, without the arousing democratic consciousness in all sectors of society, without the development of diverse independent political forces, and without a resilient and maturing democracy movement, it is unthinkable that this one-party regime will ever yield to democratic politics." It goes on to say, "The one-party system of autocracy has embedded in it evils that cannot be eradicated without destroying the system itself." Yet, it insists that the Federation is not a revolutionary party, not even a political party. Rather, it will maintain that "peace, reason, and nonviolence are its criteria for action" (Han, 1990, pp. 383-4).

CULTURALIST BONDAGE

The most influential intellectual in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, Fang Lizhi, did not actually take part in the Tiananmen protest demonstration, but was accused of being the "black hand" behind the scene and put on the "most wanted" list in the immediate aftermath of the 4 June massacre. He escaped arrest by going straight to the US embassy in Beijing to seek political asylum and stayed there until the 1991 Gulf War when the Chinese authorities finally allowed him and his wife to leave the country. Since then, he has attended many functions staged by the Federation for a Democratic China and other Chinese democracy organizations in the United States and Europe, but has steadfastly refused to join the Federation, in spite of heavy pressure put on him to lead the movement. He continued to insist that he would be involved in fighting for human rights in China, which he believed to be the most important issue facing the Chinese people. Again Fang has shown himself to be a culturalist rather than an institutionalist democratizer. He still insisted that to change the socio-political psychology of the Chinese people was more important than to destroy the CCP one-party dictatorship and to build an institutional democracy of two or more parties and fair and open elections. As his most famous predecessor, Lu Xun, believed and did more than half a century earlier, Fang in the end tried hard to liberate, modernize and democratize the soul of the Chinese people, rather than to revolutionize and democratize the Chinese body politic.³

Two very respected dissident intellectuals in China, Wang Ruowang and Qin Benli, who had suffered severely in the Anti-Rightist purge, the Cultural Revolution and other anti-intellectual campaigns in the last four decades, were in jail or under house arrest for more than a year before they were released without trial in early 1991. They met each other in a

Shanghai hospital shortly before Qin's death in April 1991. During their emotional reunion, Wang told Qin, "The Party will not desert you. You are the loyal son of the Party." Qin was pleased that Wang knew his "second kind of loyalty", a remonstrator's loyalty, was strong. He said, "It is not that the people are afraid of the government, but that the government is afraid of the people." He advised Deng Xiaoping, "The country has no hope now. I only hope that Xiaoping will not do something that will make the enemy happy and the loved ones (the people) suffer pain again. He does not have much time left. He still has time to do a couple of good things. People will not forget" (Wang, 1991, p. 3). Both Wang and Qin had made immeasurable contributions to China's liberalization and democratization in the 1980s.⁴ Wang's works on corruption and injustice under Mao and Qin's unyielding support of publications of articles on economic, legal and political reforms by Su Shaozhi, Yan Jiaqi, Fang Lizhi, Yu Haocheng and others in his *World Economic Herald* had enlightened tens of thousands of Chinese intellectuals and students. They had psychoculturally democratized many Chinese minds and hearts. However, in the end they proved to be men of the May Fourth Movement, of the "New Cultural Renaissance", rather than institutionalist democratizers, true practitioners of practical democratic politics. In a more serious sense, they turned out to be quite traditional Chinese remonstrators, exact replicas of Qu Yuan.

After a three-year inhumane and technically illegal incarceration, in July 1992, Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang's chief political secretary, who was the mastermind of the political reform in the pre-4 June period, was put on trial on charges of inciting disorder and releasing state secrets (by warning the Tiananmen demonstrators of the planned troop movements under martial law). As a scapegoat for Zhao Ziyang, he was hastily sentenced to a nine-year prison term. Both Yan Jiaqi and Chen Yizi worked under Bao during the reformist 1980s and regarded him as the most capable political reformer, not just a reformist theoretician but an effective political actor who was capable of carrying out institutionalist democratization. According to Yan and Chen, there were very few Bao Tongs in contemporary China.

On the eve of the October 1992 CCP 14th Party Congress, Bao Tong's political trial and persecution again indicated Deng Xiaoping's reluctance to push for political reform, in spite of his repeated call for economic reform.

Finally, after having been in jail and labour camp for fifteen years, China's most famous political prisoner, Wei Jingsheng, was released in September 1993. Although as rebellious and defiant as ever and as anti-Deng Xiaoping as he was in the 1979 "democracy wall" movement, his "fifth modernization" is just as idealistic and simplistic in 1994 as it was

in 1979. He still wants to direct his "trouble-making" against Deng and the party but in writing and propagating his ideas, rather than in forming any institutionalist opposition. Most interestingly, while in jail he wrote nearly a dozen "remonstrative" letters to Deng, and many more to other party leaders, including Li Peng and Jiang Zemin, suggesting reforms on public enterprises and other economic structures and policies toward the collapsed Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Taiwan. He sent the letters to Taiwan to be published by the *United Daily News* in December 1993.⁵

Basically, both the May Fourth Movement and 4 June pro-democracy campaign are culturalist democratization attempts. Although the latter did have some minor institutionalist features, it was merely a repeat performance that had progressed little beyond the former. In spite of endless tumultuous political events, struggles and battles in the last seventy years, there had been few achievements in institutionalist democratization, particularly in terms of effective constitutional government, separation and checks and balances of power, a meaningful two- or multi-party system, fair and open elections, and so on. In fact, because of the immensely more totalitarian nature of the Maoist-Dengist paternalistic dictatorship than the warlordism of May Fourth China, the intellectuals in 1989 were much more coerced, oppressed, persecuted and consequently hopeless and helpless in their quest for culturalist democratization. They suffered even more in their very limited attempts at institutionalist democratization.⁶ They did hope for some democratic reform in the CCP, some sort of "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics". That hope was totally crushed and in practice proved just an illusion, or rather a political ideological mirage created by Deng to mislead the Chinese people and to rationalize and justify his harsh oriental despotism.

Thus, the failures of their pro-democracy movements, especially when compared with Taiwan, have to be looked at with such sympathetic understanding. However, as one pro-democracy scholar (Zhao, 1993, pp. 34-7) puts it, the participants in the 1979 democracy wall movement, such as Wei Jingsheng, held a simplistic and idealistic concept of democracy. They talked about human rights, prosperity and freedom, believed democracy could attain these goals, but had few ideas on what democracy is and how it could be constructed. He believes the 1986-9 pro-democracy intellectuals and students were similarly simplistic and idealistic, viewing democracy as a utopia. He also admits that one of the main features of the 1980s pro-democracy movements was that they focused on attacking Chinese culture. Fang Lizhi blamed China's "feudal culture" for the country's absolutism, narrow-mindedness and love of authority; while Yan Jiaqi blamed what he called China's "dragon culture" for the persistence of

autocracy and personalistic–paternalistic authoritarianism. As Nathan (1991, p. 32) points out that “the obsession with culture has been characteristic not only of the Deng era, but of democratic discourse in China throughout the century”.

Esherick and Wasserstrom (1992, p. 30) cite another example of this simplistic, naïve and utopian view of democracy. When Wuer Kaixi met Premier Li Peng on 18 May, he told the premier, “If one fasting classmate refuses to leave the square, the other thousands of fasting students on the square will not leave.” Two Western observers believed that Wuer Kaixi was explicit about the principle behind this decision: “On the square, it is not a matter of the minority obeying the majority, but 99.9 per cent obeying 0.1 per cent.”

Pro-democracy scholar Suisheng Zhao (1993, p. 37) concludes:

In a different fashion, Chinese intellectuals have been so anxious to restore China’s powerful position in the world that they have used democracy only as an instrument. When they saw that democracy brought prosperity to Western countries, they studied democracy. When they found that communism and fascism made Russia and Germany strong, they quickly turned to communism and fascism.

In addition, the Chinese search for democracy has been closely related with a history of revolution. Impatient Chinese intellectuals launched the 1911 revolution, the 1927 revolution, the 1949 revolution, and the 1989 revolution. Although these revolutions mobilized massive popular support, their outcomes have at best been “majority despotism,” rather than institutional democracy.

In an interesting comparative study of the May Fourth Movement and the 4 June incident, although from different perspectives, David Strand (1990) has reached some conclusions quite similar to mine. He points out that although there were some minor differences, the form of the 4 June pro-democracy demonstrations seemed to have been lifted directly from the May Fourth Movement. He (1990, p. 2) sums up his views on the two movements: “When Chinese seek a democratic tradition of popular participation, they are drawing upon a tradition of movements, not institutions. When they act independently of the state, they are acting as heirs to outspoken elites and attentive publics that emerged with great vigor during the post-Taiping Rebellion reconstruction efforts of the late 19th century. Finally, when Chinese remonstrate to the political center against injustice, they are following a cultural logic of protest with antecedents thousands of years old.”

5 The 28 February Uprising and the Opposition Movement

THE BLOODBATH

The twenty-eighth of February 1947 has to be the most dramatic and tragic day in contemporary Taiwanese history. On that day and over the following month, the Taiwanese socio-political intellectual elite rose up to reject their motherland, China, to which they had just loyally returned as a long-lost filially pious son after fifty years of colonial rule by the Japanese, and rebelled against the Nationalist government which they had just as warmly welcomed back as their “middle kingdom” in 1945.

Even more than four decades later, the whole story of the 28 February Uprising has yet to be told. Some of the relevant official files on the incident are still locked away in the history archives of the KMT headquarters, and the documents offices of the ministries of defence and justice, the Taiwan garrison command (which was dismantled in 1992), the presidential palace, and other places. Although in late 1990 President Lee Teng-hui agreed to set up a special committee to deal with the 28 February tragedy and to open up his presidential archive, and in March 1992, the committee released its official investigation report that was well-received, there were still nagging doubts that the KMT government would really want the whole affair to be investigated, and made known (Chiou, 1993b). In addition, with most of the actors in the incident no longer available and with unknown quantities of documents and information already destroyed or lost, it is not at all clear that the whole story could ever be accurately reconstructed. Nevertheless, there are a number of basic facts and aspects of the incident that have been generally accepted as part of a true picture of the 28 February incident.¹

First, the uprising was a rebellion against the corrupt, inept, brutal and oppressive KMT government that was then being defeated on the Chinese mainland and driven to Taiwan. That government acted more like a colonial power than a father country that should receive back with love and care “an inseparable part of China” taken away in a war by an imperialist power half a century previously. “When Chinese Nationalist leaders sent military forces to Taiwan to accept the Japanese surrender, they failed to clarify in

their minds whether they were dispatching armies of liberation or of occupation" (Jacobs, 1990, pp. 104–8). Second, the rebellion was a rejection of the middle kingdom, a fight for self-determination and self-government, which later became increasingly a separatist campaign to attain an independent Taiwan. Since then, the Taiwan independence advocates have always used the 28 February Uprising as the spiritual inspiration, the ideological *raison d'être*, of their movement. Third, it was an uprising led by the intellectual elite and supported by students, initially to repudiate the Nationalist regime; therefore it was a political act which turned gradually into a cultural and political rebellion against the traditional Chinese authoritarian social, political and cultural systems. Fourth, consequently the intellectuals and students suffered most in the subsequent military suppression, a bloodbath bloodier than the 4 June Tiananmen massacre, carried out by Chiang Kai-shek's army. About twenty thousand Taiwanese socio-politico-cultural elites, most of them students and scholars, were summarily executed without trials or any other due legal processes (Kerr, 1965; Peng, 1972; Cohen, 1988; Chiou, 1993c). Fifth, thus it profoundly changed not only the political ecology of Taiwan, but also the cultural landscape, such as in the area of Taiwanization of literature and art (Chen, 1982, pp. 43–5), and even the national psyche, such as the emerging new Taiwanese nationalism (Mendel, 1970).

With Japanese institutionalism and legalism still having some impact on Taiwanese intellectuals, the lawless killing of people by the state in the 28 February incident brutally shocked them into an awakening that the May Fourth, "River Elegy," and 4 June generations of Chinese intellectuals never really encountered. In a way, the incident cleared the deck for the Taiwanese intellectuals who did not have to carry the weighty Confucian legacy of the Yellow River, the Dragon and the Great Wall of China any longer. The 28 February Uprising and massacre forced them to break out of the "Middle Kingdom" syndrome, away from the yellow earth *chung-yuan* (Central Plains) culture. It forced them, over the next four decades, to go to Japan, to the United States and other Western capitalist democratic countries to seek cultural enlightenment and political emancipation.

The result was the creation of three generations of a much more utilitarian, legal-rationalistic and institutionalist-democratic intellectual and political elite, who became the forceful and successful economic and political modernizers of Taiwan. They did not pay much attention to the legacy of the May Fourth cultural renaissance and the Chinese intellectuals' cries for new, anti-Confucian cultural campaigns. Neither did they care much about the Maoist socialist-communist political and cultural revolutions. They were pragmatists, realists and political activists who doggedly

took part in painstaking political actions, organizing anti-KMT activities, forming anti-KMT organizations and, most importantly, contesting elections to win legislative seats and executive offices whenever and wherever they were held, in spite of great odds against them.

They were not great in number in the 1950s and 1960s, and under the "white terror" of the martial law government of the Nationalists, they could not get much popular support among the severely intimidated Taiwanese people. But the first generation of post-28 February political dissidents did maintain and persist in their continuous anti-KMT democracy movement and try to set up action-oriented political organizations. Their achievements were not very impressive but they were important in terms of sustaining the opposition campaigns and establishing operational models for the following generations.

THE *FREE CHINA* AFFAIR

Before the 1960 Lei Chen affair and the attempt to form the Chinese Democratic Party is discussed, it is necessary to point out again here that the cultural tradition of the May Fourth Movement did link the political democratization processes in China and Taiwan, particularly in the 1950s, and especially via the intellectual leadership of Hu Shih. In 1949 on the eve of the collapse of the KMT government in China and the establishment of Mao's Communist empire on the mainland, a group of liberal democratic intellectuals led by Hu Shih, Lei Chen, Hang Li-wu and Wang Shih-chieh, most of them supporters, if not members, of the Nationalist Party, decided to form a "third force" between the Communists and the Nationalists. True to their May Fourth culturalist belief and conviction, they wanted to try to save China and fight against communist totalitarianism by "publishing a political journal to advocate ideas of freedom and democracy to save the people's minds" (Lei, 1978, pp. 58).

Hu Shih named the journal "*Free China*" and declared:

Today, we see the place under the Communist military oppression is covered by a layer of tight iron curtain. Under such an iron curtain, there is completely no news in the newspapers and freedom of speech is lost. Other basic freedoms of the people are even less likely to exist. This is a policy to make the people totally ignorant that even the ancient authoritarian kings and emperors would have not dared to do. This is a deliberate attempt to create iron curtain terrorism by International

Communism. We really cannot let this terrible iron curtain spread to whole China. Therefore, we initiate this association to start a "Free China" movement.

Our goals, what we want to do are as follows: (1) We want to propagate the real values of freedom and democracy among the citizens of the nation. We also want to urge our government to carry out real economic and political reforms and endeavour to build a free democratic society. (2) We want to support and push our government to apply every means to fight against the totalitarian politics behind the Communist iron curtain and to prevent it from expanding its sphere of influence. (3) We shall try our best to help our compatriots who have fallen into the Communist hands to regain freedom as quickly as possible. (4) Our ultimate goal is to make the whole Republic of China into a Free China. (Hu, 1970, pp. 291-3)

For the next ten years, these words appeared in every issue of the *Free China* fortnightly. Initially, even Chiang Kai-shek gave tacit approval to the views expressed in the journal. In more ways than one, the journal was a continuation of the May Fourth new cultural movement to advocate the ideas of Western democracy and to change the traditional Chinese authoritarian culture. On the one hand, in the early 1950s, that liberal image certainly helped the defeated KMT's international standing as well as its internal unity. On the other, however, with the increasingly hardening authoritarian rule in Taiwan, the journal had also begun to play an increasingly critical role against the oppressive Nationalist policy.

In October 1956, the journal published a special issue to "commemorate Chiang Kai-shek's birthday." The articles written by Hu Shih, Hsu Fu-kuan, T'ao Pai-chuan and other prominent scholars were clearly critical of Chiang's personal dictatorship. They suggested that Chiang should find a successor, establish a cabinet system of government, nationalize the military, and learn from US President Eisenhower's "non-action" style of government. The satirical attack on Chiang of course did not go down well with the conservative KMT hierarchy. The political department of the ministry of defence even issued a booklet calling *Free China's* thoughts poisonous. In late 1957, over seven months the journal published a series of articles entitled "Today's Problems", in which some of its most scathing attacks were made by Yin Hai-kuang, a philosophy professor of the National Taiwan University and a May Fourth westernizer.

Yin's articles criticized sharply the harsh authoritarian policies of the Chiang dynasty and attacked Chiang's application of emergency law. He condemned the Generalissimo's saying that the KMT was the government

and the KMT government was the nation and that he would defeat the Communists and recover the Chinese mainland in a few years' time. In short, he openly tried to destroy the myth and legitimacy of Chiang's "mandate of heaven". One of the articles in the series even openly advocated that Taiwan should and was ready to have an opposition party. It called for an immediate process of forming a new political party, that was at the time a total anathema to Chiang but which did, however, catch a great deal of attention both in Taiwan and overseas.

When Chiang tried to amend the constitution in 1959–60 so that he could extend his presidency into a third term, *Free China* became more openly antagonistic to him. Initially, the journal advised Chiang to learn from George Washington by stepping down after his second term. Later, the journal warned Chiang that if he forced through amendments to the constitution, it would amount to announcing the death of free China. In the end, Chiang ignored its advice and went ahead to add another "temporary provision" (Article 3) to the constitution, and was elected by the National Assembly, whose own legitimacy had been artificially created by the earlier "temporary provisions", to his third term in March 1960, and later to his fourth term.

In addition to these culturalist activities, centered around the *Free China* fortnightly, there was another political action – Lei Chen's attempt to form an opposition party – in the making. That institutionalist democratization attempt to form an opposition party was so anti-Chiang, anti-Chinese and anti-Confucian in the eyes of the Generalissimo that it totally exhausted his patience and brought his imperial rage on Lei and his followers. It also clearly separated the May Fourth culturalist approach toward democratization exemplified by Hu Shih from the institutionalist approach initially led by Lei Chen and later by the Taiwanese oppositionists.

Lei Chen's concrete steps to form the Chinese Democratic Party involved a number of changes that were political as well as ideological-cultural. By 1960, Lei's liberal reformist group included quite a number of the Taiwanese intellectual political elite who had survived the 28 February incident, such as Li Wan-chu, Kuo Kuo-chi, Kao Yu-shu, Kuo Yu-hsin and Wu San-lien.² A second political change was the increasingly competitive nature of local elections. As early as 1957, after the April elections of county-level executives and provincial assemblymen, Kuo Kuo-chi, Li Wan-chu, Kuo Yu-hsin and other two members of the so-called "five tigers" or "four dragons and one phoenix" of the Taiwan provincial assembly led a group of oppositionists to hold an electioneering discussion seminar. In the seminar, Lei Chen made an impassioned speech calling for the formation of an opposition alliance. Out of the seminar, Li Wan-chu, Wu San-lien and

seventy-six other participants formed a "Chinese Local Self-Government Studies Association". They applied twice for registration as a social organization and were rejected both times by the government.

Nevertheless, supported by a *Free China* article that declared "opposition party is the key to the solution of all problems in Taiwan" and by Li Wan-chu's newspaper, *Kung Lun Pao*, the opposition members continued to operate under different election-associated organizational names. When the 1960 elections were near, they formed an "Election Reform Seminar" and began to advocate a new political party.

The mainlander and Taiwanese liberal democratic reformists finally formed a united front on this issue and began an island-wide lecture tour to mobilize support. In August, Lei Chen announced that the new party would be formed in September or October. On 1 September, the "Election Reform Seminar" put out a strong announcement declaring its intention to form a new political party on the basis of the "patriotic need to check and balance the one-party dictatorship of the KMT". On the same day, Professor Yin Hai-kuang also wrote a powerful editorial for *Free China*, saying "The great river is flowing eastward. No one will be able to stop it." Professor Yin was wrong. On 4 September, the Taiwan Garrison Command arrested Lei Chen and Fu Cheng, editor of *Free China*, closed down the journal, and accused both of them of insurrection.

There was an international uproar, while Hu Shih and Carson Chang, one of the drafters of the 1947 ROC constitution, co-authored a letter to Chiang Kai-shek asking for Lei Chen's release, but to no avail. Lei was convicted of "making propaganda for the Communist bandits" and "knowing a Communist bandit but not reporting on him" and sentenced to a ten-year prison term. Lei was to serve his jail term in full while some of his followers were to serve a range of prison sentences. That effectively ended the first decade of limited attempts at institutionalist democratization in Taiwan.

PARTIES AND ELECTIONS

After Chiang crushed *Free China*'s democratizing push, Hu Shih retreated into his safe "ivory tower". Hu did give Lei Chen very strong moral support and discretely sought Chiang's leniency but he did not take any more organized actions against Chiang's oppressive measures. Once again, as in the case of the May Fourth Movement almost half a century before, Hu accepted culturalist determinism and could not really challenge Chiang's

traditional paternalistic authoritarian power. Yin Hai-kuang continued to be defiant but only in the culturalist way. Although fiercely vocal and uncompromising, he was another Qu Yuan, a Chinese intellectual remonstrator, powerful with his pen but not really a political democratizer of action and organization. Unlike Yin, Hu Shih, who was perceived to be in a much stronger political position *vis-à-vis* Chiang and thus expected to be able to do much more, disappointed many people by not forcing the issue and leading the fight for the birth of the Chinese Democratic Party. Instead, he acquiesced in Chiang's action and accepted Chiang's offer to become the president of the Academia Sinica, the highest academic position in the ROC. Yin suffered the consequences for his defiance but gained great respect and admiration among the Taiwanese people, especially the intellectuals.³

Still, both were intellectuals in the May Fourth tradition. Their political demise ended the last traces of the May Fourth culturalist democracy movement, as well as the last attempts to forge some sort of mainlander-Taiwanese joint venture in democratizing Nationalist politics in Taiwan. It was a great pity indeed that Chiang and his conservative followers did not see the great democratic wisdom of letting Hu, Lei and their Taiwanese intellectual comrades, such as Li Wan-chu and the other four "tigers", form a viable opposition party to wash the 28 February bloodstains from their hands and to start a real democratization process in Taiwan. The lost opportunity not only ended any chance of meaningful democratization in Taiwan for the next decade, more seriously, it also ended any possibility of reconciliation between the Taiwanese and mainlanders, of bridging the painful gap between the two groups of people caused by the 28 February incident, for the next three decades. If the 28 February massacre had pushed many Taiwanese into the irreversible separatist Taiwan Independence path, the *Free China* affair further alienated the Taiwanese people and made them even more committed to the cause of independence. The affair further radicalized and Taiwanized the anti-KMT forces and its impact has continued to be felt to the present time.

Another important point that needs to be stressed is that the proposed Chinese Democratic Party, although culturally and theoretically advocated and supported by Hu Shih, Yin Hai-Kuang and other *Free China* intellectuals, was promoted practically and organizationally primarily by Kuo Kuo-chi and other members of the elected Taiwanese intellectual political elite who were probably more politicians than intellectuals, particularly the "five tigers" of the Taiwan provincial assembly. Out of the seven members of the leading group of the initial election review seminar, only Lei Chen was a mainlander, the other six all were Taiwanese.⁴ The actual

proposal to form the party was made by Kuo Kuo-chi at one of the seminar sessions in May 1960.

These post-28 February Taiwanese intellectual democratizers gained their political power and legitimacy not through their intellectual prowess and achievements as had their May Fourth culturalist counterparts in China, but by their continuous participation and victories in local elections. After 1949, Chiang Kai-shek did learn some lessons from his defeat on the mainland and carried out land reform and held limited local elections below the provincial level to present some facade of democratic reform to pacify his critics internally and externally. J. Bruce Jacobs (1991, p. 17) points out that the Nationalist political system seems to have two obvious paradoxes. "First, despite its projection of a strong conservative, anti-Communist image externally, the Nationalist system has implemented progressive social policies. Second, the Nationalist system has simultaneously incorporated elements of 'liberal democracy' and 'Leninist authoritarianism'." He believes the latter paradox led the KMT to subject itself to relatively free elections in which its nominees have lost with surprising frequency. As will be further shown, initially it was not such a paradox. The Nationalist Party was an authoritarian Leninist party. In the 1950s and 1960s, the elections were confined to below county (*hsien*)-city level, where the outcomes would not alter the power structure of the KMT regime at all. More importantly, in those earlier decades, the elections were not really that free and fair, and rigging was widely practised. It was in the 1970s, with the elections extended to the national parliament and the emerging and increasing nonpartisan (*tangwai*) pressures, that the elections did become freer and fairer and the ruling party begin to lose more seats (see Table 2).

It was in these local elections that the Taiwanese political elite, such as Kuo Kuo-chi, Kao Yu-shu and Kuo Yu-hsin, were able to accumulate their political resources, to build up the power base that would facilitate their pro-democracy activities and at times protect them from persecution by the KMT regime. Bearing a heavy Confucian scholar-official tradition, the Nationalists were more reluctant to persecute and imprison elected officials than powerless intellectuals. Thus, in Taiwan, election times were called "political holidays", or "democratic holidays", meaning that the candidates could ignore some of the restrictions of martial law and criticize some of the sacred cow issues and policies of the government. If elected, the candidates could also escape persecution for the indiscretions they had committed during the election campaigns. However, if they lost, they had better prepare for a stint in one of the prisons for a couple of years, a

Table 2 Seats and percentages of popular votes gained by Tangwai in local and central elections, 1972–86

Elections	Local elections					Central elections			
	Provincial Assemblymen		County and City Chief Executives		Taipei Assemblymen	Members of Legislative Yuan		Members of National Assembly	
Years	Seats	Votes (%)	Number	Seats	Votes (%)	Seats	Votes (%)	Seats	Votes (%)
1972	15	20.5	0	–	–	5	21.49	9	–
1975						7	17.04		
1977	21	27.3	4	8	18.4				
1980						14	25.02	16	–
1981	18	25.1	4	13	–				
1983						9	26.07		
1985	18	26.7	4	13	26.6				
1986						13	30.03	16	31.69

SOURCE: Jing Ru Hwai (1989) "Political Opposition in the Republic of China on Taiwan", unpublished MSS thesis, University of Queensland, Australia, p. 27.

modus operandi which has continued to be the way the KMT deals with political dissidents in Taiwan.

As a consequence, elections have become a very important institutionalist democratizing technique in Taiwan. In the 1950s and 1960s, the opposition group led by the "five tigers" constantly won elections and maintained a meaningful, though party-less, institutional base to fight for increasing liberalization and democratization in Taiwan. They were the predecessors of the *tangwai* movement in the 1970s and the 1980s and the DPP in the late 1980s and 1990s. In the 1961 county-level elections, the "five tigers" managed to lead their supporters to win about 20 per cent of the votes. As Tables 2–5 show, that percentage has been maintained by the opposition in the 1960s and 1970s, and increased to about 30 per cent in the 1980s, in spite of the iron-fist control and overwhelming domination of the KMT in economic, political, social and other fields in Taiwan. To win elections thus literally meant political survival for the opposition members and their democratization campaigns. To win elections also thus

meant that the oppositionist democratizers in Taiwan had to group together to form some sort of institutional base, some sort of action-oriented organizations. The reality of politics in Taiwan was that they had to become institutionalist, rather than just culturalist, political activists. In short, they had to push for the establishment of political parties, in spite of the ban against doing so imposed by the 1949 martial law.

It is doubtful that Chiang Kai-shek and his Confucian conservatives had actually foreseen these developmental, even democratizing, consequences. As will be discussed later, in 1969 when the KMT was forced to extend elections to the national level due to the rapid decline in numbers of the members of the continuing parliament, the opposition movement's scope was further expanded to reach the central government institutions. Almost inevitably, the elections led to the illegal formation of the DPP on 28 September 1986, and to the great leap forward toward institutionalist democracy in the following years.

After the "five tigers" generation, in the 1969 local elections, a totally unknown young gas station worker, Kang Ning-hsiang, surprised everyone by winning a Taipei municipal council seat. In 1970, in the first supplementary (*tseng pu*) national elections for the three houses of the parliament, another relatively unknown Taipei politician, Huang Hsin-chieh, won a seat in the Legislative Yuan. In 1972's additional (*tseng e*) parliament elections, Kang won another seat in the Legislative Yuan. Subsequently, Huang and Kang, with other opposition members, led the anti-KMT nonpartisan movement successfully for more than two decades, in spite of the fact that Huang Hsin-chieh and many others were involved in the 1979 Kaohsiung incident and put in jail for long periods of time. Huang Hsin-chieh, after having served nine years of his fifteen-year prison term, was pardoned and released by President Lee Teng-hui in 1989 and became the third chairman of the new party, the DPP, for three years from 1989 to 1991. He again surprised everyone by winning the election in Hualien, a KMT stronghold, in December 1992 to become a legislator.

In 1973, a former KMT cadre, Chang Chun-hung, disenchanted with the Nationalist government, left the ruling party. Standing unsuccessfully for the Taipei municipal council election, he and another ex-KMT member, Hsu Hsin-liang, both of whom were renowned for their published works, became a powerful force in the Taiwan provincial assembly in the mid-1970s. Hsu caused the violent Chungli incident in the 1977 elections and won his chief magistrate's position in T'aoyuan county. Both were involved in the *Formosa* movement and after the Kaohsiung incident, Hsu was exiled in the United States for about ten years while Chang, with

Huang Hsin-chieh, was in prison for about eight years. Hsu and Chang have been two of the most influential leaders in the nonpartisan movement and DPP ever since. Hsu was to return to Taiwan in 1988 and after a six-month stint in jail was elected the fourth DPP chairman. Like Huang Hsin-chieh, Chang was to win the 1992 legislative election and become a member of the "new" parliament, whose 161 members were, for the first time since 1947, completely newly elected.

In the controversial 1977 elections, featuring the first massive anti-KMT riot since 1947 (the so-called Chungli incident), the nonpartisan movement impressively won five out of twenty-one county-city chief executive seats. In addition, twenty-one oppositionists won Taiwan provincial assembly seats and eight won Taipei municipal council seats (Table 2). Overall, it was a remarkable accomplishment by a group of unorganized political dissidents. Not only did they win elections, more importantly they forced the KMT to back down in the Chungli incident and also forced the resignation of the second most powerful politician in Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo's right-hand man, Lee Huan (Li Huan), then the KMT organization head.

The Kaohsiung incident two years later, which will be more fully discussed in the following chapter, saw more than sixty nonpartisan leaders put in jail. Still, incredibly, in the 1980 national and 1981 local elections, the wives, brothers, sisters and defence lawyers of the Kaohsiung trial defendants again triumphed in a most difficult political situation. New stars, such as You Ch'ing, Taipei county magistrate, and legislator Ch'en Shui-pien, emerged out of nowhere to win and to become top leaders of the nonpartisan movement and later the DPP.⁵

The nonpartisan ranks grew in the next few years. They won elections in 1983, 1985, 1986 and, most impressively, in 1989; substantial gains were recorded in the 1986 and 1989 elections waged after the DPP was formed in September 1986, as Tables 3–5 show. In the 1950s and 1960s, with only a loose alliance, the "five tigers" and their gentry-class intellectual followers had won symbolic democratic victories if not many seats. With the increasingly organized and united nonpartisan movement and in the slowly but steadily liberalizing political atmosphere of the 1970s, despite the violent Chungli and Kaohsiung incidents, Huang Hsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Hsin-liang and other emerging Taiwanese intellectual political dissidents had won even more impressive electoral victories. Hsu Hsin-liang's massive 1977 electoral win, with its mass-movement campaign style that triggered the Chuangli incident, powerfully jolted the authoritarian establishment of the Chiang dynasty.

Table 3 Voting results of the 6 December 1986 Elections, ROC

	Number of candidates	Number elected	Ballots cast	Percentage of ballots cast
A National Assembly				
Kuomintang				
KMT-nominated	59	53	3 481 731	46.91
KMT-endorsed	24	15	1 227 495	16.54
Self-selected	19	0	360 696	4.86
Total		68	5 069 922	68.31
Democratic Socialist Party	2	1	69 150	0.93
Young China Party	3	0	17 053	0.23
Non-registered				
candidates (DPP)	25	11	1 403 290	18.90
Others	37	4	862 990	11.63
Total		16	2 352 483	31.69
B Legislative Yuan				
Kuomintang				
KMT-nominated	62	55	4 620 402	61.48
KMT-endorsed	12	4	487 231	6.48
Self-selected	17	0	143 818	1.91
Total		59	5 251 451	69.87
Democratic Socialist Party	1	0	1 180	0.02
Young China Party	2	0	6 244	0.08
Non-registered				
candidates (DPP)	19	12	1 666 509	22.17
Other	24	2	540 719	7.86
Total		14	2 214 652	30.13

SOURCE: *Lien-ho-pao*, 8 December 1986, p. 2.

ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY

The nonpartisan (*tangwai*) leadership was severely crippled by the Kaohsiung débâcle. Nevertheless, led by Kang Ning-hsiang who was not jailed, and the family members and defence lawyers of the *Formosa* defendants, the organization did manage to survive "white terror" political

Table 4 Seats won by KMT, DPP and others in 1989 elections

<i>Kinds of Election</i>	<i>Legislative Yuan</i>			<i>County-City Chief Executive</i>			<i>Taiwan Provincial Assembly</i>		
<i>Parties</i>	KMT	DPP	Others	KMT	DPP	Others	KMT	DPP	Others
<i>Candidates</i>	143	56	103	28	18	21	79	42	36
<i>Seats Won</i>	72	22	8	14	6	1	56	16	5

<i>Kinds of Elections</i>	<i>Taipei City Council</i>			<i>Kaohsiung City Council</i>			<i>Total</i>		
<i>Parties</i>	KMT	DPP	Others	KMT	DPP	Others	KMT	DPP	Others
<i>Candidates</i>	54	21	26	48	24	22	354	164	208
<i>Seats Won</i>	34	14	1	29	8	1	205	68	16

SOURCE: *China Times*, 3 December 1989, p. 1.

pressure to contest every local and national election. The injection of defence lawyers into the nonpartisan ranks proved to be a formidable legal-institutional oppositionist line-up to the KMT. You Ch'ing, Ch'en Shui-pien, legislator Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing and others have won one election after another and turned out to be dominant figures in Taiwan's democracy campaigns.

The 1986 and 1989 elections were most remarkable. The 1986 parliamentary elections were the first test of the illegally formed DPP. The party had been hastily formed – details of its formation are given in the following chapter – in late September 1986 and the elections were held in early December while the DPP was still officially illegitimate under martial law. They were chaotic elections with the KMT's patience stretched to extreme limits and great pressure put up on the government to crack down on the DPP campaign activities, many of them illegal according to the electoral and martial law regulations. Nevertheless, the elections were successfully held and the DPP won the day, not in the sense of vote-getting but rather in the sense of hard political institutionalist struggles and successes. They had firmly established themselves to be the only viable, meaningful opposition party in Taiwan. They won just over 30 per cent of the votes, thirteen out of seventy-four Legislative Yuan seats and thirteen out of ninety-one National Assembly positions. However, the victories by You Ch'ing, Kang Ning-hsiang and others were impressive.⁶ They were the top or the second highest vote-getters in their respective districts. The victories

Table 5 Total votes for political parties in 1989 elections

	<i>KMT</i>	<i>DPP</i>	<i>Other Parties</i>	<i>Total</i>
County and City Officials				
County				
magistrates	3 271 314	2 551 352	451 029	6 273 695
City mayors	586 110	273 764	186 722	1 046 596
Total	3 857 424	2 825 116	637 751	7 320 291
Percentage of total votes cast	52.69	38.58	8.73	100.00
Legislative Yuan				
District	4 519 629	2 334 597	833 495	7 687 721
Occupational and other categories	920 229	279 619	229 725	1 429 573
Total	5 439 858	2 614 216	1 063 220	9 117 294
Percentage of total votes casts	59.67	28.67	11.66	100.00
Taiwan				
Provincial Assembly	4 566 033	1 868 609	876 943	7 311 585
Percentage of total votes cast	62.45	25.56	11.99	100.00
City Councils				
Taipei	824 038	275 569	80 276	1 179 883
Kaohsiung	407 667	136 513	64 265	608 445
Total	1231 705	412 082	144 541	1 788 328
Percentage of total votes cast	68.87	23.05	8.08	100.00
Grand total	15 095 020	7 720 023	2 722 455	25 357 498
Percentage of total votes cast	59.11	30.23	10.66	100.00

SOURCE: *Shih-chieh jih-pao*, 3 December 1989, p. 8.

of Wang Ts'ung-sung, Hsu Mei-ying and Wu Che-lang, the first two representing labour and the last business, two professional organizations traditionally under the KMT iron-fist control, were nothing short of miraculous. After the elections on 7 and 8 December, the *New York Times* reported the DPP victories on its front pages, while Japan's *Yomiuri Shimbun* in its 9 December editorial commented: "In these elections, the DPP gained a lot of people's support, indicating that from now on, both internally and externally, Taiwan is going to turn into a totally new face. The formation of the DPP, its formal entering on the electoral stage, and marching toward democratization ought to be regarded as the beginning of the age of party politics in Taiwan" (Li, 1988, pp. 251-2).

If the 1986 elections were the solid beginning of democratic party politics in Taiwan, after a short period of three years, a more mature and effective performance by a two-party political system was evidenced at the 1989 elections. As Tables 4 and 5 show, the elections included the Legislative Yuan, county and city chief executives and other local council elections. They were heatedly, even bitterly, contested elections. The tables also show the results of the elections. In statistical terms, all three elections put together, the KMT for the first time won less than 60 per cent of the votes, a drop of about ten percentage points from previous elections, while the DPP gained more than 30 per cent of the votes, an increase of about 5 per cent from previous elections. If some "nonpartisan" (who did not join the new DPP) winners, such as Chang Po-ya and her sister Chang Wenying (who won a Legislative Yuan seat and Chiayi County magistrateship respectively) and Ch'en Ting-nan (who won a Legislative Yuan seat in Ilan county), who had consistently sided with the nonpartisan movement and DPP in the past, are counted as part of the overall anti-KMT oppositionist camp, the opposition would have won about 35 per cent of the total votes. Compared with their previous 25 per cent, the 1989 results were remarkable indeed.

Most significantly, in the most important county and city chief executive races, out of twenty-one positions the DPP won six and more than 38 per cent of the votes. With Chang Wen-ying, the opposition would have won about 40 per cent of the votes. In a Taiwan immediately after the lifting of martial law and still under rigid control of the temporary provisions during the period of the "anti-Communist campaign", that was a massive victory. In particular, You Ch'ing's win in the Taipei county magistrate contest, which was called the "great war of the century" and a "must win" battle for the KMT because Taipei county is the largest local authority with more than three million population and the home county of President Lee Teng-hui, was so shocking to the ruling party that rumours

spread in the early hours of 3 December that a military coup was contemplated by some of the diehard Nationalist conservatives. In addition, the victories of Chou Ch'ing-yu in Changhua, Fan Chen-chung in Hsinchu county, Su Chen-ch'ang in Puingtung, Yu-Ch'en Yueh-ying in Kaohsiung county and Yu Hsi-k'un in Ilan were remarkable in their own way.

The twenty-two DPP and nonpartisan seats won in the Legislative Yuan were very significant in the sense that they could for the first time propose bills and nominate for committee membership. In the early 1970s, the KMT totally ignored the existence of Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Hsin-chieh in the Legislative Yuan. In the 1990s, clearly they could no longer lightly take action against DPP legislators, especially such as radical and militant Ms Yeh Chu-lan (wife of Cheng Nan-jung who burnt himself to death in 1988 to protest the KMT persecution of the press). In spite of the disparity in numbers, the DPP and "nonpartisan" members were able to put up more credible resistance and force the KMT to make concessions and compromises in legislative and other political matters.

Most foreign observers, such as US Congressman Stephan Solarz, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, praised the fairness and outcome of the elections (Ts'ai and Myers, 1990). The authoritative weekly, *The Journalist* (No.143, 19 December 1989), declared "Long Live the Voters" and "the Greatest Setback to the KMT". Kang Ning-hsiang's newspaper, *The Capital Morning Post* (3 December 1989), with You Ch'ing's and other six DPP and "nonpartisan" magistrates' pictures in colour on the front page, announced "In the first post-martial law elections, the KMT has suffered unprecedented defeat. With the wins of the New Nation Alliance, the demand for Taiwan independence has gained wide electoral support." Even the conservative newspaper, the *United Daily News*, which is run by Wang T'i-wu, a member of the KMT old guard, admitted on the following day (3 December 1989), "The ruling party lost in seven counties and cities. That was the greatest defeat in the last forty years. The voters used election ballots to tell the ruling party to reform. New leadership, new thinking and a new approach must be the new challenges to the ruling party." Even the Beijing regime commented, "In the elections, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) achieved great developments, whereas the Kuomintang (KMT) suffered unprecedented setbacks" (Ts'ai and Myers, 1990, pp. 377).

An additional point worth noting is that out of the thirty-two DPP candidates who belonged to the "New Nation Alliance" and openly advocated Taiwan independence, twenty of them won. Their campaign activities openly defied the newly enacted National Security Law in which advocates for Taiwan independence could still be tried for treason and, if convicted,

could attract long, up to life, prison sentences. Their winning the elections, however, put the government in a difficult position. In the end, the "political holiday" or "democracy holiday" syndrome prevailed and the government did not try most of the cases, except a couple of the unlucky candidates who did not win.

Ts'ai and Myers (1990, p. 378) sum up their article on the elections by saying: "The powerful winds of democracy that blew across Taiwan between June and December 1989 brought new, young faces into politics; political taboos of the past had been broken; more businessmen had joined hands with new, aspiring politicians to spend huge sums of money. The high voter turnout on December 2, the fairness of the elections, and the calm that had prevailed attested to a sober political awareness by ROC citizens. Taiwan has taken a giant step forward toward democracy, confirming what many American observers had to say about the elections."

Of course, in terms of real democratization in Taiwan these elections were not really sufficiently important to warrant such high praise. Even after the elections, with one hundred and one newly elected members in the Legislative Yuan, there were still in 1989 about two hundred old life-tenured legislators who had been elected to their seats in 1947. However, the old were dying out while the new were taking over. Particularly the newly elected representatives of the people, with their people-based constitutional legitimacy and power in the emerging two-party system, were to function increasingly effectively and to force the old guard rapidly off the centre stage of the legislative process. The most important point about these elections was that they had firmly and irreversibly advanced the birth of a two-party political system, as was already mentioned above and will be further discussed in the following chapter, which would inevitably and equally irreversibly lead to even more substantive institutionalist democratization and eventual birth of true democracy in Taiwan.

6 Institutionalizing the *Tangwai*: The DPP

REFORM TO PROTECT TAIWAN

Probably more unintentionally than intentionally, the KMT allowed the local elections in the 1950s to expand slowly but steadily into national elections in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in increasing democratization of the political systems in Taiwan. One of these political systems was the opposition party and two-party polity that had emerged from three decades of elections. Elections and the party system seemed to go hand in hand so well in Taiwan's political development that it has been obvious that the two institutions have been closely linked in a symbiotic relationship. Probably more by historical accident than by purposeful design, the oppositionist democracy movement in Taiwan has, since 1947, taken the firm institutionalist path, in sharp contrast with the culturalist road trodden by the Chinese democratic reformists.

To be fair to the culturalists in Taiwan, they did persist with propagating Western liberal ideas of freedom and democracy. Represented by the *Wen Hsing* (*Apollo*) group of intellectuals and led by Li Ao (a self-professed disciple of Yin Hai-kuang and Lu Xun), they tried to cultivate Western liberal democratic political culture in the belief and value systems of the Taiwanese people. They attracted some university students who, after the political "winter" of the 1960s, emerged to support and push for political reforms – the "reform to protect Taiwan" campaign – in the early 1970s. From this new intellectual elite many political activists appeared to shape the nonpartisan (*tangwai*) democracy movement in the next two decades.

By the late 1960s, the *Apollo* monthly's "cultural renaissance" liberalization and Westernization writings had played their part; their usefulness was exhausted in the dark hours of the post-*Free China* days of the "white terror". By then, the internal and external political conditions of Taiwan had also dramatically changed. On the domestic front, Taiwan's economic miracle had begun to take off and Chiang Kai-shek and his old KMT leadership had become ill and tired, both physically and mentally. Chiang's son, Ching-kuo, was ready to take over and to lead Taiwan into its next developmental stage. On the international front, US President Richard

Nixon pronounced his new "Nixon Doctrine" and began to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region. More importantly, Nixon started his new initiative to play the "China card," to forge a new rapprochement with Mao's Middle Kingdom and to alter the US strategic position in Asia as well as the world. The new US foreign policy had a devastating impact on Taiwanese internal, as well as, external politics.

In 1968, just as Nixon became the American president, Chiang Ching-kuo became the ROC's minister of defence and began to emerge as the new strongman in Taiwan. In July 1971 when Nixon's national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, secretly visited Beijing and worked out an agreement with the PRC premier Zhou Enlai, Chiang Ching-kuo was aware of the pending changing fortune of the ROC and as a consequence was forced to carry out a series of "*ke-hsin pao-t'ai*" (reform to protect Taiwan) policies. In late 1971 when the PRC was admitted to and the ROC excluded from the UN, the KMT government faced its most severe test since the Nationalist defeat in 1949. Chiang Ching-kuo sought the reformist ideas and supports from the new generation of Taiwanese intellectuals, many of whom had studied abroad, mostly in the United States.

Initially this group of new, basically Westernized, liberal democratic intellectuals gathered around the reformist journal *The Intellectual* (*Ta-hsueh tsa-chih*). They numbered more than one hundred, including Professors Yang Kuo-shu, Hu Fu, Chang Chung-tung, Hungdah Chiu (Ch'iu Hung-ta) and Sun Chen (later to become the president of the National Taiwan University), and liberal scholars such as Chang Chun-hung and Hsu Hsin-liang. From 1971 to 1973, the journal published many reformist articles suggesting and urging drastic economic, political and social policy changes, not merely cultural reforms. In addition to its articles, the journal also held seminars to publicize and propagate its authors' reformist views. In August 1971, at one of its seminars, the present president, Lee Teng-hui, then a professor at the National Taiwan University, was invited and gave a rather radical talk about reforms in Taiwan. In October 1971, the same month in which the ROC was ousted from the UN, the journal put out a special issue on "national affairs remonstrance" which was co-authored by fifteen scholars. The articles called for democratizing the whole structure of the ROC political system. Another article in the same issue by Ch'en Shao-t'ing, then president of the journal, in the same issue, advocated the complete re-election of the three chambers of the parliament. These were all very radical ideas at the time, and had a great impact on the leadership, as well as the general public in Taiwan (Li, 1988, pp. 33-109).

THE TANGWAI (NONPARTISAN MOVEMENT)

However, it was not only in the cultural-intellectual area that these reformists began to have an impact on Taiwanese politics. More importantly, as described in the previous chapter, it was in the local and national elections, particularly after 1969, that the reformist intellectuals, such as Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung, departed from their earlier culturalist democratization campaign and entered *realpolitik*. By contesting and winning elections, Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, later joined by Hsu Hsin-liang, Chang Chun-hung and others, began to lead a different kind of political movement. Their nonpartisan (*tangwai*) movement was a more organized, more grass-roots-based, and more mass-campaign-oriented opposition force than the *Free China* democracy movement. They were a totally new and different breed of political dissidents from their predecessors, such as the famous "five tigers" of the Taiwan provincial assembly. They came from the Taiwanese indigenous intellectual political elite educated in Western ideas, values, and economic, political, social, and educational systems. They had very little to do with China, and even less with the May Fourth culturalist reform tradition. Most of them also had very little understanding of, and interest in, the Maoist communist revolution in China. They were very much Westernized liberal democrats with a utilitarian pragmatist mentality.

Thus, from the very beginning, they took part in elections and made their political names by winning elections. They did publish a number of legal or illegal *tangwai* journals to break up the nearly total monopoly and control of mass media by the KMT, for under the martial law regime there was no freedom of the press and association in Taiwan. The opposition was not allowed to publish newspapers or to form political associations, especially political parties, but they were allowed to publish journals and periodicals. Thus, following *The Intellectual*, led by Huang Hsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Hsin-liang and Chang Chun-hung, the nonpartisans have published an enormous number of weekly, fortnightly and monthly journals (Chen, 1982; Chiou, 1986). Kang's five-issue *Taiwan Political Review* became an overnight success in mid-1975. It was so radical and militant in the eyes of the Nationalists that they hastily banned it in December 1975 and accused it of inciting insurrection. One of its editors, Huang Hua, who had already been imprisoned for more than ten years for a previous "treason" conviction, was put in jail for another fifteen years on the same trumped-up charge. Such irrational and drastic action by the KMT showed how frightened the government was of the new oppositionist forces.

By reason of the *Taiwan Political Review* and its suppression, the *tangwai* became an even more united and organized opposition. After the 1977 elections, in which Hsu Hsin-liang managed to stir up the violent Chungli incident and the nonpartisan candidates were able to unite together to win quite a few seats, they were able to form a "Taiwan Tangwai Elections Support Group" in October 1978, which was supposed to play a quasi-party role in the impending December elections. However, US President Carter announced on 16 December 1978, that he would officially recognize the PRC on 1 January 1979, and thus forced Chiang Ching-kuo to cancel the elections. The nonpartisan movement, all geared up for the 1978 elections, was deeply frustrated and angered by the cancellation but could do little about it. They believed that the KMT was worried about losing the elections because of the increasingly united and well-organized nonpartisan political system, and had seized on Carter's announcement as an excuse to call off the elections.

After having strongly protested against the cancelled elections, in 1979 the *tangwai* movement became more alienated and frustrated with the KMT, with "the system", and thus became more radical and militant. It was a year that saw increasing political polarization, radicalization and tension between the nonpartisan movement and the KMT, which finally and fatally led to the disastrous 10 December Kaohsiung incident (Chiou, 1986). In June 1979, Kang Ning-hsiang with the able editorial assistance of Antonio Chang, later publisher of *The Journalist*, published *The Eighties*, and later *The Asian* and *The Current*, trying to regroup the dissident intellectuals together to maintain his moderate reformist campaign. Simultaneously Huang Hsin-chieh, Hsu Hsin-liang, Chang Chun-hung, Lu Hsiu-lien, a famous feminist, and other more radical members of the nonpartisan movement together formed a new militant group and published the now notorious mass-movement-oriented *Formosa* monthly, which was to advocate much more radical anti-KMT stances and actions.

FORMOSA AND THE INSTITUTIONALIST OPPOSITION

In the extremely polarized and tense political atmosphere, the *Formosa* group quickly became the central organization of the *tangwai* movement. The monthly publication was much more than just an oppositionist political journal. It was in reality a quasi-political party whose branches, called *fu-wu ch'u* (service offices), and mass demonstrations spread like prairie fire throughout the island-state. Its bold militant confrontationist actions

clearly troubled the KMT hierarchy, particularly the conservatives who held power after the purge of the liberals in the aftermath of the Chungli incident. The confrontations intensified in late 1979. On 10 December 1979, to commemorate World Human Rights Day, the *Formosa* group staged a massive anti-KMT demonstration in the port city of Kaohsiung. The KMT leadership decided not to tolerate the challenge and sent large numbers of anti-riot troops to crush the demonstration. The resultant riot got out of control with both sides suffering some casualties. On 13 December, security forces moved quickly to round up the nonpartisan leadership. Eight *Formosa* leaders, including Lin I-hsiung whose mother and twin daughters were mysteriously murdered on 28 February 1980, were tried, convicted and sentenced to long prison terms, ranging from 12–14 years to life, by the military court.¹ Others, more than sixty of them, were tried by the civil courts and sentenced to 3–8 years.

The *Formosa* trials were the most serious political persecution since the 28 February Uprising. Clearly, the harsh treatment of the nonpartisan opposition had very little to do with the Kaohsiung demonstration and rioting. The 1977 Chungli riot had been much more violent – the police headquarters were burnt down during the incident. Yet there had been no mass arrests and “treason” trials, because there were elections and there was only one man, Hsu Hsin-liang, who was not an organized institutional threat to the KMT power. The *Formosa* affair was totally different. There was a mass organization, a political institution, with many salient party characteristics offering a clear and credible threat to the authoritarian power of the ruling KMT, a Confucianist–Leninist party. That, the Nationalist government was not prepared to tolerate. That was the case in the 1960 *Free China* incident and it was the same in the 1979 *Formosa* fiasco.

Both the KMT and the nonpartisan movement paid dearly for the Kaohsiung riot and *Formosa* trials. On the KMT’s side, the government was forced by domestic and international pressures to hold the trials, particularly the military ones, in open court and allow the mass media to cover them extensively. When the “*Formosa* eight gentlemen/ladies (*mei-li-tao pa chun-tzu*)” with their group of able and dedicated defence lawyers mounted the stand to make their passionate and impressive defence speeches, more like scholarly lectures on human rights, the rule of law and democracy than customary criminal defence statements, and those speeches were broad-cast on television and reported fully by the newspapers, it was electrifying (Kaplan, 1981). In the event, the KMT did manage to win the legal battles; however, they certainly failed to convince the Taiwanese people and to win a moral–political victory. Overnight the

Formosa defendants became political martyrs whose martyrdom would continue to haunt the KMT regime up to the present day.

On the other hand, the nonpartisan movement also suffered a serious setback. Riding the tide of people's sympathy, those who had not been jailed and those who joined the nonpartisan movement after the *Formosa* incident did win the resumed elections in 1980 and the subsequent 1983 elections. Although the elections did force them to be united temporarily, there were many rumours, suspicions, frustrations and much self-recrimination among the *tangwai* rank and file. The younger and more radical new recruits who joined the movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s were not happy with the "old guard", such as Kang Ning-hsiang and his followers. Led by young radicals such as Lin Cho-shui, now a legislator, Ch'iu I-jen, later deputy secretary-general of the DPP, and others, most of them were editors and writers for the *tangwai* journals who formed their own faction, the *New Tide* (*hsin chao-liu*), in the DPP, they carried on a debilitating anti-Kang campaign that started in mid-1982 and was to last for more than a year. The result was the split of the movement and an unexpected election defeat for Kang in 1983.

As the 1983 elections approached, the nonpartisans did organize a "Tangwai Editors and Writers Association" and a "Tangwai Central Support Group", which functioned relatively effectively as quasi-party campaign organizations, illegal but tolerated by the authorities during the "democracy holidays". However, the radical editors' association and moderate support group continued to split the nonpartisan camp even though they did cooperate to form a united front to fight the KMT at the elections. In early 1984, in addition to their "hundred flowers blooming" magazines, some nonpartisan office-holders began to push for a permanent quasi-party organization. In May, led by Fei Hsi-p'ing, a former legislator, Chang Chun-hsiung, You Ch'ing and others, the nonpartisans formed the "Tangwai Public Officials' Public Policy Research Association". Although there were no elections pending and the association was not allowed to be registered as a social organization, and thus was illegal, it was again tolerated by the KMT, in spite of occasional threats from the government that action would be taken to ban the association.

By then, the KMT itself had been substantially liberalized with its conservative leader, General Wang Sheng, head of the political department of the ministry of defence, who had carried out the purge of the *Formosa* group and was once regarded as heir-apparent to Chiang Ching-kuo, sent into "exile" as the ROC ambassador to Paraguay. In fact, the whole of Taiwanese society had substantially changed. Its economy had become "a miracle" with consistent 10–15 per cent annual growth rates during the

previous decade. With successful capitalism, the culture and the society had become very much Westernized, and thus more pluralistic, utilitarian and pragmatic. The government was still authoritarian, but to use Edwin A. Winkler's (1984) words, the politics of Taiwan in the 1980s had become soft authoritarianism, no longer the hard authoritarianism of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, although I do not necessarily agree, a case of KMT-led liberalization, what Moody (1992) calls "ruling party adaptability", led by Chiang Ching-kuo in the mid-1980s, that led to rapid democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, can be made.

In addition, there was the Henry Liu affair. Liu, a well known critic of the KMT who wrote a fairly damning biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, was assassinated in late 1984 at his home in northern California by agents sent by the chief of the intelligence section of the ROC ministry of defence. This created a nasty international incident and had a demoralizing impact on the KMT government. In early 1985, the Taipei Tenth Credit Cooperative, one of Taiwan's largest financial institutions, collapsed. It had been involved in shady and corrupt practices and a number of KMT high officials, including the party secretary-general, were implicated. In mid-1985, KMT legitimacy was weakened still further by the arbitrary arrest of Li Ya-p'ing, owner of a technical college in Kaohsiung and publisher of a Chinese newspaper in California. Again the heavy-handedness caused an international uproar and damaged the KMT government's reputation (Chiou, 1986, pp. 22-4; Chou and Nathan, 1987, p. 284).

THE "DIALOGUES"

In spite of these favourable conditions for the nonpartisans, in the November 1985 and February 1986 local elections, lacking a fully functioning party organization they were unable to capitalize on the KMT's misfortunes and indeed fared quite poorly, except in the Taipei municipal council contest. The nonpartisan leadership made up their mind in late 1985 that they had to expand their policy research association, set up branches throughout the island state, and become a real political party, in practice, if not in name. Although troubled by a series of domestic and international crises, the KMT was not in the mood to give in and let the *tangwai* easily "smuggle" itself into existence as a bona fide political party. Mediated by one of the most respected elder statesmen in Taiwan, T'ao Pai-chuan, a typical May Fourth liberal intellectual who was also a former member of the Control Yuan and an advisor to both Chiangs, and three of the most

prominent liberal scholars, Professors Hu Fu, Yang Kuo-shu and Li Hung-hsi of the National Taiwan University, the nonpartisans and KMT went into a series of "dialogues" in late 1985 and early 1986. Using a carrot-and-stick style, the KMT tried everything to talk the nonpartisans out of forming nationwide quasi-party organizations.

By May 1986, the stalemate had become serious with both sides threatening to cut off negotiations. The KMT threatened to carry out mass arrests if the nonpartisans went ahead and established anything like a political party, while the nonpartisans held firm and insisted that they would not compromise on the extension of their public policy research association. As polarization and confrontation seemed inevitable, on 7 May the "old man", Chiang Ching-kuo himself, unexpectedly told the KMT Policy Committee that they should try to develop dialogues with people of all walks of life in society, based on sincerity and faithfulness, so that political harmony and the people's welfare could be maintained and preserved.

Incredibly, immediately on 10 May through the renewed mediation efforts of T'ao Pai-chuan and the three professors, three KMT Policy Committee deputy secretaries, Liang Su-jung, later president of the Legislative Yuan, Hsiao T'ien-chan, later minister of justice and presidential advisor, and Huang Kuang-p'ing, now vice-president of the Legislative Yuan, hastily called another "dialogue" meeting with You Ch'ing, Kang Ning-hsiang and other *tangwai* leaders. One radical *Formosa* faction leader, Huang I'ien-fu, younger brother of Huang Hsin-chieh, was invited but was noticeably absent, suggesting the existing disunity prevailing in the nonpartisan camp.

The 10 May dialogue lasted five hours with both sides very conscious that this was the last chance for them to bridge their polarized positions. In the end, they managed to hammer out a three-point agreement. The most important point was that the participants agreed that the establishment of the *Tangwai* Public Policy Research Association and its branches should be allowed. However, they failed to agree on the name of the association or to settle the question of official registration. As to the former, the KMT wanted the nonpartisans not to use "*tangwai*" as part of the association's name because it contained too much anti-KMT and separatist sentiment, while the nonpartisans felt the term had special meaning and significance in their long oppositionist democracy struggle and were reluctant to give it up. On the latter, the KMT wanted the association to be awfully registered as a legal social organization under martial law, so that it would not be allowed to behave too much like a political party, whilst the nonpartisans argued that since the KMT and two other minor parties,

the Youth Party and Democratic Socialist Party, had never been registered according to the law, their new association, as a political party in fact, if not in name, should also not have to be registered either.

Although the 10 May dialogue did not really settle the issue, on the same day, the more radical *Formosa* faction headed by Ch'en Shui-pien, Huang T'ien-fu, and other more militant members, ignored the concurrent dialogue and announced that they had formed a Taipei branch of the association, the first in the nation. On the same day, the Taiwan Garrison Command, the chief administrator of martial law, banned Kang Ning-hsiang's *The Eighties* for the fourth time, again threatening the nonpartisans with its martial teeth. On 15 May, even the moderate Kang reacted swiftly by forming another branch of the association and called it the "capital branch" to differentiate it from the radicals' Taipei branch. Instantly, a chain reaction was triggered with new branches and splitting branches springing up everywhere over the island like bamboo shoots after rain.

The *tangwai* ranks were divided on the matter, but neither was the KMT's conservative faction amused. As the nonpartisan radicals accused Kang Ning-hsiang and other participants in the dialogue of making too many concessions and selling out to the Nationalists, the KMT conservatives were so frightened of the *tangwai* emerging to be a legitimate political party that they carried out a series of critical campaigns against their own representatives in the dialogue. KMT rightists even compared T'ao and Professors Hu, Yang and Li with the "democratic" intellectuals of the 1940s, such as Lo Longji, Zhang Naiqi and Shen Junru, who had sold out to the Communists in 1947-8 and characterized the dialogue as a capitulationist farce. Clearly, this group of KMT old guard could not accept the *tangwai* as a legitimate political opposition. Whilst their authoritarianism might have been softened somewhat by Chiang Ching-kuo and his reformists in the past two decades, it was nevertheless still quite authoritarian and far from being ready to be democratized.

By the time the second round of talks was supposed to take place on 24 May, both sides found that the initial euphoria and feelings of optimism created by the 10 May dialogue had dissipated. Past differences, distrust and antipathies had returned, and with the pressures from their own camps mounting they could no longer engage in meaningful give-and-take dialogues. Polarization again had set in and each side had to harden their respective stands. The 24 May dialogue ended without reaching any agreement on the thorny issues of the *tangwai* association's name and the question of registration.

Before the third dialogue was to take place on 6 June, the court handed down a decision against the nonpartisan journal *P'eng-lai-tao's* (*Paradise*

Island) publisher Huang T'ien-fu, president Ch'en Shui-pien and editor Li I-yang (who became a popular Taipei city councillor in 1989), in a criminal libel suit initiated by a conservative KMT academic and high official in the presidential office, Feng Fu-hsiang.² In the eyes of the non-partisan radicals, this was another blatant instance of political persecution and provocation aimed to further poison the evolving *tangwai*-KMT relations. A series of street protest demonstrations were launched by the non-partisan militants to show their indignation. In the worsening political atmosphere, the *tangwai* dialogue team decided to postpone the 6 June meeting indefinitely, for all practical purposes terminating the limited goodwill and chance of compromise between the two parties. On 18 July, the KMT sources indicated that they had run out of patience, and if no further contacts were held between the two sides, the government would again apply the weight of martial law to declare the *tangwai* organizations illegal and ban them (Chiou, 1986, pp. 26-7).

THE DPP AND THE EMERGING TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

So as to "say good-bye" to Ch'en Shui-pien, Huang T'ien-fu and Li I-yang as the three commenced serving their jail terms resulting from the libel conviction, the Taipei branch of the *Tangwai* Public Policy Research Association initiated seven mass protest demonstrations throughout the island, attracting tens of thousands of supporters. These "farewell parties" galvanized the nonpartisan movement into a frenzied state of mind amid the volatile political atmosphere of mid-1986.

At that time, Hsu Hsin-liang, still in exile in the United States because of the Kaohsiung incident, declared at the UN Square in New York on 1 May that he would organize a "committee for the formation of the Taiwan Democratic Party". He promised to form the party officially in August and then bring the party back to Taiwan to take part in the coming elections. As the number one nonpartisan election campaign strategist, whose 1977 Chungli incident was still a nightmare to the Nationalists, Hsu's threat was not taken lightly either by the KMT or the then *tangwai* leaders in Taiwan. With the dialogues ended in failure and the two sides locked in a dangerous confrontationist mode, the nonpartisan ranks, although seriously split, increasingly came to see an institutionalist political party as the only option, the only way out, if they were to have a political future.

In June, Kang Ning-hsiang's public policy branch produced a "democracy timetable" in which Kang and his supporters mapped out an agenda

for the *tangwai*: (1) to form a new party in 1987; (2) to lift martial law in 1988; (3) to have a complete election of the parliament in 1989; (4) to directly elect the president in 1990; and (5) to seek peaceful coexistence with China across the Taiwan Straits in 1991. It was a very radical reformist timetable then, yet in some ways it did anticipate some of the political events that were to unfold in the following few years. However, Kang's plan to form an oppositionist party was proven to be too cautious. In July, after it had become increasingly clear that the KMT was not going to give in to their demands, the *Tangwai* Public Policy Research Association secretly set up an "action group" to plan the formation of the new party. The group included You Ch'ing, Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing, Huang Er-hsuan³ and six others. On 9 August, Kang Ning-hsiang held a mass rally to explain why they had to have a political party. After that a series of "party formation" rallies, conferences and seminars were held. The activities to aggregate interest in, and gather support for, the call of the *tangwai* to form a new party were frenzied. On 25 August, Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing proposed the name the Democratic Progressive Party for the new party.

However, the conservatives in the KMT were equally adamant that the oppositionists should not be allowed to form a party. The threats from the minister of justice, the KMT centre and other government officials were crystal clear; if the *tangwai* went ahead against martial law, they would immediately be arrested, tried and put in jail. More than verbal threats were involved, and Lin Cheng-chieh,⁴ then a strong supporter of Kang and a Taipei city councillor, was indicted on 3 September on a charge of libel, because of his accusation in the Taipei city council that a KMT councillor used special privilege to get a NT\$ one million loan from a government bank. In spite of the supposed immunity of the statement made in the city council, the court sentenced Lin to eighteen months imprisonment. The sentence was seen by the nonpartisans as blatantly provocative political oppression. Immediately after the sentence, in the courtroom itself, Lin announced that "the judiciary is dead and farewell to the Taipei citizens" and went outside to join the mass rally and protest march led by Kang and other nonpartisan leaders. During the march there were fights between the police and the marchers. Lin was able to break through the police shield, rush to the presidential palace, and throw a bell at the palace to show his indignation. For more than ten days, Kang and Lin led a series of protest marches throughout Taiwan, attracting tens of thousands of people. Eleven professors from the National Taiwan University, led by Hu Fu, Li Hung-hsi, Yang Kuo-shu and Chang Chung-tung (another famous liberal scholar who, although a life-long member of the KMT, eventually left the party

and joined the DPP in 1991), held a "farewell" party for Lin, creating quite a sensation, particularly among the intellectuals.

As the 6 November elections were approaching, the nonpartisans were pressured by lack of time and the increasingly volatile political situation. While polarization had intensified between the two sides, a sort of war of nerves was also being waged between the two camps. On 19 September, Kang Ning-hsiang, You Ch'ing, Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing, Chiang P'eng-chien and other "dialogue" *tangwai* members invited nonpartisan representatives throughout the island state to consider the party formation proposal. You, Hsieh, Chang and others were assigned the task of studying and proposing the name, programme and constitution of the new party. On 27 September, another meeting was held and a proposal to form the party was drawn up. Sixteen signed the proposal which they planned to raise in the 28 September nonpartisan national meeting of the "*Tangwai* Elections Support Association". When the meeting was convened on the morning of 28 September at the Grand Hotel, built by Madame Chiang Kai-shek in the 1950s to become one of the oldest and most majestic landmarks in Taipei, more than one hundred *tangwai* representatives immediately entered into a procedural debate on the question of whether the party formation issue should be put on the agenda. Representing the group, You Ch'ing declared that the time was now right for the formation of the new party. Nonpartisan organizations, such as public policy and editors associations, had all done their homework and were ready to act, and they had come up with a well-prepared party programme and constitution and a list of party names. By lunch time, the representatives had gone through the process of moving such a motion but few of them thought it would be possible for them to form a new party immediately. They thought they were discussing a future action but, as the day dragged on the atmosphere became more and more heated, lively but also euphoric. Suddenly in the evening session, Chu Kao-cheng, certainly the most dynamic but also unpredictable young radical, decided to act. He had recently received his PhD from West Germany but returned home to find that the KMT would not allow him to teach, and so had decided to throw his lot into oppositionist politics by contesting the November election for the Legislative Yuan.⁵ At the evening session he rose to say that since all the representatives who had signed the proposal to form the new party were candidates for the coming elections, if they formed the party now and the KMT persecuted them, they should all refuse to contest the elections and let the KMT suffer the criticism and pressure which, he believed, would be unprecedented from international as well as overseas Chinese communities. He then proposed that they should

not wait any longer but immediately change their strategy by founding the party then and there. You Ch'ing immediately stood up and proposed that the meeting declare the birth of the new party. It was a strange political phenomenon for suddenly it seemed all one hundred of those present, certainly the most experienced oppositionists in Taiwan, forgot the dire consequences which their spontaneous action could entail. More like a coup than a deliberate political decision, by midnight they had pushed through all formalities and, in more than one sense, brought about a dangerously premature birth of the first real opposition party in Taiwanese history (Li, 1988, pp. 213-68).

By the dawn of 29 September, many people in Taiwan, including *tangwai* supporters, must have thought that the Grand Hotel theatrics was a brave but ill-considered and dangerous action. Most participants went home to prepare for the rage of the KMT authoritarian power. They believed the KMT would not tolerate their defiant behaviour and would use martial law to pull such seeds, not even roots yet, from the ground and crush them just like they had done sixteen years before in the case of Lei Chen's Chinese Democratic Party.

For the next few days Taiwan lay under a thick layer of uncertainty. On 30 September, the KMT dialogue team met the three professors and desperately tried to salvage the situation. After the meeting, they declared that the KMT chairman, Chiang Ching-kuo, and the party centre had reiterated that their commitment to continuous dialogues with the *tangwai* to maintain social harmony and to achieve democratic reform had not changed, that the nonpartisans' (the KMT disliked the use of "*tangwai*") illegal and radical activities would lead to social unrest and hamper the construction of a constitutional democracy, and thus should not be attempted, and they should not misunderstand the government's determination to uphold the rule of law. And as regards the nonpartisans' announcement concerning the foundation of the "Democratic Progressive Party", the mediation professors proposed further dialogues to advance democracy which they agreed and would convey their proposal to the concerned authorities, "if the nonpartisans would hold their party formation action at the preparatory stage". To the KMT statement, the DDP replied: "First, our party welcomes sincere dialogues; second, we hope the government will apply its power according to the constitution and not misuse it; third, our party maintains its freedom to form the party is its constitutional right and we are willing to compete equally with other parties to collectively advance our constitutional democracy."

The impasse continued until 5 October, more than seven days later, when finally Chiang Ching-kuo, after protracted and difficult consultations

with high party officials and his personal advisors, spoke out. In a KMT Central Standing Committee meeting, he said, "Time is changing, circumstances are changing, and the tide is changing. To meet these changes, the ruling party must push reforms according to new ideas, new methods, and based on constitutional democracy. Only so will our party be able to move with the tide and to be with the people all the time." Two days later, he met the visiting publisher of the *Washington Post* and for the first time declared that the government would shortly lift the four-decade-long martial law. With that, Chiang Ching-kuo, displaying a great deal of political wisdom and skill, resiled from a hard-line confrontationist stand, allowed the DPP to be legalized, and thus peacefully resolved one of the most serious political crises since the 28 February Uprising.

On 10 October, the DPP convened its first national congress and elected a compromise candidate, Chiang P'eng-chien, to be its first chairman. Although the KMT was not happy with the DPP's quick action before the law could be changed to allow the legalization of the new party to be properly processed, the government did not take any retaliatory action. No matter how it is considered, after more than forty years of one-party, and really one-man, authoritarian government and with the Nationalist century-old suspicion and refusal to accept any meaningful opposition parties, the sudden birth of the DPP was undoubtedly the most dramatic break from traditional Confucian authoritarian political system and behaviour, indeed the most important breakthrough in contemporary Chinese as well as Taiwanese political history. As Chou and Nathan (1987, p. 283) put it more mildly, though just as accurately: "The reform undertaken in 1986 represents a fundamental change of course, moving toward what we would call democratizing reform. The formation of an opposition political party does not by itself make Taiwan a pluralist democracy, but it is the most important single step that could have been taken in that direction."

J. Bruce Jacobs (1991, p. 16), an old Taiwan hand, believes that, "The Lei Zhen [Chen] case of 1960, when Lei and several other persons attempted to establish a China Democratic Party, confirmed that the Nationalist Party would not tolerate a genuine opposition party." After the 1979 Kaohsiung incident, Jacobs (1981, p. 22) reiterated his view that the Nationalist Party leadership in Taiwan had never intended to implement democracy in the sense of permitting a loyal opposition to replace the Nationalist leadership and gain control of the reins of government through elections, even though nonpartisan candidates could and did defeat Nationalist nominees in relatively open elections. After the DPP was formed, Jacobs (1991, p. 24) was surprised and observed, "On the basis of precedents, . . . the DPP leaders would have been arrested, yet they continued their activities

and contested the December 1986 elections under the DPP banner, and have continued to remain active to the present. Whether the Democratic Progressive Party can actually replace the Nationalist Party as the ruling party remains to be seen, but existence of a legal opposition political party has fundamentally altered the nature of Taiwan's political system."

7 The National Affairs Conference

CRISES AND MELTING OF SNOW

Although the DPP performed credibly in the 6 December 1986 elections, the KMT did not treat them as a loyal opposition and accept them as a constitutional equal who could legitimately replace them as a new government. In the following three years, the thirteen-member DPP minority in the Legislative Yuan, although outnumbered by about twenty to one by the KMT, took quite a militant, sometimes violent, approach to disrupt the nation's legislative processes. Particularly, young Chu Kao-cheng, dubbed "Taiwan's warship", effectively and skilfully used his "body language", often forcing the house into an uncontrollable, violent but farcical chaos.¹ Showmanship was involved in the DPP performance, compelling the KMT to respond in a very awkward manner. Although not attaining much success in the public policy area because of their small numbers, or preventing the ruling party from pushing through non-democratic, even anti-democratic, policies and laws, such as the hasty passing of the National Security Law to replace martial law in June 1987, the DPP still managed to break many political taboos, such as its open advocacy of Taiwanese independence and calls for investigation of the 28 February incident. And they did force the KMT to make some political concessions, such as liberalizing press control and releasing political prisoners.

Before officially lifting martial law on 16 July 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo released Yao Chia-wen, one of the eight *Formosa* defendants tried by martial law, and twenty-five other political prisoners on 20 January 1987 and Huang Hsin-chieh and Chang Chun-hung, another two principal *Formosa* defendants, on 30 May 1987. Yao was to become the DDP's second chairman later in the year, while Huang Hsin-chieh took over the chairmanship a year after and served for two terms. Finally, as will be described further in the following chapter, the last major figure of the *Formosa* incident who was sentenced to life imprisonment, Shih Ming-te, was paroled by President Lee Teng-hui and released in May 1990, thus in a sense signaling the ending of one of the most tragic events in Taiwanese history. Yao, Huang, Chang and Shih were all elected to the parliament in the December 1992 elections.

If the founding of the DPP on 28 September 1986, was the first major

breakthrough in Taiwanese political development, the death of Chiang Ching-kuo and succession of Lee Teng-hui on 13 January 1988, with its subsequent political crises and reforms which finally led to the 28 June 1990 National Affairs Conference (NAC), was undoubtedly the second most critical political change in contemporary Taiwanese politics.

As Chiang Ching-kuo's constitutional successor, Lee Teng-hui, expressed it more than two years later, as the snow had begun to melt and authoritarian politics in Taiwan started to break up and disintegrate, political power would inevitably begin to split, spread and pluralize. The Nationalist government after Chiang's death was just no longer the same. One-man dictatorship was past history. Lee, a Japanese- and American-educated PhD in agricultural economics and, more importantly, a native Taiwanese rather than a mainlander, immediately faced a conservative backlash and resistance from within the KMT power centre after succeeding Chiang on 13 January 1988. On 27 January when the KMT Central Standing Committee met to appoint him concurrently the acting chairman of the party, the conservatives led by none other than 90-year-old Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who emerged from a long self-imposed exile and seclusion, tried to prevent the committee's thirty-one members from taking such an action. Clearly, in the eyes of Madame Chiang and her old guard, to have a Taiwanese take over the chairmanship of the grand old party was too unpalatable. However, the then more liberal leadership led by Lee Huan and James Soong, respectively secretary-general and deputy secretary-general, with a more accurate understanding of the changing nature of Taiwanese politics, were in the end able to block the old guard's restorationist "palace coup".

On 7 July, when the KMT convened their thirteenth party congress, although the conservatives again attempted to prevent Lee, a "Taiwanese president", from becoming a "Taiwanese KMT chairman", under the able guidance of Lee Huan and James Soong, the liberal reformists were again able to thwart the second "palace" mini-coup. Lee Teng-hui did get his chairmanship but eventually had to give his chief rival, Lee Huan, the premiership, a move which developed into another political crisis in early 1990.

Without the kind of paternalistic, authoritarian power-base his two charismatic predecessors had had, Lee Teng-hui was to face continuous challenges from the conservative wing of the KMT, most of them mainlanders with a strong *han* chauvinistic mentality. In the end, the KMT was clearly divided into two factions, one mainstream and one non-mainstream. Lee Teng-hui and James Soong, who later became first the KMT secretary-general and then governor of Taiwan, have led the one side, while Lee

Huan, later joined by General Chiang Wei-kuo (Wego Chiang), Ching-kuo's younger brother, and John Kuan, former deputy secretary-general and head of the organization department of the party, led the other faction. Those two factions were to continue their bitter power struggle for the next three years until late 1992 and early 1993 when the KMT "lost", not in the numerical but in moral sense, the crucial December 1992 parliament elections to the DPP and the subsequent power showdown between President Lee and his non-mainstream faction arch-rival, Premier Hau Pei-ts'un, in which Lee won and Hau was forced to step down.

Without the two powerful Chiangs, the "revolutionary" KMT has certainly become an increasingly different party since 1989. Thus, in the December 1989 elections, the Nationalists suffered a massive setback and John Kuan as head of the party's organization department was sacked because of the defeat. After the 1989 elections, although the DPP had emerged as a viable opposition party and a two-party system had made its long-awaited appearance, the KMT was still not ready to accept the new political conditions and the new rule of the game. They remained deeply suspicious of the DPP and looked at the new party more as a rebellious organization bent on the destruction of the ROC as a nation than as anything else. Especially, the impressive showing of the New Tide faction and the New Nation Alliance of the DPP in the 1989 elections made conservative KMT members see the new party as a traitorous agent of Taiwanese independence. The relations between the two parties were uneasy.

By late February 1990 when the KMT was going to convene its special Central Committee meeting to choose its presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the March elections, as Chiang Ching-kuo's second term of office would end in May, the KMT factional fight flared up again. Lee Teng-hui and Li Yuan-tsu were nominated as presidential and vice-presidential candidates by the KMT Central Standing Committee. However, Chiang Wei-kuo, with the support of a group of old guard – some of them retired generals and some members of the National Assembly – that constituted the non-mainstream, declared himself "waiting to be elected but not campaigning for the office". When the non-mainstream faction managed to talk Lin Yang-kang, the president of the Judicial Yuan and generally regarded as the second most influential Taiwanese politician after President Lee himself, into joining the race and to team up with Chiang as the presidential candidate, the race was thrown into a crisis.² Lee Teng-hui had to mobilize Hsieh Tung-min, former vice-president, Huang Shao-ku, former president of the Judicial Yuan, Y. S. Tsiang (Chiang Yen-shih), former party secretary-general, and a handful of other party elders to intervene and talk the non-mainstream challengers out of the

internecine squabble. Although the traditional Chinese personalistic political manoeuvre worked and Lin first withdrew from the challenge, after which Chiang had no choice but to follow suit, the damage had been done and the president's position was substantially weakened.

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES

During the power struggle, both sides tried to secure the support of the old, life-tenured National Assembly members, called by the anti-KMT people in Taiwan "old thieves", who would vote in the March presidential elections. With Lee Teng-hui and his running mate making the door-to-door house-calls on them, something that the two Chiangs had never done, the Assembly delegates felt important and powerful again. In a quite farcical way they regained some lost self-esteem and self-confidence and began to believe and act as if they were indeed holding the "*fa-t'ung*" (legitimacy tradition) of the ROC which they should exercise proudly and enthusiastically, not only just to elect the president and vice-president of the Republic but to "save" the nation from radical forces such as the DPP, who were, in their old eyes, hell-bent on destroying their glorious Republican Revolution and their sacred "Middle Kingdom".

With their new-found power, derived from their *han* chauvinistic concept of "*fa-t'ung*", the "old thieves" became intoxicated and corrupt again. Without any real understanding or appreciation of the dramatic changes in Taiwan politics, they leapt into the whirlpool of the complex KMT factional power struggle. Most sided with the non-mainstream faction. Their false sense of a mission to save the nation was one factor, but they were also a group of corrupt, money- and power-hungry politicians. With their votes to elect the next president, they tried to "blackmail" the KMT into giving them more benefits and privileges and extending their political power into some legislative areas so that they would be equal with the more powerful Legislative Yuan, which was of course totally unconstitutional even under the 1947 ROC Constitution.

The result was a pathetic and ugly display of greedy and corrupt, as well as naïve, political behaviour. When they finally gathered at Yangming Mountain on the outskirts of Taipei, isolated, heavily fortified and protected by a couple of thousand of anti-riot crack troops, to carry out their anachronistic electoral duties, they instantly alienated and angered most, if not all, of the people in Taiwan, particularly the young students and intellectuals. While Lee Teng-hui needed their votes and could not afford to

antagonize them, the DPP, a mere handful facing about seven hundred KMT members, were only able to disrupt the proceedings, even resorting to physical violence to prevent the old Assembly members from reporting for duty or mounting the podium to make their speeches, and even in desperation overturning the dinner tables at the presidential state banquet. After a couple of days' futile disruption, the DPP were not allowed to attend the meetings any longer and were ejected from Yangmingshan; thereafter they could only continue their angry protests at the foot of the mountain. The presidential election at Yangmingshan was widely called the "strange tale of the mountain" or the "election of the village chief of Yangmingshan".

Clearly both the KMT and the old National Assembly members had seriously misjudged the mood of the nation. For the first time, more seriously, they completely underestimated the degree of alienation and frustration of the traditionally docile and obedient student population. Unlike their counterparts in South Korea or Thailand, Taiwanese students had to be regarded as the most Confucian, apolitical, conservative and nonviolent in Asia. They were so even more than their counterparts in China, thanks to the KMT's control programmes being more successful than the Communists'. They had not carried out any protest marches against the government for more than four decades since the 28 February Uprising. The KMT's soft but firm control of the Taiwanese youth, through organizations such as the China Youth Corps, had been very effective. However, on this occasion, deeply disgusted and hurt by their elders' corrupt and greedy performance on Yangming Mountain, on 17 March, starting initially with only about sixty students from the National Taiwan University, the Taiwanese students began to gather at the gate and square of the massive Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in the centre of Taipei, to protest the political farce being stage-managed by the ruling party. The students' action instantly touched the hearts of not only other young people but the general public in this culturally still very traditional Confucian society. On the second day, the ranks of the student protestors swelled to include representatives from many tertiary institutions and even some high schools, throughout the island. Their action was seen as a mini-Tiananmen democracy movement, with its more famous counterpart in Beijing less than a year before and still fresh in the memory of students and the intellectual political elite in Taiwan. On 19 March, after just three days, there were more than three thousand students participating in the sit-in with about twenty thousand people standing behind them in the imposing memorial hall square to show their support.

By then, the KMT hierarchy, remembering their humiliating defeat on

the Chinese mainland, which they had always blamed just as much on "leftist" students and intellectuals as on Mao and his Communists, were deeply troubled and shaken. They had developed great skill in dealing with the *tangwai* and the DPP, but not with the rebellious students.

From the very beginning, the students' political demands were direct and simple. They wanted the government to abolish the anachronistic National Assembly, terminate the equally anachronistic and meaningless "anti-Communist rebellion mobilization period" which had been used by the KMT to oppress political dissidents and suppress democratization processes, convene an NAC to resolve the constitutional and political crises besieging the country, and promise a firm reform timetable.

The nonpartisans and the DPP had been making similar demands for more than two decades but getting only piecemeal responses from the KMT. Even during the March crisis, although the DPP mobilized every resource they could muster to support the student demonstrations, the KMT was still not taking them too seriously. The fact of the matter was that during the student sit-in period, when a DPP delegation led by Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh personally called on President Lee Teng-hui to discuss the on-going political crisis, they were thrown out of the presidential palace, Chairman Huang being forcibly removed in a very undignified manner by the military police.

Strangely, even as late as March 1990, the KMT still had not recognized the DPP as a legitimate and worthy opponent, a bona fide opposition party. For the students, however, the story was somewhat different. Because of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall student protest, on 21 March, the 668 National Assembly members hastily abandoned their campaigns for more money and power and dutifully elected Lee Teng-hui to be the first Taiwanese ROC president. At 1.30 in the afternoon of 21 March, the ritual of presidential election was over. At 7.50, the same afternoon, Lee received fifty-three student representatives, talked with them for about an hour, and promised to call an NAC to push for democratic reforms immediately after his 20 May inauguration. He agreed that an extensive constitutional reform agenda should be put to the NAC.

Unlike their Beijing counterparts' tragic fate, the Taiwanese students' first and only mild pro-democracy campaign accomplished a great deal in less than a week's time, thanks to the four-decade-long struggles of the oppositionist movements and in an ironic sense Deng Xiaoping's massacre of the students in the 4 June Tiananmen affair. On 22 March, the students went back to their campuses and the DPP took over the next stage of the battle for institutionalist democratization, riding on the back of the students.

Indeed, the authoritarian political snow in Taiwan had more than become soft, it had begun to melt like the snow on Yu Mountain in central Taiwan in the summertime.

Because of the dramatic impact of the student protest campaign which changed, or rather revealed, the increasingly different, complex, even pluralizing and democratizing political conditions in Taiwan, the authoritarian KMT were not only forced to accept the students' demands, but also to soften their authoritarianism still further. And partly because they wanted to fulfill some of those promises they made to the students and the nation, such as the immediate convening of the NAC, the KMT had to deal with the DPP more conciliatorily and democratically. Increasingly, Lee Teng-hui and his reformist followers came to accept that they would need a constructive opposition party to resolve the mounting constitutional crisis and to push for substantive political reforms. Although there was an initial unhappiness over Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh's visit to the presidential palace, the president did send James Soong to apologize to the chairman, and throughout the second half of the March crisis, a communication channel was constantly maintained between the president, James Soong and their staff, and the DPP leadership, through a number of contacts, such as Ch'en Ch'ung-kuang, one of the most respected elder Taiwanese statesmen and industrialists, and the Reverend Weng Hsiu-kung, President Lee's family priest, and his church. In the end the two sides were able to cooperate to contain the crisis.

On 2 April, in the presidential palace, President Lee met Chairman Huang for the first time as the two heads of two parties, signalling the arrival of a new era, the beginning of a two-party system in Taiwan. The KMT for the first time officially accepted the DPP as a worthy opponent, if not quite yet a loyal opposition waiting in the wings to form the next government.

However, the conservatives in the ruling party remained unhappy with the rapid changes in their "revolutionary" party. Some would have preferred a 4-June-Tiananmen-style crack down on those they saw as unruly students and opportunist oppositionists. Particularly the non-mainstream faction began to question the emerging new power alliance in the party, with a KMT Taiwanese president who increasingly cooperated with a DPP filled with Taiwanese, even Taiwanese-independence advocates. Having been pushed or eased out of power, the KMT non-mainstream faction led by Lee Huan and John Kuan (Kuan Chung) began to fight back even more viciously and called this new Taiwanization political phenomenon the "Lee Teng-hui complex".

NAC AND PARTY POLITICS

On 4 April 1990, President Lee announced the formation of a 24-member preparatory NAC committee. It included KMT top leaders, such as James Soong and Y. S. Tsiang, who after helping Lee Teng-hui solve his February–March crisis, became the presidential secretary-general and certainly one of the most trusted friends of the president. Also included were the DPP's Huang Hsin-chieh, Chang Chun-hung, Kang Ning-hsiang and Ch'en Yung-hsing (the chief party advisor), and some prominent liberal scholars, such as political scientists Hung-mao Tien of the University of Wisconsin, Hu Fu and Alexander Ya-li Lu of the National Taiwan University, and a law professor, Hungdah Chiu, from Maryland University. Although the radical New Tide faction was not happy with the composition of the committee, especially as none of its members were invited to join the extra-parliamentary organization, the four DPP heavy-weights were adamant in their support of the convention of the NAC. It took some power play, but in the end they managed to persuade the party rank and file to go along with the idea of the NAC as an initial attempt at institutionalist democratization.

As the preparatory committee went into action immediately, setting up numerous task forces, research teams, seminars and conferences to search, collect and compile relevant materials, opinions and information for the 28 June formal conference, the power confrontation between President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lee Huan led inevitably to a collision course. It became clear by mid-April that President Lee was going to dump Premier Lee after 20 May, when the president started his new term and the latter was not prepared to accept his dismissal without a fight. On 25 April, after a series of manoeuvres on both sides, Lee Huan declared that "if called upon to serve again, I would not evade the duty and would devote myself 100 per cent to the office", clearly reversing his earlier stand that he would step down to allow a Taiwanese take over the top executive position.³ With that open expression, the president was visibly cornered by his premier's power *t'ai-chi* (Chinese boxing) play.

To complicate the matter further, and probably more importantly, the president and his mainstream supporters felt increasingly that the division of the two factions and the split between the Taiwanese and mainlanders both in the KMT and in the country as a whole had taken a nasty turn and could become even more explosive. There were rumours around that in desperation the non-mainstream faction would use their new contacts with the Chinese Communists to bring the Dengist red army across the Taiwan Straits to seize power and force reunification of the two antagonistic sides,

the so-called "yin Ch'ing-ping ju-kuan" (bringing the Ch'ing soldiers into the Great Wall) syndrome. Real or imagined, the president and his men felt deeply troubled and threatened by this possibility. On 1 May, the president revealed for the first time that he had asked the premier to stay on three times but the premier refused. On 2 May, surprising almost everyone in Taiwan and probably upsetting most opposition and many KMT leaders, he announced that Hau Pei-ts'un, a four-star general, minister of defence, former chief of general staff, and certainly the most powerful military general in Taiwan, would be his next premier. Although it effectively neutralized Lee Huan, the appointment was another bombshell that suddenly exploded on the fragile Taiwanese political landscape.

DPP followers, students and professors, some of the latter even traditional KMT supporters, took to the streets again. On 3 May, the protestors surrounded the Legislative Yuan and in the middle of the night, someone started a fire in one of the Yuan's buildings. At times more than twenty thousand people marched through the Taipei streets. Still, with the non-mainstream faction of the KMT effectively neutralized because General Hau was generally regarded as part of their leadership, Lee Teng-hui was able to weather this third political crisis in the year.⁴ On 20 May, when his new presidency was inaugurated and he announced a series of far-reaching political reforms, the president was able to maintain and even consolidate his own power position.

In the Hau Pei-ts'un crisis, the DPP was temporarily absent from the NAC preparatory committee meetings and threatened to pull out of the whole exercise. However, in the end when, immediately after his inauguration, the president in one brave, unexpected and unprecedented action pardoned nearly all political prisoners, including the controversial *Formosa* defendants, and restored their full political rights, the DPP NAC representatives responded positively by deciding to return to committee work. When Hsu Hsin-liang, who had been serving a six-year jail sentence after he smuggled himself into Taiwan and was arrested and tried about six months earlier, and Shih Ming-te, who had just served ten years of his life term following the Kaohsiung incident, and who with his pre-*Formosa* fifteen-year prison life was called the "Mandela of Taiwan", stepped through the jail doors on the same day as President Lee took office, everyone in Taiwan knew that the political game would be played in a totally different manner from now on. Particularly, Hsu as a potential presidential candidate would pose a threat to, or at least a constant headache for, the KMT. Less than two months later, at the NAC, Hsu immediately proved himself to be a formidable political foe, a powerful and skilful political antagonist. He was the strategist, as well as the main actor, in the conference, who

orchestrated the attack on the KMT old guard and forced the ruling party to make concessions and accept the principal reform proposal for altering the presidential election system.

In his inauguration speech Lee promised to terminate the "anti-Communist rebellion mobilization period" and abolish the temporary provisions within one year. That would constitutionally end the authoritarian rule of the KMT regime and was hence an impressive show of reformist commitment. Together with the pardoning of political prisoners, Lee's actions were enough to persuade the DPP not only to return to the NAC preparatory meetings but also to begin organizing its own series of activities to drum up popular support for its reform programmes.

To add to the dramatically changing political condition in Taiwan, on 21 June the Grand Council of Justices, the highest judicial organ, handed down a new constitutional interpretation, No. 261, diametrically altering its original interpretation, No. 31, that had legalized life tenure for the parliamentarians almost forty years before. It declared now that all members of the parliament elected in 1947 should retire by the end of 1991. In a quiet but effective way, that decision helped Lee Teng-hui hammer the last nail in the coffin of the old KMT-ROC political system.

The new cabinet was formed with only a few new faces and a civilian defence minister, Ch'en Li-an (who later became the president of the Control Yuan). Lee's political crises, though, which had severely weakened the KMT and permanently changed the Taiwanese political landscape, were basically over. He had survived. Now all he had to do was to convene the NAC to establish the legitimacy of his presidency, which he did not get from the Yangmingshan election, on a new constitutional base with some popular support. However, on 13 June, when he finally announced the full list of one hundred and fifty NAC representatives, many were disappointed. Although the most famous political dissidents, such as Professor Peng Ming-min, Hsu Hsin-liang, Lu Hsiu-lien, Yao Chia-wen and even some well known pro-independence advocates in the United States, such as Ch'en T'ang-shan (who returned to contest both 1992 legislative and 1993 Tainan county-chief elections and won both), were invited, about 70 per cent were conservative KMT members or supporters. Only 10 per cent were DPP members, and only 30 per cent were liberal reformers, including liberal scholars from the KMT. Less than 30 per cent were members of the intellectual political elite with political science and law training backgrounds.

However, Taiwanese politics had by that time already fundamentally changed. Even the KMT was no longer united, and it certainly was not Confucianist-Leninist any more. Thus, the "New KMT Alliance" faction,

a non-mainstream group in the KMT, was bitterly opposed to the NAC, even though one of its more famous members, legislator Chao Shao-k'ang (Jaw Shau-kong), was an NAC delegate.⁵ In addition, due to the new variable of the "Lee Teng-hui complex" which had created new political cleavages and uncertainties in the ruling party, the liberal-conservative, reformist-restorationist line was no longer that clear and decisive. The Taiwanese-mainlander cleavage further complicated many political issues. Consequently, depending on the issues, KMT delegates at times ended up in completely opposite camps, some of them occasionally siding with the DPP. This was particularly true with highly sensitive and controversial matters, such as the abolition of the 1947 Constitution, changing the existing semi-cabinet government into an American-style presidential system, and Taiwan's policy toward China. In short, the battle lines in the NAC could not be drawn purely on traditional party, ideological and power divisions any longer. In this new volatile political situation, the DPP as the one and only institutionalist opposition to the KMT despite its small size was to play a pivotal role in the unfolding NAC drama.

THE DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SYSTEM

Just importantly, by the time the NAC sessions were under way, all the principal political and constitutional issues had already been thoroughly researched, discussed, argued, documented and published in newspapers, journals, research papers, policy statements, and seminar and conference presentations. The independent Institute for National Policy Research, reportedly to be Lee Teng-hui's think-tank, alone had held many seminars and conferences and produced an enormous volume of well-researched papers and books on the main constitutional and political issues for the NAC.⁶ The documents collected by the NAC preparatory committee, led by Vice-Premier Shih Ch'i-yang, a former law professor, were also fairly complete, both in terms of facts and theories. It was indeed a very remarkable constitution-making or -amending exercise, thus vindicating Lee Teng-hui's sincerity and determination to carry out successful reforms.

Five major issues to be dealt with by the NAC as decided by the preparatory committee were, briefly, as follows. First, how should the parliament be reformed? Should the three-chamber parliament be substantially restructured, for example by abolition of the National Assembly and the Control Yuan? Second, how should the long-delayed local self-government be implemented in the vastly changed political circumstances

now prevailing in Taiwan? Should Taiwan be divided into several, three or six provinces, increase its *yuan-hsia* cities (the municipalities, such as Taipei and Kaohsiung, under direct administration of the Executive Yuan), or abolish the provincial-level government as in Japan? Third, how should the central government be reformed and reorganized? Should the ROC adopt a governmental system similar to the US presidential, British parliament-cabinet, or French "semi-presidential" system? Or should the ROC continue the five-*yuan* system designed by its founding father, Dr Sun Yat-sen, originally for China in the early twentieth century? Fourth, after the termination of the "anti-Communist rebellion mobilization period" and thus inevitable abolition of the temporary provisions of the constitution, should Taiwan "defreeze" and reactivate the 1947 Constitution, amend the constitution to meet the present political needs, or continue to "freeze" the 1947 Constitution and adopt a "basic law" like the one West Germany had had since the end of the Second World War, or the "Democratic Great Charter" proposed by the DPP, to meet the new political challenges, or, most drastically, draft a new constitution to replace the old one, thus creating a totally new political-constitutional government, even a new state or a new republic? Fifth, what should be the new Taiwan's relations with China? How should Taiwan map out its new open policy toward the Communist regime on the Chinese mainland?

Of course, such problems were immensely complex and difficult. Power, policy and ideological lines were mixed, crossing each other at some points and tangled together at others. The best example would be the pre-conference theoretical and philosophical, as well as some ideological, debate and split between two of the most authoritative constitutional scholars in Taiwan, Hu Fu and Li Hung-hsi, two of the professors involved in the previous *tangwai*-KMT dialogues. For the last two decades, Hu and Li had been comrades in arms, steadfastly standing at the very front of Taiwan's constitutional reform and political democratization battles. As liberal-democratic scholars, they had been actively involved in the dangerous confrontationist politics between the KMT on the one hand and the non-partisans and DPP on the other. Their contribution to Taiwan's political liberalization and reform was highly regarded. However, in this crucial historic moment, they painfully parted company, with Hu adamantly advocating a return to the 1947 Constitution with some amendments to meet present Taiwanese conditions, whilst Li just as strongly believed that the old constitution, no matter how much modification was made, could no longer solve the vastly changed new political problems of Taiwan, and thus he supported the basic law option. Since the NAC, Li has further changed his mind and begun to support drafting a new constitution for

Taiwan. The debate became so fierce that their long friendship was seriously damaged and on the eve of the NAC grand opening both of them withdrew from the conference. Most people felt that had they attended, the NAC would have been more effective and meaningful.

When the official sessions of the conference were under way, the battle lines were fairly clearly drawn. The KMT conservatives, represented by elders like Lin Tung, chairman of the party's influential policy committee, and Wang T'i-wu, the publisher of the pro-non-mainstream *United Daily News*, preferred the status quo. Other than restoration of the old constitution, they would support only minor changes to the present political constitutional systems. The KMT liberals led by James Soong, Shih Ch'i-yang, and Ma Ying-chiu (Ma Ying-jeou), then chairman of the Executive Yuan's research, development and evaluation committee and later minister of justice would support Hu Fu's more extensive constitutional reform position. However, among the KMT delegates, substantially along the Taiwanese-mainlander great divide, they split on the central government system. The "New KMT" people, such as Chao Shao-k'ang, and non-mainstream forces, such as Ch'en Ch'ang-wen (Ch'en Chang-ven), chief legal advisor to Premier Hau Pei-ts'un, pushed for cabinet government, while President Lee's supporters, such as Kao Yu-jen, former Taiwan provincial assembly speaker, Hsieh Shen-shan, a member of the Legislative Yuan and later KMT deputy secretary-general, and Ku Chen-fu (Koo Chen-fu), the top Taiwanese industrialist, all three also members of the KMT Central Standing Committee, quietly but forcefully worked for adopting a US-style presidential system. On the DPP side, people were more united in pushing for the drafting of a "democratic great charter," turning Taiwan into five or six provinces so as to look more like an independent nation than a mere single province of China, abolition of the anachronistic National Assembly and Control Yuan, and having the president elected directly by the voters of Taiwan. On the difficult question of mainland China policy, only the KMT liberals advocated more opening up to China, while most of the others across party and ideological lines called for more caution and care to protect Taiwan from falling into the Chinese Communist united front mousetrap. In a sort of tacit understanding, both KMT and DPP decided not to raise the sensitive issues of reunification with China and independence of Taiwan.

In between the two major parties were the liberal scholars, like Hung-mao Tien, Hungdah Chiu, Parris Chang of Pennsylvania State University, Michael Ying-mao Kao of Brown University, Peter Ch'en of Wayne State University, Byron Weng of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Fu-mei Ch'en of Stanford's Hoover Institution and others. They were squeezed in

the middle, trying very hard to advance their long-cherished reformist democratic goals, and at the same time to mediate between the KMT and the DPP to avoid any further polarization and confrontation that was constantly threatening to abort the conference. Their demands were less dogmatic, more flexible and less united. They just wanted to see the institutionalist democratization process firmly put in place. As for the few political dissidents from overseas, such as Wang Kuei-jung of the influential Formosa Association for Public Affairs, a Taiwanese lobbying organization in Washington, DC, and Huang Yang Mei-sing, a Taiwanese activist in New York and later head of DPP's foreign affairs department, basically they were moderate independence supporters. They would prefer to see a new constitution, a presidential government, and a more sovereign, even independent, nation-state of Taiwan emerging from the conference. They, however, were not really dogmatic and militant about their more revolutionary stands, and thus were able to work with liberal scholars and the DPP most of the time.

During the hectic seven-day conference, there was a great deal of power manoeuvring as well as straight-out horse trading. Clearly, the KMT and the DPP were the principal power players of the game. It was amazing to see the two parties which would not even recognize and talk to each other, with the KMT regarding the DPP as traitors, just six months earlier, spend the hot summer days and nights pursuing each other to rationally discuss important national affairs, to painstakingly seek consensus and compromise and to democratically settle their differences in order to achieve major reforms in Taiwan's political-constitutional structures. When James Soong and Chang Chun-hung, two party secretaries-general, sat on the central stage to co-chair the final plenary session, the political image and message broadcast live through the television screen and other news media to the Taiwanese people was certainly more than simply historic. The memory was still fresh on many people's minds that Chang was court-martialled ten years before, sentenced to a twelve-year prison term, and just out of jail, while Soong was the government chief spokesman who vilified Chang and his co-defendants in the *Formosa* trials. The sight must have had a great socio-psychological impact on the future political behaviour and culture of the twenty million people in Taiwan.

Although the liberal scholars on both sides did play a sort of intellectual lubricant role, by reading relevant documents, writing reports, explaining fine points of political and constitutional theories and practices to the "real" politicians and power players, even temporarily playing the role of the referee to maintain the level playing field, they knew they were not the principal ball handlers and were outside the boundaries of Taiwanese power politics.

As the conference progressed, reformists and oppositionists alike were proven to be realistic players. A loose coalition of the reformists, including the DPP members, "nonpartisans" who were not really part of the former *tangwai*, such as Wu Feng-shan (president of the influential *Independence Post* newspapers), liberal scholars and overseas dissidents, from the very beginning, although they tried to push for more radical constitutional changes, realistically wanted only to attain two major goals: First, to establish a constitutional referendum process, so that one day the political future of Taiwan might be decided by such a process; and second, to set up a new presidential election system in which the next ROC president would be directly elected by the citizens of Taiwan. Vastly outnumbered by the KMT representatives, they knew that to achieve such a dramatic consensus they would need the support of many KMT liberals and reformists. From the start, they also knew that they could probably get the direct presidential election but not the referendum process.

Battles were fought, won and lost on secondary and less controversial issues, such as local government autonomy and mainland policy. When the major battles were finally fought and the dust settled, as expected the reformists had defeated the last ditch attempts by the KMT conservatives and some "New KMT" members to water down the most important NAC resolution, that the next ROC president should be elected by the citizens of Taiwan. They believed that once implemented, although still unclear in terms of the form of the election, the direct presidential electoral system would effectively force the abolition or dramatic reform of the National Assembly, change the central government structure, and alter the basic spirit and letter of the 1947 Constitution, no matter how the reform was carried out, whether through a constitutional amendment process or by drafting a new constitution. More seriously in the eyes of the conservatives, to let the Taiwanese voters elect their president would produce a "Taiwanese president", not an "ROC president" representing the "legitimacy tradition of whole China" (*fa-t'ung*), which was why the conservatives fought so vehemently to defeat the proposal.

THE FIRST STEP TOWARD INSTITUTIONALIST DEMOCRATIZATION

A decision concerning how the constitution should be amended would have to wait until early 1992, when the new constitutional-reform National Assembly to be elected in late 1991 was convened. There could be no

question, however, that all concerned realized that the NAC's agreement in principle was a major victory for the reformers. More importantly, all sides also agreed that since the NAC was successfully convened and had fulfilled its intended constitutional reform purposes, it was President Lee who was the major winner. On the evening of the last day of the conference, after having presided over the last general session – broadcast live throughout the island-state – the president hosted a state banquet for the delegates. He was in a jubilant mood, toasting three times the great success of the conference. He was of course right to be very pleased with the outcome of the whole exercise. His shaky presidency certainly did not get any political legitimacy from the 641 National Assembly members who had voted him into office on Yangmingshan on 21 March. It did, however, achieve a new, though strictly speaking not constitutional but only quasi-constitutional, legitimacy from the NAC. Most people saw and accepted it that way and that was the real significance of the Grand Hotel theatre directed by President Lee.

Of course, that was only part of the story. From the perspective of democratizing Taiwan, the most important thing about the conference was not only the constitutional reformist outcome or the legitimization result for the Lee presidency, but the first appearance of the institutionalist framework of the two-party system. It was only a preliminary form, but it was nevertheless an institutionalist democratic party system in the making.

The next morning, 5 July, the president invited the overseas delegates to morning tea at the presidential palace. In a triumphant mood, quoting the then British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, Lee explained to them why when the snow begins to melt it is most dangerous and what a political minefield he had gone through in the last few months when Taiwan's authoritarian power structure had broken down and disintegrated like the melting snow, resulting in a series of bitter power struggles. The deep impression he tried to make was that he was sincere and confident in carrying out the difficult but inevitable political and constitutional reforms. In answering a question about the NAC consensus on popular election of the president, he seemed to be willing and ready to support the recommendation and push for its eventual implementation. He talked in great length about the need to go to the people, to listen to them and to let them participate in the decision-making process of national affairs. In answering another question on the referendum, he also expressed his willingness to consider the matter.

Thus the stage was set, a beginning had been made by the NAC to push for institutionalist democratization in Taiwan. The "great transition" from

liberalization to democratization, Samuel Huntington's (1968) institutional variable, having made its presence felt for the first time in Taiwanese politics, seemed finally off and running. No one was yet optimistic about its ultimate outcome. Nevertheless, Lee Teng-hui with his declared commitment to serving only one term and working for real democratic reforms,⁷ coupled with his immense popularity among the Taiwanese people, was probably in the best position to start, if not finish, bringing about this long-awaited political miracle.

Certainly, before March 1990 there were not many political observers who had foreseen such a dramatic change. The most generous and objective assessments of political development in Taiwan, made by observers with some basic sympathy and understanding of the Taiwanese political situation – Samuel Huntington, Lucian Pye, Robert A. Scalapino, Hung-mao Tien, Thomas B. Gold, Constance S. Meaney and Edwin A. Winkler – had been at most cautiously optimistic, as will be shown in the following paragraphs.

In his 1986 article on Taiwan's development, Pye (1987, p. 614) concluded that "the island is far from being politically monolithic, decision-making by the authorities cannot be by fiat, but rather must involve compromises among a substantial body of opinion-makers and competing interests". Nevertheless, he stressed, "The system is still authoritarian in comparison with Western democratic ideals."

In an article written in early 1986, before the illegal formation of the DPP, I was even more critical:

As of now the cruel reality of Taiwanese politics does not indicate substantial democratization or warrant optimism. Political developments in Taiwan since 1949 certainly suggest that both the KMT and the *tangwai* are to blame for the failure of democracy in Taiwan, with the former deserving much more criticism and condemnation than the latter. Political polarizations have taken place and continue to take place not just between the KMT and the *tangwai* but also between the moderate and militant factions within the *tangwai*. Both polarizations are serious but not yet extreme. They have the potential to develop into violent confrontations, though not necessarily a violent revolution. Certainly, polarization has severely hurt the democratization process in Taiwan.

Presently the *tangwai* is factionalized, fragmented, frustrated, and embittered. On the one hand, most of the *tangwai* members believe the KMT is totally authoritarian, corrupt, and beyond democratic reform and salvage. They believe the KMT will never allow them to become

a significant loyal opposition, even less a viable and workable alternative. On the other hand, they are also very well aware that an economically growing Taiwan under the efficient control of the KMT does not present the necessary revolutionary conditions to make the KMT "the enemy of the people." There is just no possibility for them to carry out a revolutionary struggle to overthrow the Nationalist regime. The *tangwai* supporters are not ready for such a struggle, and neither are the Taiwanese masses.

No matter how the Taiwanese *tangwai* like to compare Taiwan with South Korea and the Philippines, they are not like Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam's New Korean Democratic Party, a party that might win the 1988 presidential elections. They are also not comparable to the New People's Army in the Philippines, a military insurgent force that receives substantial mass support and fought a credible guerilla war in the countryside against the totally corrupt and inefficient Marcos regime. Chiang Ching-kuo's political acumen seems just slightly superior to that of Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea, and his government seems less corrupt and despotic than Marcos's was in the Philippines.

Still, Chiang is running out of time, and the KMT is running out of anti-Communist rhetoric and political excuses. Soon they have to face the rapidly evolving democratization question in Taiwan. The *tangwai*, alienated, frustrated, polarized, and fragmented though it may be, is still potentially the most viable and powerful political force that the KMT will have to deal with either in a democratic situation or in a revolution. When the time comes, more likely sooner than later, if democracy is still not a viable alternative, another Chungli or Kaohsiung violent confrontation will quite probably challenge the KMT again on the "island China." After that, recent events in the Philippines and South Korea may no longer look quite so remote from the shores of Formosa, the "island beautiful". (Chiou, 1986, pp. 27-8)

Only a few months after that assessment was made, the *tangwai* broke through the martial law barrier, formed the DPP and successfully contested the next two elections. Since then, the DPP has become an institutionalized opposition party in Taiwan and at the NAC emerged to be an efficient functional loyal opposition. In the eyes of Hsu Hsin-liang, the most respected DPP political strategist, after the NAC the opposition party was even ready to take over power in the near future. Indeed, since the NAC, many would agree that the KMT-DPP two-party system has become a firm, viable and permanent fixture, an institutional reality, in the rapidly democratizing Taiwanese politics.

SCHOLARLY VIEWS

By 1989 expert assessments were still similarly cautious. In a conference on democratization in the ROC at the Institute of International Relations, Taipei, 9–11 January 1989, co-sponsored by the Institute and the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, renowned scholars such as Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, Andrew Nathan, Susan Pharr and Myron Weiner, came to praise the successful “Taiwan experience”. In his keynote speech, although cautioning about the difficulty of really meaningful democratic institutionalization, Huntington did suggest that Taiwan was in a good position to make such a great transition. Lipset, in his keynote address, followed his classic *Political Man* theoretical line and indicated that Taiwan’s economic miracle, coupled with its high educational level and other favourable social conditions, was ready to lead Taiwan into a substantive democratization phase. However, it must be pointed out that both Huntington and Lipset were very careful in their cautious optimism. Neither predicted the real democratization would take place in Taiwan in the near future.⁸

Some of the papers presented at the conference were later up-dated, revised and published in the volume *Political Change in Taiwan* (Cheng and Haggard, 1992). Although most of them saw remarkable changes along the line of authoritarianism-to-liberalization transformation, they did not believe the process of institutionalist democratization had really begun in Taiwan in the late 1980s.

In her article, “Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT”, Constance Meaney (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 116) concludes her assessment: “Changes in the ROC as of 1991 still add up to liberalization more than democratization. They create necessary but not sufficient conditions for a full transition from authoritarian rule to institutionalized democracy.” She points out that liberalization will not inevitably lead to full democratization, or that liberalizing changes granted by the regime will be maintained in the absence of full democratization. She explains that liberalization refers to relaxation of repressive measures and restoration of civil liberties. The ending of martial law, relaxation of press restrictions and permission of demonstrations fall into this category. Democratization involves more fundamental change in the character of the regime and institutionalization of democratic processes. She says that some changes in recent years in Taiwan do come close to this category. At the national level the most obvious perhaps is permission of *tangwai* candidates to run and be elected, and later of the DPP and others to organize.

In spite of these changes, Meaney is cautious and believes the potential

for Taiwan to end up in a "halfway house of liberalization without full democratization" is high. The KMT still sees itself as a "natural political player" who has no professional role into which it might retire, as would a military general. "Moreover, the party has experience in competing elections, and it had financial resources unavailable to its rivals and hegemony if not monopoly over media. It is intertwined with the state bureaucracy, in particular the powerful economic bureaucracy. It has motives to liberalize and up to a point democratize (in particular, a desire to project a progressive image to the world, and present an alternative to the mainland, and an ideology that sees eventual democratization as a goal) regardless of opposition pressure. But it is not clear that the KMT is in a crisis such that it will be pressed to extricate itself by trespassing into democracy as a solution, as Di Palma puts it" (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 116).

Edwin A. Winckler (1989, pp. 45–6), a long-time observer of Taiwanese politics, in his paper, "Taiwan Politics in the 1990s: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism", is clinically precise in an examination and prediction of political development in Taiwan. In late 1989, he did not anticipate the beginnings of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy until the mid-1990s, probably after the 1996 presidential election and 1997 retrocession of Hong Kong are safely over. He predicted that in the mid-1990s, although the National Assembly would have been reformed and might contain enough non-Nationalist Taiwanese to challenge the Nationalist presidential candidate, probably the Nationalists would still have sufficient control to re-elect him (Lee Teng-hui). However, this might involve a Nationalist promise to allow a more open contest within the National Assembly in 2002, if the 1996 candidate were still Lee, and the 2002 election would choose his successor. In any case, assuming that relations with the PRC remained stable, after 1996 credible arguments could be advanced, perhaps in the 1998 national elections, that the next president should be chosen more competitively. The way the Nationalists do things, probably they would maintain some soft-authoritarianism safeguards until after seeing that an open competition in 2002 produced an acceptable result. Assuming it did, thereafter those safeguards might be removed, and the 2008 presidential election might even be conducted by direct popular vote, consolidating a transition to democracy.

In his revised edition, entitled "Taiwan Transition?", Winckler does not include the above timetable (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, pp. 221–259). Instead, he says that parliamentary elections should promote democratization and that re-election of central representative bodies in late 1992 will strengthen the function of parliament, encourage the assertiveness of Nationalist legislators, and increase the leverage of the DPP. However, it

is unlikely to deprive the KMT of a parliamentary majority, "something that would probably take many elections if it occurs at all". He believes the 1992, 1995 and 1998 parliaments will be legally democratic, but "politically they will be overcoming the legacy of authoritarianism" (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 250).

Winckler's assessment in 1990 was that "Taiwan was halfway through transition – neither authoritarianism nor democracy, but rather a jumble of both" (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 221). Taiwan had liberalized authoritarianism but not yet institutionalized democracy. Transition was likely to continue as it had begun – protracted struggle between conservatives and progressives, producing tortuous but cumulative change. According to Winckler, in 1990 the most basic negatives remained the "refusal of the ROC to let Taiwan be just Taiwan" and thus, although one could be guardedly optimistic, the outcome of Taiwan's transition remained in doubt (Cheng and Haggard, 1992, p. 221).

In their conference paper entitled "Transition from Authoritarianism in East Asia: Empirical Observation" (which is not included in Cheng and Haggard's volume), Thomas B. Gold and Gwo-Shong Shieh (1989, pp. 2–18), cited Eisenstadt's "breakdowns of modernization", and Huntington and Eisenstadt's conclusion on the subject matter: "social groups had been mobilized for political participation before effective institutions and norms had been established to incorporate such activity. Out of this chaos emerged a collection of military regimes which achieved uneven results at economic growth or political or social stability. In any event, far from inducing social stability, efforts at economic modernization had brought on instability and various undemocratic political responses." They also use the works of David Collier and Guillermo O'Donnell to make the point that the countries which recorded high economic growth rates in the 1970s were all authoritarian regimes to one degree or another, democracy appeared to be well off the agenda in the third world and economic development had not occurred in most places. When it did, it had not brought about democracy. Finally, they apply O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter's theory of democratization in their "Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies" to Taiwan and specify that, when the rules and procedures of citizenship are applied "to political institutions not previously governed by other principles", "extended to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations", or "extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation", then the process of democratization is under way. They stress that liberalization can occur without democratization. Nevertheless, they conclude their examination of Taiwan by saying, "Taiwan has passed a major crisis in its transition to democracy,

and its institutions appear to have outlived their creators. It has yet to have a founding election to test the viability of the transition. An election for national and local bodies is on the books for November [December] of 1989. Prior to that, authorities are working out a way to restructure the national elected organs to reflect more closely the actual population under the government's control, and the fact that so many of the elected officials have died or left the country. The KMT is also moving to separate the party from the state. Successful restructuring and election will be the next major tests."

The events leading up to and including the NAC have certainly proved that Meaney's and Winckler's assessments are too pessimistic, while Gold and Shieh's views were more optimistic and fairly perceptive and accurate. Another conference attendee, Tun-jen Cheng (1989, pp. 41-2), was quite optimistic about the political development in Taiwan. In his article, "Democratizing the KMT Regime in Taiwan", that is also not included in the published volume he and Haggard edited, he stated that, while Taiwan had definitely crossed an important threshold of democratic transition, the uncertainty still remained as to whether or not the incipient democratic institutions would grow and endure. He cites Robert Dahl to the effect that once a repressive regime moves away from the premise of total control and begins to allow some opposition, then there is no natural cutting-off point unless one reaches full-scale political competition or reimposes total control. He points out that history has seen the lapse of fresh democracy all too often, as in Weimar Germany, Taisho Japan, post-Kemal Turkey, and the Southern Cone of Latin America in the 1960s. However, he concluded his presentation by saying that there were enough reasons to suggest that Taiwan might be on an irreversible course of democratization.

In his paper at the conference, "Liberalization and Democratization: Taiwan's Developmental Experiences", and his new book, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China*, Hung-mao Tien (1989a, p. 252; 1989b, pp. 41-2), as a strong supporter of Lee Teng-hui's reforms, was most optimistic. The paper was later revised, renamed "Transformation of an Authoritarian Party State", and collected in Cheng and Haggard's (1992, pp. 33-56) volume. He argued that Taiwan's one-party system had clearly come to an end, although the KMT would probably continue to dominate the political scene in an emerging "dominant party" system. He emphasized that the substantial liberalization and democratization that have taken place in Taiwan make the ROC political system unusual, the political changes already under way in Taiwan suggested that the once exclusionary authoritarian system was now in transition, and if the current pace of liberalization continues, an open society on Taiwan is

just around the corner. However, he still cautioned that given popular demands for institutional reforms and democratization, there was a growing pressure for separation of the state from the party, a task that would be difficult to implement, and resistance to proposed institutional reforms, especially of the three national representative bodies, had shown little sign of subsiding.

The NAC and the dramatic pre-NAC political development proved that the resistance to institutionalist reforms, although strong, was not enough to prevent the reforms from being pressed and realized. Robert A. Scalapino (1990, p. 111) in an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, states:

In Taiwan, political developments also warrant cautious optimism. As in all societies, certain special circumstances prevail, in this case the division between mainland refugees and their children on the one hand, and the Taiwanese on the other. But the Taiwanization process has now encompassed the ruling Kuomintang itself, and the December 1989 elections went smoothly if raucously, with genuine political competition yielding a dominant party system for the present . . . The situation is one demanding wisdom on the part of those wielding power. The independence issue was openly debated for the time being. Constitutional revision lies ahead, an extremely delicate matter, but the moderates both in the Kuomintang and in the opposition have thus far prevailed.

In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1990, Lucian Pye (1990, pp. 3–19) discussed the current global crisis of authoritarianism. Throughout the speech, he talked about the “Great Transformation” and the transition from authoritarianism to democracy and he applied Taiwan constantly to amplify his points. He mentioned the high educational and technological levels and cited the statistics that 45 per cent of the current thirteenth KMT Central Committee had postgraduate degrees while only 2 per cent had a high school education or below. He said that it was unlikely that Taiwan could have put off political reform indefinitely, given its rate of economic development. Then, he elucidated the psychological element of fear in authoritarian government as follow:

Montesquieu long ago taught us that fear was the key sentiment basic to tyrannies; and while we now, sadly, have abundant experiences with state-induced fear, we are very short of knowledge about the after effects of reigns of terror. In some cultures the receding of fear of state power seems to ignite hope, which in turn can open the floodgates to enthusiasm and activism. The resulting state of public mind is one that

liberalizing authorities may welcome and exploit, as in Taiwan and South Korea, or find threatening, as in China with the Tiananmen incident, when hope and enthusiasm gave way to disillusionment and anger and when, in the words of the Chinese poet Li Shizheng, "We hear again the urgent knocking of red terror."

Finally, the authors of *Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China* (Feldman, 1991) and *Taiwan Beyond the Economic Miracle* (Simon and Kau, 1992) look in general at the NAC and the subsequent political development in Taiwan with praise and optimism, whilst Moody's (1992) *Political Change on Taiwan: A Study of Ruling Party Adaptability* is less certain and optimistic about Taiwan's democratic future, although more positive about the KMT's role in Taiwan's liberalization and democratization processes.

Moody (1992, pp. 188–9) holds the view that neither the death of Chiang Ching-kuo and the thirteenth Party Congress in 1988 nor the election of Lee Teng-hui in 1990 indicate what the system will look like in the future. Nor did the NAC by itself make things immediately clearer. He seems overly pessimistic. His talk about the KMT's attempts at modelling themselves, after Japan's Liberal Democratic Party is also now irrelevant. He further asserts that Lee Teng-hui and the NAC favour a presidential system. This is justifiable, however, only if the president comes to be directly elected by the people; if the president is to remain powerful, the National Assembly cannot. Direct election of a powerful president appeals to the DPP as well, in that their best chance to win the government is to run a popular candidate for election. Also, it could contribute to political civility, since any opposition candidate with a chance of winning would have to be fairly moderate, both to get sufficient popular support and to avoid overly frightening the power centres in the bureaucracy and armed forces. A strong president directly responsible to the people would mean a general weakening of the KMT, as such a president would be likely to owe his advancement more to personal appeal than to party organization. On the presidential issue, Moody is generally correct.

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

Indeed, red or white terror in Taiwan has substantially subsided, and enthusiasm and activism have become the democratizing impetus in Taiwanese

politics, particularly since 1990. More important than Pye's political psycho-cultural transformation which will still take time to achieve, and Lipset's and Rostow's economic (capitalist) growth condition, which has already made its presence felt in Taiwan, is the Huntingtonian institutionalist democratization process which finally emerged in the NAC and its aftermath. Although admittedly still in a very preliminary stage, that emergence should substantiate, to some extent, the argument that the real transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Taiwan is definitely under way. With the emerging two-party system and evolving constitutional reforms with the distinct possibility that both the central government structure and the presidential election system will be fundamentally changed, Taiwan seemed, in the aftermath of the NAC, to have finally passed the stages of liberalization and soft authoritarianism and crossed over the threshold of the beginning of institutionalist democratization.

In late 1973, at the home of Professor Ch'en Chi-ch'eng, a well-known lawyer and legal scholar, a group of nonpartisan activists, who had just come out of the culturalist liberalization and democratization campaigns of *The Intellectual*, began to talk about opposition unity and organization.⁹ Most were in fear of Nationalist oppression and complained at great length about their mistreatment or persecution at the hands of the KMT authorities, such as the purges of the editorial board of *The Intellectual* and the staff of the philosophy department of the National Taiwan University in 1972-3. They saw the elections as important venues for political activism but did not perceive any possibility for them to form oppositionist political organizations.

Earlier in the summer of 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo convened the first National Construction Conference. Vocal, though naïve, calls for radical political reforms were made. They were a purely Qu Yuan-style remonstrance exercise. It was the high time of the "reform to protect Taiwan" campaign, a sort of mini-May Fourth culturalist democracy movement. It took us a couple of years to find out the futility of such intellectual activities. When Kang Ning-hsiang and Chang Chun-hung published their *Taiwan Political Review* in mid-1975, the intellectuals enthusiastically wrote for the *Review* and would continue to write for Kang's journals and newspapers for the next one and a half decades. Although only five issues were published before it was banned in December 1975, the *Taiwan Political Review* had put great pressure on the Nationalists and forced the KMT regime into reformist concessions. In early 1978, Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Hsin-liang, and other *tangwai* leaders bathed in the euphoria of their election successes and the KMT setback in the Chungli incident. Their confidence and courage were markedly boosted; hence the *tangwai*'s increased

militancy and organized radical activities resulting in the formation of the quasi-party *Formosa* group.

Two days after the violent Kaohsiung incident, Chang Te-ming, then a lawyer for the *Formosa* magazine, later a legislator and now a controller, described and explained to me why the nonpartisans had to carry out the mass demonstration on the World Human Rights Day and how the KMT security agents purposely forced the *Formosa* demonstrators into a confrontational corner and caused the riot. About a year later, after the Kaohsiung trials, the Taiwan Garrison Commander, the martial law administrator, showed me the video tapes of the trial proceedings and tried to explain their side of the story and to justify their harsh action. Both versions were equally mind-boggling and blood-chilling affairs. On the one hand, the nonpartisan determination to form an institutionalized opposition, not yet a political party but certainly something very much like one, was more than apparent, and was abrasively confrontational. On the other hand, there was a clear and strong message from the authorities that the ruling party was not in any mood to tolerate such an open institutionalist oppositionist action.

In late 1985 and early 1986, during the "dialogue" period, in a number of extensive interviews with me on the KMT-*tangwai* dialogues by Kang Ning-hsiang, You Ch'ing, Hu Fu and Li Hung-hsi, the efforts on both sides to lessen the increasing political tension were apparently sincere. The dialogues were not yet an NAC sort of two-party political power play and political wheeler-dealing, but they did possess some of the basic features. It was a pity, but the KMT conservatives just could not accept the emergence of the *tangwai* as a quasi-opposition party. The failure of the dialogues forced the nonpartisans into a more desperate and radical corner. In early 1986, again at Professor Ch'en Chi-ch'eng's home, a group of about thirty *tangwai* leaders held an informal meeting to talk about the future of their movement. After more than six hours of intense debate, acting as an informal chairman, Kang Ning-hsiang asked what would have happened if they had just gone ahead and disregarded the KMT threat and formed their long-awaited party. The answer from the group seemed unanimous, that they would have been arrested right away. The meeting ended on very chilling and fearful note.

Half a year later, in defiance of the KMT martial law, they unexpectedly jumped the gun and formed the DPP. It was a desperate, rather than a carefully calculated, high-risk act. They called the bluff of the KMT, caught the government by surprise, and won. In the December 1986 elections, Kang Ning-hsiang's campaign to regain his seat in the Legislative Yuan, that he had unexpectedly lost in 1983, was closely observed by me.

Following Kang's electioneering activities, including "democratic seminars", rallies, illegal "walks" through the Taipei streets, propaganda work and other strategic meetings, one had to be very impressed by the difficulties Kang encountered and the importance of an election win to an opposition member. For the first time, many university professors and literary figures emerged from their previous silence and non-involvement to openly support Kang, attending Kang's mass rallies and signing open letters to declare their endorsement of Kang's candidacy. Many of these professors, such as Chang Chung-tung of the National Taiwan University, were KMT members and their open defiance of the party would certainly be detrimental to their careers, if not dangerous to their health. People like Professor Fu Cheng of the *Free China* affair, who had served his long prison term and come out of jail to live a life under constant "white terror", still unequivocally and tirelessly worked for Kang's and other DPP candidates' campaigns.

Both KMT and DPP candidates regarded the 1986 elections as very significant to Taiwan's democratization process. In spite of their enormous amount of resources, the Nationalists were really worried about losing the election and resorted to massive vote-buying. On the other side, DPP candidates, such as Wu Che-lang who defied all odds to win a National Assembly seat in the business professional constituency, complained constantly about how little money they had, how the KMT authorities would apply dirty tricks to make their campaigns almost impossible. Wu accused the KMT of refusing to give him the membership lists of the business associations, and thus he did not even know who his voters were, and how he had to drive a tiny van with a loudspeaker on top everywhere throughout the island looking for voters and opportunities to make his campaign speeches. Chu Kao-cheng, another DPP candidate, created a huge following. His mass rallies attracted more than 50 000 people at times. His campaign success was called a Chu Kao-cheng "warship" phenomenon. His charismatic leadership style fits well the Weberian model in a rapidly changing Taiwanese society. He won a landslide election victory and went on to shake up the parliament with his "warship" "body language" politics. However, three years later in the 1989 election he lost the DPP endorsement and without a party blessing fought his own lonely battle. He still won an impressive victory but stayed out of favour with the DPP hierarchy. He was censured by the party's disciplinary committee but decided to quit the DPP and form his own party, the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party, in 1991. Between the DPP and the KMT, in late 1991, all his party's candidates failed to win seats in the National Assembly and he had yet to find a viable political position for his new party. In 1992, it seemed his

Weberian charismatic leadership had ceased to be attractive in the rapidly democratizing Taiwanese political ecology and his third party had become irrelevant. He barely squeezed through in the December 1992 elections and his party again failed to win any seats in the November 1993 county-chief elections.

The 1986 elections were extremely tense and exciting. The "democratic holiday" syndrome was in full bloom and outcomes were very hard to predict. Many electioneering activities carried out by the DPP candidates, such as pre-election "seminars" on democracy or national affairs, candidates' "birthday parties" and "testimonials", which were in fact used as illegal campaign forums, and the equally illegal appearances of professors and other non-registered campaign speakers really made a mockery of the rigid election law. The election officials, police and secret agents were everywhere video-recording the whole proceedings and taking pictures as evidence. In 1986 martial law was not yet lifted and the political atmosphere was still full of fear and terror. The massive confrontation between the DPP supporters and the police at the Chiang Kai-shek international airport on 30 November, when Hsu Hsin-liang, who had been in exile in the United States since the *Formosa* incident, tried to break through the airport security and return to campaign for his comrades but was stopped and forced to go back to the United States, was almost a repeat of the Kaohsiung riot eight years earlier. Therefore the victories for Kang and some of his DPP fellow candidates were impressive in quality, in moral terms, rather than in their quantity or in terms of real political power. The most important thing for Taiwan's democratization process was that they proved that elections and parties definitely mix like fish and water, and only when together could they make a powerful democratizing impact.

In the 1989 elections, the DPP was clearly a worthy opponent, a viable alternative to the ruling KMT in the rapidly democratizing Taiwanese politics. Martial law had gone but there was the national security law in its place. The election law was just as messy, if not more so because the KMT had tried to make the law even more rigid and restrictive, such as limiting who and how many people could speak at the campaign rallies and how many rallies were allowed, as in 1986; and the DPP candidates and campaign workers ignored and broke the laws just as frequently, if not more so, as in 1986. In respect of the controversial issue of Taiwanese independence, many DPP candidates openly defied and challenged the law. They even formed a faction, the "New Nation Alliance" in the DPP to challenge not only the KMT authorities but also their own more moderate party members. Indeed, had it not been for the "democracy holiday" syndrome, many of them would have been arrested and persecuted under the

new national security law which explicitly prohibits the open advocacy of Taiwanese independence. Campaigns were very expensive (reportedly on average more than half a million US dollars spent for a Legislative Yuan seat and about one million for a county magistrateship for the DPP candidates, two to three times that amount for the KMT candidates) and the KMT spent even more money to buy votes (rumour had it that the KMT spent about ten million US dollars buying votes in the Taipei county-chief election alone). The DPP candidates, such as worker-writer Yang Ch'ing-ch'u and Professor Fu Cheng, did not have much money or much chance of winning either (Yang was deep in debt after the election for many years), still they fought a valiant battle. There were more intellectuals openly and actively campaigning for the DPP candidates. The large number of university professors who enthusiastically campaigned for You Ch'ing in the heatedly contested Taipei county magistrateship was unprecedented and crucial. The more radical Taiwanese intellectuals, such as the famous writer Lin Shuang-pu, who was committed to the independence cause, vigorously campaigned for Yeh Chu-lan, widow of Cheng Nan-jung who burnt himself to death in 1988 in protest of the KMT persecution. Their campaign rallies attracted at times fifty thousand people. It was also the first time that "green" environmentalist candidates, such as Lin Cheng-chieh and professor Lin Chun-i, became very popular in Taiwan, although the former won while the latter lost by a small margin. The police and secret agents were still collecting evidence everywhere, but the candidates and supporters ignored them totally while the Taiwanese people were also not afraid of them any more.

These were very tough campaigns. Lacking resources and facing overwhelming KMT financial and organizational superiority, as well as control of the mass media in the hands of the Nationalist government, the DPP were not fighting on a level battle field and their prospects did not look too good throughout the campaigns. When it became clear that You Ch'ing had won the Taipei county, the "New Nation" alliance had got most of its candidates elected, and the DPP had created a "31% landslide", it was as if an earthquake had struck and totally changed the political landscape of Taiwan. After a long delay, and as rumours that the KMT was rigging the election began to appear, at 2.30 a.m. in the morning of 3 December when You Ch'ing's victory was finally conceded by the KMT and reported by the Central News Agency, it really felt like a new dawn, the birth of a new baby, in the political life of Taiwan. Even today the event still feels like the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, although not quite like the fall of communism in the Soviet Union in August 1991. It seemed that, at long last, a two-party system had finally made its preliminary but firm appearance

in the island-nation. The significance of elections to the painstaking democratization process of Taiwan was indisputable. Without these bitterly fought but generally peaceful elections, it is very doubtful that the great transformation from authoritarianism to democracy in Taiwan could have been so relatively successful. Because of the continuous involvement of the oppositionists as well as the people at large in electioneering activities, more violent confrontationist or revolutionist fights have been avoided. This proves that Hsu Hsin-liang's democratizing technology may work and that through elections the DPP may eventually win power, fundamentally change the political complexion of Taiwan, and effectively achieve all the reformist goals they have been fighting for for more than four decades.

In the post-NAC era, the 1990 National Assembly elections saw the KMT win an impressive victory, getting more than 71 per cent of the vote and more than three-quarters of the seats, whilst the DPP suffered a serious setback by gathering only 24 per cent of the vote and 75 out of 325 seats, less than a quarter of the total number of seats, thus in fact forfeiting any constitutional rights to influence the 1991 constitutional reform exercise. However, the DPP performed impressively in the December 1992 legislative elections, by winning more than 31 per cent of the vote and 51 (52, if Ch'en Ting-nan who later joined the party is included) out of 161 seats. The election "defeat" created a further power split and struggle in the KMT between President Lee and Premier Hau, resulting in the forced resignation of the premier. The "Taiwanization" of the KMT has since become more or less a reality. The newly strengthened DPP in the parliament has also since become a force to be reckoned with. They have made their presence felt and left behind a series of policy-making imprints. They have certainly become a meaningful opposition and a viable alternative to the ruling party in Taiwan.¹⁰

In the November 1993 county-magistrate and city-mayor elections, although the DPP lost one existing seat and won only six out of twenty-one Taiwan provincial seats, they did gain 41 per cent of the vote, the highest vote they had ever obtained, whilst the KMT, although winning thirteen seats in Taiwan, obtained only 47 per cent of the vote, the lowest the ruling party had ever reached. The New Party formed and led by Chao Shao-k'ang and other former KMT non-mainstream legislators only a couple of months earlier, on the other hand, did not win any seats and got only 3 per cent of the vote.¹¹ The remarkable win of the KMT was generally attributed to the active campaigns carried out by President Lee for the local candidates throughout Taiwan, in addition, of course, to the KMT's massive "money politics" capability and efficient party organization. Throughout the elections, Lee kept reminding the KMT members that

party politics had become the most important feature in the democratization of Taiwan, to win votes the most critical task for the ruling party, and in order to win votes to kneel down before the people was necessary even for the president himself. The unprecedented populist behaviour of the president clearly went down well with the voters.

In short, in spite of the ups and downs of the fortunes of the DPP, the three post-NAC elections further strongly support the view that the DPP has become a viable alternative to the KMT and the two- or multi-party system and elections have become the most important institutionalist democratizing factors in Taiwanese politics. Together, parties and party politics, elections and electioneering activities have substantially changed Taiwan's political landscape and brought the island-state to the verge of real functional-institutional democracy.

INSTITUTIONALIST DEMOCRATIZERS

Throughout the March–May 1990 political crises, Kang Ning-hsiang on the DPP side and his friend Ch'en Ch'ung-kuang, a personal confidant of Lee Teng-hui, on the KMT side together played a sort of mediators' role. They were deeply involved in some of the power politics played between the ruling and opposition parties. It was one of the most interesting and exciting times in contemporary ROC politics. Even Hsu Hsin-liang who was in jail and Shih Ming-te who was confined in a military hospital felt optimistic and excited about the evolving political situation. Their optimism was contagious and had a great impact on the opposition camp. Their views on Taiwan's democratization process were positive, realistic and pragmatic. Hsu enthusiastically expressed his well-known belief in taking part in and winning elections, and by winning elections seizing power and replacing the Nationalist regime. Shih invested a lot of hope in the DPP. His well-known organizational approach toward Taiwan's oppositionist politics had become even firmer and sharper. Although both were articulate intellectuals who were full of ideas, they impressed people with their great capability to act. They were men of action, democratic activists and strategists, rather than merely intellectual elitists of ideas and theories. Long exile and prison life had not changed their belief in, and commitment to, Taiwan's institutionalist democratization. Before they were pardoned and released from jail in May 1990, they were already perceived as eventual DPP leaders who would bring about a meaningful two-party system in Taiwan.

The June–July 1990 NAC witnessed a realistic political interplay

between the KMT and the DPP. It was completely different from the television images of violent "body language" that the DPP had applied so often in the parliament to make their oppositionist cases, and that had often been broadcast throughout the world thanks to the electronic information revolution. The willingness on both sides to make give-and-take deals was present, in spite of the great disparity of numbers between the two camps. After seven days of intensive sessions of quasi-parliamentary operations, most participants went away with a deep impression that the democratic seeds had indeed been sown on Yuanshan where the majestic Grand Hotel, the venue for the conference, sits. It was, of course, an over-optimistic view reached in the euphoria of the aftermath of a colourful political event. It must be soberly pointed out again that it was not the substantive achievements but the format, the procedure, the institutionalist framework of the conference, that had been set up, that was important and could have far-reaching consequences. The DPP was not yet that well-organized and prepared to be an alternative government, while the KMT was not so generous and democratic as to be ready to level the playing field to let the DPP play an open and fair game of two-party politics. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the NAC, it seemed clear that the great transformation to institutionalist democratization had begun and the prospects looked good for the process to be peacefully and successfully carried out.

In late April 1991, Professor Fu Cheng was dying of cancer in hospital. When Professor Byron Weng and I visited him, he was very ill but strangely energetic and he talked at length about the *tangwai* and DPP politics that he had been deeply involved with for two decades. In the 1950s, he helped Lei Chen publish the *Free China* fortnightly and in 1960, he took part in the attempt at setting up the Chinese Democratic Party. After having served a six-year "corrective education" prison term, he came out of the notorious *Huo Shao Tao* (the "fire burning island", where political prisoners were incarcerated) in 1966. He began to teach constitutional politics at Soochow University in 1972 and ardently joined the nonpartisan movement. He helped to organize many nonpartisan activities and institutions. As described above, he campaigned for many oppositionist candidates in elections. He was instrumental in the formations of *tangwai* policy research associations and the DPP. Immediately after the establishment of the DPP in September 1986, he was in charge of preparation of contingency leadership arrangements in case the KMT authorities decided to arrest the DPP leaders. He told the DPP hierarchy that "they can arrest the people but the party should not be allowed to be destroyed". In 1989, encouraged by You Ch'ing, in spite of the clear impossibility for him, as a mainlander, to win in Taipei county, he used his very limited resources to throw his hat into

the Legislative Yuan ring. Supported by many famous professors, such as Yang Kuo-shu, Hu Fu and Chang Chung-tung, he put everything he had into the contest. He did not even come close to winning but was happy with the result because, to him, to participate in the election was just as important. Professor Fu Cheng died on 10 May 1991. He was one of the most respected institutional democratizers in Taiwan. He understood and was able to talk about democratic theories just as well as Hu Shih and Yan Jiaqi, although he has never enjoyed the national and international fame Hu and Yan have had. Yet in the institutionalist sense, he did more for Taiwan's democratization than Hu and he was a much more effective democratizer than Yan.

Although their memberships do overlap, the present DPP leadership can be roughly divided in the following five groups. First, the party elder-statesmen include Huang Hsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang, Yu-Ch'en Yueh-ying (former Kaohsiung county magistrate) and others, who in a "family tree" sense succeeded the famous "five tigers" to win elections and lead the *tangwai* movement into DPP party politics. They are not democratic theorists but democratic practitioners. They published nonpartisan journals, fought for freedom of the press, but did not themselves write culturalist democratization works. They are not qualified to be university professors. Second, the *Formosa* intellectuals, who were involved in, or influenced by, the *The Intellectual* "reform to protect Taiwan" campaign and the volatile *Formosa* mass movement, include Chang Chun-hung, Hsu Hsin-liang, Ch'en Yung-hsing (a psychiatrist and a National Assemblyman) and others. Most of them have studied at a postgraduate level, taught at universities or colleges and are certainly qualified to be lecturers and professors. They have edited or written extensively for nonpartisan journals. Most of them have been in political prison at one time or another, most belong to the dominant *Formosa* faction. Third is the group which contains the defence lawyers for the nonpartisan movement. They are Yao Chia-wen, You Ch'ing, Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing, Ch'en Shui-pien, Chang Teming and quite a few others who have defended the oppositionist political prisoners since the early 1970s. Most graduated and engaged in postgraduate studies at the law school of the National Taiwan University, with You attaining a PhD from a West German university and Hsieh an MA from the University of Tokyo. They are the cream of the Taiwanese intellectual elite. Fourth is a group which includes most of the radical New Tide faction, such as Ch'iu I-jen, deputy party secretary-general, and Lin Choshui and Lu Hsiu-i, both members of the parliament. Most of them belonged to the *tangwai* journals' editors and writers association. They were highly educated, with Ch'iu once a PhD candidate in political science at the

University of Chicago and Lu having a PhD in political science from the University of Paris. Although they are more idealistic, ideological and militant, they have proved themselves to be very effective organizational men. Both Yao Chia-wen and Shih Ming-te have supported this faction. Their New Tide faction has been the best organized group in the party, and thus has occupied quite a few seats in the party's central executive committee. They have written many works on Taiwanese politics. They are Taiwan's top intellectuals, yet they have gone down to the grass-roots level to organize the masses. They are the wild card in Taiwan's oppositionist politics. Fifth are the DPP local "*shan t'ou*" (mountain heads), who started from local politics, organized the DPP's local branches, built up strong local support, won many local elections and now control the various localities in Taiwan's political map; they are growing in importance in opposition politics. They include Yu-Ch'en Yueh-ying's family in Kaohsiung county, Hsu Hsin-liang's family in T'aoyuan, Yen Chin-fu (city councillor) in Taipei, Yu Hsi-k'un (county magistrate) in Ilan, etc. Some of them belong to the *Formosa* faction, while others belong to the New Tide faction. They are the natural institutionalist political elite, rather than cultural intellectual leaders.

Finally, a few words should be added here about Professor Peng Ming-min, certainly one of the most respected oppositionist intellectuals in contemporary Taiwan. With two of his students, in 1964, Professor Peng (1972) published a "Declaration on Taiwanese Self-Determination" and was sentenced to a long prison term by the martial court. He was subsequently pardoned by President Chiang Kai-shek and fled Taiwan. After exile in the US for twenty-three years, he returned to Taiwan in late 1992 and immediately joined the opposition camp. He has since become a potential candidate for the 1996 presidential election. He and his followers do not belong to any of the above groups.

Together, they have formed a powerful democratic oppositionist party machine in Taiwan's evolving political landscape. As a group of the intellectual political elite, they are very different from their counterparts in China from the May Fourth generation to the 4 June generation. Although they possess some salient "cultural renaissance" characteristics, such as Yao Chia-wen's (1988) seven-volume historical novels on Taiwan which he wrote while in jail and many popular literary works by Wang T'o and Yang Ch'ing-ch'u, they are just not like Liang Qichao, Hu Shih, Lu Xun, Carson Chang, Chen Qitian, Liu Binyan, Yan Jiaqi and Su Xiaokang. They are primarily institutionalist, while their counterparts in China are basically culturalist, democratizers. In the end, their different kinds of *modus operandi* have led to very different democratization outcomes.

8 Two Diverging Political Systems

ASIAN DEMOCRACIES

In the early 1990s, an examination of the democratic map of Asia would show that most “part free”, semi-democratic and “free”, fully democratic, countries, although with diverse historical and cultural backgrounds and even more different levels of economic development, had some basic common functional democratic institutions, such as relatively open, fair and competitive elections for political leadership and fairly active, competitive, and functional two- or multi-party systems. Among those countries that were regarded as semi-democratic in the late 1980s, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, some of them had become democratic, although not all of them stable democracies, by 1994.¹ Periodic elections for the parliaments and presidents were held and indeed institutionalized, and party systems, although with the opposition parties not always fighting on a level playing field, had become a permanent fixture and were frequently actively, and sometimes even raucously and violently, involved in elections and other political activities.

In the early 1990s, in Singapore, Malaysia and Pakistan, the institutions of parliamentary democracy left by the British colonial governments after the Second World War, in spite of being quite alien to the indigenous cultures and having been under constant threat of return to traditional Asian personalistic, paternalistic, even militaristic, authoritarian rule, survived and still functioned relatively well. After four decades, those democratic features had become institutionalized parts of the political systems which might yet suffer setbacks, but the probabilities were that they would move forward to become full democracies, if not immediately, then in some distant future.

During Lee Kuan Yew’s thirty-one-year charismatic but soft-authoritarian rule of Singapore from 1959 to 1990, the dominant party system under Lee became more and more authoritarian, almost retrogressing from soft to hard authoritarianism. But Lee did maintain periodic elections to legitimize his government and let the opposition parties – the Labour Party and the Singapore Democratic Party – participate, albeit subject to enormous handicaps. By the time Lee held his last election in 1990 before he stepped down, he had, with some success, pushed Confucian moral

education to make the island city-state into a Confucian socio-political order. He persecuted the only Labour member of the parliament on a charge of misuse of party funds and caused him to lose his seat. And when he won the 1990 election with eighty out of eighty-one seats, he allowed the Singapore Democratic Party to occupy only one lonely chair in the parliament. In November 1990, Lee stepped down and let his deputy prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, take over the reins. In late August 1991, to get a "new overwhelming mandate" or a "solid endorsement" of his more open, consultative style of government, Goh called a snap election more than two years ahead of schedule. The result was a "disaster", a "great setback", for Goh and Lee's People's Action Party. For the first time since the mid-1960s, the party lost four seats to the opposition parties and got less than 60 per cent of the vote. The supposedly content Confucian subject-people expressed their wishes for stronger opposition parties and a more meaningful democratic political system. Stung by the setback, Goh proclaimed that partisan politics had arrived in Singapore: "There is now a proper opposition in the parliament and the ground rules have changed." The two opposition parties together had won only a little more than one-third of the votes and four out of eighty-one seats in the parliament, but just like Taiwan's DPP in the 1989 elections, they suddenly became a meaningful opposition, although not really a threat to the authoritarian power of the ruling People's Action Party. It seemed, just as in Taiwan in the early 1990s, Singapore was making its great transition from semi- to full-democracy.²

Two stable democracies in Asia, rich Japan and poor India, obtained their democratic institutions from two different historical and political experiences and circumstances. India's democracy was built on the legal-institutional superstructure left by the British colonial government, while Japan's institutionalist democratization was principally imposed on it by General Douglas MacArthur and his American occupation forces. Both had long traditional authoritarian cultures, yet both have adopted basically Western political systems and, with various degrees of reluctance, difficulty and resistance, made the systems work relatively smoothly in a short period of time. Economic growth has made Japanese democracy more stable, although not necessarily more democratic, than Indian democracy. Traditional Confucian authoritarian culture had probably helped the ruling Liberal Democratic Party remain in power for thirty-eight years, thus making it really more a dominant party system, than a functional multi-party system, as in the case of India, until 1993 when the Liberal Democratic Party finally lost in the lower-house elections and a seven-party coalition government led by Morihiro Hosokawa took over power, thus ending the dominant

party system in Japan. Although they have problems, both countries are generally accepted as true democracies and it is the institutionalist democratization process, rather than economic or cultural factors, that have brought about the establishment of constitutional democracy in these two vastly different Asian countries.

Although in South Korea there have been more violent student demonstrations, more military coups, more opposition parties, and more genuine national elections to elect its presidents and members of the parliament than in Taiwan, the democratization process in South Korea has been basically similar to that in Taiwan. Elections and political parties, particularly the opposition parties formed by determined political dissidents and supported by intellectuals and students, have constituted the backbone of the relentless and persistent push for democracy in South Korea. Twice the most famous South Korean political dissident, Kim Dae Jung, almost won government from the two military strongman incumbent presidents, Pak Chung Hee in 1972 and Roh Tae Woo in 1987. More importantly, in the 1993 presidential election, two former political dissidents, two Kims, Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, led two major parties to fight the most democratic election battle in South Korean history, with Kim Young Sam emerging a victor, thus ending the political life of Kim Dae Jung, certainly South Korea's most colourful political dissident. That qualifies South Korea as a full democracy, compared with the semi-democratic status of Taiwan, in the eyes of New York's Freedom House. In addition, both South Korea and Taiwan have also attained more or less similar levels and followed similar patterns of economic development.

Finally, as already pointed out above, in addition to Sri Lanka, in 1994, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines, after having just successfully carried out democratic elections, have to be regarded as fully democratized countries.

CONFUCIUS AND LENIN

Lucian Pye (1988, pp. 30–4) has written: "Many of the problems that arise in defending political culture in general terms evaporate when the subject becomes Chinese politics, for it is simply impossible to deny the importance of attitudes, sentiments, and subjective considerations in the changing society that is China. Indeed, cultural factors dominate public life in China more than in just about any other country." He explains why this is so: "First, the strangely potent mixture of Confucianism and Leninism

seems to agitate passions and arouse visions." This is to be seen not only in the explosive and violent history of the PRC but also in North Korea and Vietnam. "The purposeful dedication to controlling history inherent in Marxism–Leninism, when applied to controlling civilization with its enormous travails of change, has produced something more profound than Mao Zedong Thought. To the extent that Chinese politics has been a politics of awakening, it has been driven by strong contending sentiments and endless clashes of ideas – clashes, however, that have had to be muted, because the traditions of Confucianism and Marxism–Leninism have sought to keep a straitjacket on dissent." "A second reason for the exceptionally dominant role of cultural factors in Chinese political life is that Confucianist Leninism places supreme value not just on ideology, but on highly moralistic versions of ideology. . . . The Maoist tradition has kept alive the Chinese belief that the collective good will be advanced if everyone acts morally and in accordance with the correct definition of his or her role."

Pye continues to point out that the stress on the moral behaviour of individuals is, moreover, framed in the context of a collectivity that is always perceived to be precious, be it the family, the party or the country. More importantly, there is in that culture a marked instinct for hierarchy. Indeed, the creation of bureaucracies has long been a part of the genius of the Chinese people. I would argue that the Chinese Confucian authoritarian culture has, since the Han dynasty, become more than just a political culture but an institutionalized bureaucratic authoritarianism. It is the authoritarian institutions rather than just the authoritarian culture that has made democratization so difficult in the Middle Kingdom.

When the Chinese speak of "political reform" to match Deng's economic reforms, they are really referring only to administrative reforms. This is further evidence of their propensity toward orderly hierarchy and not toward dynamic processes. Such was the case in the 1984–8 political structural reform and has been the case in the Dengist post-Tiananmen reform. Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, as well as Yan Jiaqi, had always maintained that it was a "within the system" structural reform to make the "system" more efficient so that the economic reform could be successfully carried out. In essence, it was only a bureaucratic reform. In spite of his deep appreciation of the importance of political power and checks and balances in political science, before the 4 June Tiananmen massacre Yan Jiaqi did not really advocate rearrangement of the power structure, which would have required elimination of the dictatorship of the CCP, as the basic solution to the political crises in China.

"Finally, and possibly most important of all", Pye stresses, "the study

of political culture is important for understanding Chinese politics because of the unique relationship between the primary institutions that are so important in socializing the Chinese and the public institutions of national politics. Historically, Confucianism was a distinctive ideology in part because it fitted the ideals and needs of both the rulers in their political realms and the common people in their family and clan settings. Mandarin scholars and officials could teach the doctrines of the Sage as the basis of the legitimacy not only of the imperial system but also of the authority systems of the fathers and elders throughout the country. In modern times, however, and most especially with the arrival of Confucianist Leninism, there has been a distinct bifurcation into the two realms, but there remains an odd, and quite Chinese, way in which the two still reinforce each other so as to provide continuity in the socialization process but also flexibility in national policy orientations."

Not necessarily with Pye's persuasively sophisticated psycho-culturalist argument in mind, many Chinese intellectuals, either the May Fourth generation or the 4 June contemporary "mandarin scholars and officials", no matter how much they have stressed that they wanted to Westernize and democratize China, have put out the same reformist rationalization that they have to get rid of the 2000-year-old Yellow-River, yellow-earth, and yellow-dragon Confucian political culture before they can modernize and democratize the Chinese political system. More importantly, with the arrival of Marxism-Leninism, and particularly the perceived successful marriage of Confucianism and Leninism, the post-1949 Chinese intellectual political elites have gone one step further by accepting the invulnerability, impenetrability and indestructibility of the dictatorship of the Communist Party in contemporary Chinese politics. When asked why not a two- or multi-party system, why Taiwan can but China cannot, they would inevitably cite the omnipresent, thus seemingly omnipotent, penetration and control of the CCP in their life and in Chinese society. Very few of them, except militant radicals, to some extent such as Fu Shenqi, Wang Juntao and Hu Ping of the 1979 "democracy wall" generation, believed real competitive elections fought by meaningful opposition parties armed with freedom of the press would be possible and realistic in Dengist, even less in Maoist, China. Led by brilliant intellectuals like Yan Jiaqi, Su Shaozhi, Chen Yizi and others, they tried very hard to reform the Chinese polity into a "socialist democracy", to make the CCP more "democratic" within the party, to have more competitive elections for and give more decision-making power to the people's congresses, and to separate as much as possible the structures and functions of political systems between the party and the state, and between the party-state organs and other socio-

economic units. It was a nice try but in the end proved to be a futile, although not completely wasted, exercise.

Their rationalization and argument ran that because, in addition to the presence of Western capitalism, there had been no dictatorship of the communist party in Taiwan, the Taiwanese reformists, including the KMT, *tangwai* and DPP reformers, in spite of the similar Confucian authoritarian political culture they had to live and deal with, were able to more successfully push their institutionalist democratization programmes. On the surface, it seems not a bad argument, but a careful scrutiny would easily reveal that the theory has a number of flaws. Since the mid-1920s, the KMT too has been a Confucianist-Leninist revolutionary party, with similar, if not better and tighter, dictatorial control mechanisms. In terms of actual political control, since 1949, in many respects, such as the application of secret police to persecute political dissent, the KMT in Taiwan has been just as ruthless and effective as its counterpart, the CCP, on the Chinese mainland. Because of the small size and the ease of control of an island-state like Taiwan, it could be argued that the KMT's oppression of the political opposition has been more efficient and more severe than the CCP's. To count the numbers of the known political prisoners and the years of imprisonment of the political dissidents in Taiwan from Lei Chen and Fu Cheng, to Shih Ming-te and Huang Hua, then to the "*Formosa Eight*" and sixty others and in China, from Ding Ling and Lin Xiling, to Wei Jingsheng, "Li Yi Zhe", Xu Wenli and Fu Yuehua, then to Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, Ren Wanding, Bao Zunxin and Wang Dan, even without taking into account the population disparity, the KMT has outdone the CCP in many aspects. And to compare the 28 February massacre with the 4 June killings, it is quite clear that the former was much bloodier than the latter.

Another often mentioned point is that although both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong were Confucian, even Stalinist, despots, between Chiang Ching-kuo and Deng Xiaoping there were basic differences, with the former more in tune with changing times and conditions, having a better understanding of democratic principles, and thus more inclined and ready to accept and push for political reform and constitutional democratization than the latter. Thomas B. Gold (1990, p. 38) gives quite a credit to Chiang Ching-kuo when he points out that the KMT party-state has acknowledged the dramatic social structural change, the emergence of civil society and the political demands induced by this change, and sought ways to reform the system while preserving stability. He believes that Chiang Ching-kuo's contribution in this regard cannot be denied. As the push from below continued to mount, Chiang's initiative made the key difference

in defusing several situations and in trying to negotiate a new social contract. Peter R. Moody, Jr (1992) has also placed much emphasis on the role Chiang and his KMT have played in adapting to the changing economic, social and political environment and emerging civil society and opposition party.

It seems plausible, though only hypothetical, to argue that if Chiang had decided to take stronger oppressive measures against the nonpartisan movement when they illegally formed the DPP on 28 September 1986, and if Deng had supported Zhao Ziyang and not sent in the tanks and troops to crush the pro-democracy demonstrators on 4 June 1989, the democratization stories of the two Confucian states could have been totally different.

It is an interesting theory but difficult to verify. The leadership is, of course, important; but to give too much credit to Chiang Ching-kuo and too little credit to the *tangwai*, the DPP and other oppositionist forces is just not right (Myers, 1987; Chou and Nathan, 1987; Ts'ai and Myers, 1990). Even an old China hand like Ross Terrill of Harvard University, after a recent visit to Taiwan, seemed to exaggerate Chiang's role. Interviewed by *The Free China Journal* (12 July 1991), he reportedly said that a new era began in 1987 in Taiwan because of the "stunning democratization process launched by the late ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo, and the mental freedom and political liveliness that resulted". He then went on to say, "Taiwan has come out of the shadows of authoritarianism. The fact that you have an opposition party and a pretty free press helps to guarantee that the path you're on will lead further and further toward democracy." It would appear that he has missed the point by mixing up the causal relationships between Chiang Ching-kuo, the *tangwai* and DPP, and Taiwan's democratization process. He did of course stress the importance of the free press and the opposition party. In the same interview, he further stated that the present Chinese Communist policies and leadership "could just slide away like bean curd" after Deng Xiaoping's death, but predicted, "What's not possible is a quick shift from communism to democracy." He pointed out the fact that there was no opposition movement on the mainland that could take advantage of the situation. The fact that there was not made it that much more difficult to predict how democracy might be brought to the mainland but he did not explain why there was no opposition movement, even less an opposition party, in China.

Bruce Jacobs (1991, p. 10) in a footnote to his recent seminar paper says: "I believe Chiang Ching-kuo took these (reform) measures because he wished to lay a foundation for reform prior to his death." While Chiang does deserve credit for the manner in which he accepted the democratization

movement, he was also reacting to persistent pressures from the opposition. He was forced to react to the oppositionist challenges and then to take damage-control measures, some of them undoubtedly new initiatives, to deal with the political crises caused by the continuous oppositionist challenges. Chiang Ching-kuo was a complex man. When he was young, he studied and lived in the Soviet Union for more than a decade. He became a communist. He was full of revolutionary ideas and openly against his father's authoritarian rule. Yet, after he returned to China in the 1930s, he quickly adopted the Nationalist ideology and accepted the heir-apparent's role. He did push for some reform in Gangnan, Jiangxi province, in the early 1940s and in the late 1940s, before the fall of mainland China, tried without success to wipe out corruption in Shanghai. In Taiwan in the 1950s, he was put in charge of security and intelligence organizations. He was ruthless in dealing with his father's and his own political opponents within the KMT and political oppositionists outside of the party. In the early 1970s, as premier, he led the ten construction projects to push Taiwan's economy into rapid growth. He also saw the need for political reform and supported the "reform to protect Taiwan" campaign. Yet, after the 1977 Chungli incident, he sacked his reformist right-hand man, Lee Huan, and let his chief political commissar, General Wang Sheng, who had succeeded him in control of the powerful security and intelligence apparatus, carry out a massive purge of the nonpartisan movement. Chiang Ching-kuo was very tough with the nonpartisans in the *Formosa* incident and its aftermath. It was in the mid-1980s, when his health began to seriously deteriorate that, he first dispatched Wang Sheng to Paraguay and brought back Lee Huan to deal with the political crises created by the increasing militancy of, and pressure from, the highly frustrated and radicalized *tangwai*. It was after the birth of the DPP that he visibly turned soft on the opposition, lifted martial law, liberalized his mainland China policy, allowed contacts with the Chinese Communists and began accepting, even initiating, political reforms. It is generally accepted that during the short period of time left before he died on 13 January 1988, he had put in motion a number of reformist programmes which would eventually lead to the substantive democratization results discussed in the previous chapters.

Finally, a short note should be included about the mandarin scholar-officials in the KMT and CCP. On the one hand, it is certainly true that the KMT high-level officials are better educated, most of them Western-educated, than their counterparts in the CCP. Therefore, the former should, in general, be much more in favour of institutionalist democracy than the latter. On the other hand, according to the study of elite transformation in

China and Taiwan by Li Cheng and Lynn White (1990, pp. 33–4), “The massive Chinese elite transformation of the 1980s is one of the most dramatic stories in the contemporary era. A new generation of leadership, which can be best characterized as technocratic, is becoming dominant on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” The converging process has made the leadership structures in China and Taiwan quite similar and they even go as far as to say, “A comparison of ideological shifts and system evolution on the Mainland and Taiwan show that clear distinctions between socialism and capitalism are coming to an end in both places. This does not mean the end of ideology, but rather the end of the era of the previous ideological conflicts – because technocratism is becoming an ideology for both the Mainland and Taiwan.” There is no doubt that the advisors to Deng Xiaoping and Chiang Ching-kuo were important and did make a difference in the ways they helped their respective masters handle political crises and reforms. However, as pointed out by Cheng and White, most of them were technocrats, not even Qu Yuan-type remonstrators like the radical reformists and oppositionists. Thus their influence on controversial political reform and democratization programmes, although not totally negligible, was certainly relatively not very important.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

In his study of Chinese democracy, Andrew Nathan (1985, pp. 224–5) lists four basic functional benefits of democracy as follows:

First, democracy regulates conflict. It allows social and ideological clashes to be carried out peacefully and encourages groups to press their interests through legal processes rather than corruption and violence. It protects government from control by any single social force and so enhances its ability to make decisions in the public interest. And it gives the leaders information that allows them to adjust in response to the attitudes of the public and the effects policies have on people’s views. Second, democracy makes government more legitimate. People who feel they have been consulted are readier to accept decisions once they have been made. Groups that have witnessed the strength of their opponents know that government may not be able to give them all that they want. Policy issues are partially resolved through compromise and platform-building in the public arena before they are brought to the government for resolution. Third, democracy improves the quality of government. It provides

the best means for supervising the great bureaucracies of the modern state and also helps prevent government leaders from abusing their powers. The leaders think through more carefully policies that they have to defend in public. Democracy can recruit political leaders from a larger pool of contestants than autocracies, so bringing abler people and more diverse viewpoints into government. Finally, democracy encourages stability. The struggle for office is conducted through peaceful means at regular intervals. Politicians do not use violence to get office or keep it. Policies, too, are less liable to sudden change since they are the product of protracted bargaining among interest groups.

Nathan (1985, p. 224) also cites Deng Xiaoping's famous charter speech of the Gengshen Reforms, given to the CCP Politburo on 18 August 1980. In the speech, Deng also talked about the benefits of democracy. It would, he said, help pool collective wisdom for economic development, assure a smooth leadership succession, recruit new and more able cadres into local posts, restrict overcentralization of power and consequent bureaucratic immobility, and prevent the making of "hasty decisions" by cadres. It would discourage corruption and prevent the re-emergence of one-man dictatorship. It would "promote the smooth development of our modernization drive".

In 1980 when he started his long road to modernization, in theory Deng Xiaoping seemed to understand some of the basic ideas and principles of democracy. However, after ten years of practice, he had clearly shown that he did not really know how to institutionalize his democratic theory to make it work. Not only did he not practise what he preached, but on the contrary, became more paternalistically authoritarian and all that he did was limited bureaucratic reform which created more corrupt, even more authoritarian, bureaucratism.

Examining the democracy movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s, Nathan (1985, p. 225) notes that the Chinese democracy activists agreed with the reformers in regarding democracy as an effective means to the end of national development. But the more radical among them insisted that democracy could not perform its functions unless it involved the exercise of real power by the people. For the people to exercise real influence required two minimal conditions: competition for office and an independent press. However, unfortunately some Chinese democratic reformers believed competitive political leadership could be attained within the party and thus advocated intra-party rather than inter-party democratization.

As described in detail in earlier chapters, since then the democracy protestors of 1986-7, the "River Elegy" reformists, and the 4 June Tiananmen

democracy fighters, all had fought the same battle and demanded the same culturalist reform. Freedom of the press has been the number one goal for the Chinese reformist intellectuals since the May Fourth Movement. They have fought hard for it and won some battles in the process. Because in Confucian authoritarian China dissent in ideas and thoughts has always been regarded as being just as traitorous and dangerous as actual rebellious actions, the ruler has never allowed freedom of speech and the press to become part of Chinese political culture and system, hence the obsession as well as necessity for Chinese intellectual reformers to struggle continuously to attain this basic human, as well as political, right. Even a structuralist reformer like Yan Jiaqi maintained the belief that democracy could be achieved by competitive elections for office within the dictatorship of the Communist Party until just days before the 4 June Tiananmen incident. Most of the reformers, radical or moderate, in their fight for democracy in the 1980s, ignored the fundamental requirement and basic democratic right to organize opposition parties to contest elections and gain power as an integral part of their democratization campaign.

Nathan (1985:205) vividly quotes Fu Shenqi and other more radical democracy fighters in that period: "Our country is democratizing, there can be no doubt", wrote the Shanghai worker and democracy activist Fu Shenqi. "Equally beyond question is that no matter what shape and concrete form the process of democratization takes, its essence will be the historical advance from no elections to elections, and from empty elections to authentic elections." Independent candidates who dared to speak out might be suppressed at first, wrote another democrat, but "no matter what opposition or resistance the election process now meets, it will not lose its vitality, but on the contrary will gain greater vitality from each winning or losing clash. You can count on it: all over the country there will be more and more workers and students participating in election campaigns. The election movement is just beginning to grow."

In this view, held by a very small group of radical reformers, the elections represented not just a chance to speak out, but a chance to alter the structure of state power through the people's congresses. As Fu Shenqi observed, "The democracy movement is based on the laws, but it also ceaselessly demands new laws. These ceaseless demands for new laws will be satisfied precisely as the election system is perfected." As a case in point, Fu cited the people's periodicals, hitherto the movement's main means of action but now under pressure. He advocated linking the election and the periodicals' aspects of the movement, with the candidates fighting for better laws to protect the periodicals and the periodicals publicizing the programmes of the candidates.

Although still lacking the organizational dimension of substantive democratization, these few "democracy wall" radicals did have some more realistic and workable ideas and approaches. They were too few and too disorganized, however, and thus easily suppressed by the authorities. Although they did put their fingers on the importance of elections, and in that had some similarity to the oppositionist movement in Taiwan, in the area of institutionalizing the democratization process they seriously lagged behind their Taiwanese counterparts, who had started their organizational oppositionist campaign more than two decades earlier. One of the most interesting exceptions, although only with symbolic democratic meanings, is the case of Hu Ping.

As a young 32-year-old graduate student in European philosophy specializing in Hobbes, Locke, and Hume in 1980, as a radical democracy activist, with Wang Juntao, Hu Ping took part in the Beijing University election that was to send two deputies to the Haidian (Beijing University) district people's congress. Hu won the election with 57 per cent of the votes, while Wang Juntao came second but did not secure 50 per cent of the votes and thus lost. Hu, however, was not allowed to represent Beijing University and attend the Haidian district people's congress; the election was exciting and colourful on the university campus but in a real political sense totally meaningless. Hu was alienated and frustrated. In 1986, before he left for the United States to further his graduate studies, Hu Ping (1986) published his famous long essay "On Freedom of Speech" which created quite a stir among Beijing students. In the United States, he quickly joined Wang Bingzhang's Chinese Alliance for Democracy, the publisher of *China Spring*, and he fought an unpleasant battle with Wang to gain control of the Alliance. Since the 4 June Tiananmen incident, he has generally supported a more organized approach toward democratizing China. There were many calls for the Alliance to be united with Yan Jiaqi's Federation for a Democratic China to form an oppositionist political party and many Chinese pro-democracy activists wanted Fang Lizhi to lead the new party. So far, although the merging of the two pro-democracy organizations has taken place, the movement has been just as divided as ever and a new oppositionist party has not been born. In 1988, commenting on the controversy on the "River Elegy", Hu Ping (1988) loudly said: "Do not blame the Yellow River; blame the Chinese Communist Party."

Hu Ping was, of course, only partially correct. In terms of China's backwardness, increasing authoritarianism and lack of democracy, both the Yellow River, namely the traditional Confucian culture, and the CCP are equally guilty. The PRC political system of 4 June 1989 was certainly more authoritarian than the 1989 ROC government, or the *Beiyang* warlord

government, of 4 May 1919. For that, Mao, Deng and the CCP have to take the blame. Their Leninist, combined with Confucianist, institutional authoritarianism has given birth to the deadly 4 June totalitarian political behaviour and its attendant political system. Culture is part of the problem but the Maoist–Dengist political institution is the core of the whole tragedy.

In China, there were people's periodicals, while in Taiwan there were *tangwai* journals. All contributed to breaking the CCP's and KMT's tight control of the mass media and to fighting for freedom of speech and the press. Whilst in China there were practically no "authentic elections", in Taiwan, where they were fought vigorously and relentlessly by the oppositionists, there were continuous meaningful, relatively and increasingly open and fair, democratic elections. The 1986 and 1989 elections in particular had firmly established democratic elections as a permanent, effective and integral part of Taiwan's institutionalist democratization process; whilst the post-NAC 1990, 1992 and 1993 elections were fought on the firm basis of an institutionalist two- , some may argue multi-party system. In the PRC, there was no institutionalized opposition, such as political parties, that intended to gain, or even seize, political power from the CCP; in Taiwan there were many such organizational forces, from the 28 February Uprising to the 1986 formation of the DPP, the Taiwanese oppositionists' sole purpose was to play power politics with, and wrest power from, the KMT.

SAME CONFUCIAN CULTURE BUT DIVERGING SOCIETIES

Talking about the Chinese democracy movement again and quoting Schumpeter's "another theory of democracy", Andrew Nathan (1985, pp. 226, 231–2) concludes his authoritative work with three paragraphs which are relevant to this book:

What makes the movement significant from the standpoint of Western values is the fact that, without knowing it, the democrats had arrived at the same thesis about minimal requisites of democracy that is central to contemporary democratic theory in the West. As formulated by Joseph A. Schumpeter in his influential book *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942), the "theory of competition of elites" defines "the democratic method [as] that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by

means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Democracy defined by this way is a technique, one to be adopted for whatever benefits might flow from the accountability of government to the people. But Schumpeter insisted that in order to assure this accountability, the democratic technique must include a free vote and a degree of freedom of the press and of association sufficient to guarantee that the competition for office is truly open.

Even those who agree with the democrats' analysis that overconcentration of power is at the root of China's political problems fear the disorder they believe would flow from any weakening of party control. Most intellectuals appear to accept the party's claim that political order in their country requires leaders with strong authority. They hold to the old view that, because of China's feudal tradition and peasant backwardness, institutional change is useless until the culture is reformed. Many who speak this way seem unaware of how their words echo back through history: to the judgement of Liang Qichao that China was fit only for enlightened despotism; to the political passivity and cultural reformism of dispirited liberals of the 1920s and 1930s; to the tutelage theory of the Guomindang.

Like the early Liang Qichao and other reformers in China's tradition of Confucian optimism, however, the democrats seemed to see institutional change as needing only to be ordained to be successful. Confucius once said, "Is virtue a thing remote? If I desire to be virtuous, virtue will be at hand." To the democrats, pluralist reform was similarly a matter of making up one's mind as to its desirability, and so they concentrated on demonstrating the benefits of their proposed reforms, as if this were all that was needed to make the case for adopting them. By default, they left the task of evaluating their ideas' practicality to those who feared, in the pessimistic tradition of the later Liang and other conservatives, that society was still too backward to allow the people to hold real power. In the end, the democrats may have had the better of the theoretical argument that democracy cannot perform its functions without competitive elections and an independent press. But so far, China's century-long obsession with political order and national strength has made it impossible for most other Chinese, even non-Marxists, to share their vision of change.

Exactly because post-Second World War Taiwanese intellectuals did not have such a heavy Confucian tradition upon their backs, or at least the tradition was severely broken by the 28 February Uprising, there were few Liang Qichaos in Taiwan, and even fewer mandarin scholars who subscribed

to the view that political order is so important that they need strong authoritarian leaders to maintain such order. From the very beginning, the Taiwanese oppositionist intellectuals took the institutionalist approach to democratize the ROC's political system. They certainly did not believe that democratic institutional change needs only to be proclaimed to be successful. They have fought hard and paid a high price for their *tangwai* organizations, the DPP and electoral successes. They did carry out culturalist democratization work in their nonpartisan journals, meetings and rallies to make the Taiwanese people understand and accept democratic principles, but they did not stop there and, as the *Formosa* affair showed, went much further in pushing for substantive institutionalist democratization.

That constitutes the basic difference between Chinese and Taiwanese intellectual political democratizers. Some would argue it is only different in degree, while some would point out that it is already different in kind. The two societies have diverged, rather than converged, to increasingly become two different societies. In a complicated argument, Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers (1991, p. xlv) try to make such a case:

Yet, to an important extent, the ROC's "inhibited political center" allowed for capitalism and the play of competing ideologies; it had a Millsian component, both ideologically and institutionally; and it endorsed Confucian orientations toward the self-group relation. Thus, it was different in kind, not just degree, from the PRC's "uninhibited political center," even when the latter shifted from the transformative to accommodative policies.

This divergence was deepened by developments during the past two or three decades. In the ROC, made possible by the accommodative, inhibited centre, three interrelated breakthroughs have taken place: the successful process of economic modernization, the development of an urbanized society with a large middle class and a "great transition" from authoritarian rule to increasing political pluralism. In the PRC no comparable breakthroughs have occurred. According to this view, then, the effort to bring economic modernization and democratization to the mainland will require more than just angry opposition to oriental despotism. What will be needed is concrete and practical actions that will lead to institutionalize on the mainland those three kinds of pluralism basic to the three breakthroughs that transformed the society in Taiwan.

This is a provocative analysis. The only point that needs to be raised here is that the "inhibited" centre in Taiwan, the KMT, became "inhibited", not simply because of its self-enlightened and self-initiated change

as the authors seem to imply, but to a great extent because of the continuous struggle against, and pressure put on it by, the persistent oppositionist campaigns.

Tu Wei-ming (1991, p. 9) puts it somewhat differently. He says that if the Taiwan "economic miracle" has attracted the most attention with the American public, the fascinating and enduring feature of the Taiwan experience has been its conscientious effort to chart a radically different course of development, deliberately to challenge the socialist experiment on the mainland. "As a result", he argues, "the perceptual gap between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits has been exceedingly wide; despite the rhetoric of unification, the two 'countries' have vastly different economic structures, political systems, social conditions, and cultural orientations. The Taiwan independence movement has created perhaps the most controversial and explosive political issue on the island, but the democratization process initiated by the top Nationalist leadership under pressure in 1987 has undoubtedly caught the spirit of the moment." Tu Wei-ming agrees that if Taiwan becomes truly democratic, the question of Taiwan's Chineseness will inevitably become a matter of public debate. In addition, although he has some doubts, he does notice the new intellectual phenomenon called "sedimentations of Taiwanese history", a sort of Taiwanization process. For the Taiwanese intelligentsia, especially those under forty who were born and raised in Taiwan, "the recognition that there have been distinctive Dutch, Japanese and American strata superimposed on the Chinese substratum since the eighteenth century – not to mention the upsurge of native sentiments of the Polynesian aborigines – makes the claim of Taiwan's Chineseness problematic". Tu (1991, p. 14), however, stresses that Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are grouped together with mainland China as the "first symbolic universe" of Chineseness because "the life orientation of each of these societies is based in Chinese culture".

On the role of the intellectuals in the modernization and democratization in Taiwan and China, Metzger (1991, p. 56) in another article states: "Whether intentionally or not, the intellectual marketplace in Taiwan turned out to be compatible with modern pluralism, while the Communists' zealous, utopian way of evoking modern China's teleological vision turned out not to be. In the 1980s, many mainland intellectuals felt that Marxism was no longer viable, and their society desperately needed the guidance which could be provided only by a new, intellectually correct formula or doctrine not yet conceptualized, or at least not yet sufficiently promulgated. What few, if any, of them advocated was stopping the search for such a single correct way of thought and instead institutionalizing the kind of open,

eclectic, diverse, and heterological intellectual scene that has in fact become so fundamental to the Taiwan way of life."

Certainly, it was intentional in the eyes and minds of the Taiwanese oppositionist intellectuals. They have carried out such a prolonged struggle and paid a heavy price of sweat and blood to transform Taiwan from authoritarianism to democracy. The dedication and commitment to Schumpeterian institutionalist democracy has been so extensive and intensive that it had to be a conscious and intentional act. They might not have always interpreted and explained their struggles in such theoretical terms. Their four-decade-long fight for democracy has certainly been quite clear in terms of empirical behaviour, what they have actually done. It was their long oppositionist organizational struggles that forced the KMT centre to be "inhibited", Taiwan's socio-political structures to be more and more pluralistic, and its intellectual scene to be increasingly heterological. The economic miracle and the emerging urbanized society and middle class, the civil society, have undoubtedly helped this modernization and democratization process. However, as the DPP supporters would tirelessly point out, Taiwan's rich industrialists and businessmen and large middle class have been the strongest and most loyal followers of the KMT conservative and authoritarian rule. Unlike the gentry-class oppositionists of the 1950s, most of the *tangwai* and DPP leaders have been poor and middle-class intellectuals, typified by Kang Ning-hsiang, Hsu Hsin-liang, Shih Ming-te and Chang Chun-hung, while their followers have mostly been lower class, workers and peasants.³ Up to now, the DPP still has troubles getting support from the rich and the middle class. To avoid following the same political steps of the Japanese dominant party system, in the 1990s, the DPP will have to fight very hard to break up this monolithic middle-class block and to make the Taiwanese middle class accept and support the pluralistic two- or multi-party system and eventually join the DPP in large number.

In the most ironic way, the economic miracle and the expanding middle class in Taiwan have been a powerful weapon used by the conservative authoritarian Nationalist rulers to fight against the oppositionist democracy movement and to prevent the DPP from becoming a real institutionalist democratic alternative to the KMT. Immediately after he was released from the prison and became the DPP secretary-general, Chang Chun-hung (1989) saw this problem and tried to develop a strategy to woo the business people and middle class. For his increasing support of the business interests, he has been widely criticized by the radicals, such as the New Tide faction, in the party.

9 Conclusion: Democratic Technology

Although socialism, capitalism, Westernization and modernization must have some impact on them, culturally China and Taiwan are still fundamentally Confucian. Traditional personalism, paternalism, authoritarianism, monism and subject culture, although different in degree, are still the basic characteristics of Chinese and Taiwanese cultural systems. Because of the different economic and political paths they have taken in the last four decades, Taiwan's political culture has become more pluralist and participant, even more rational-legalistic, and hence less personalistic and authoritarian. Nevertheless, it is still only change in degree, not yet in kind.

Economically, socialism-communism in China and capitalism in Taiwan have created two radically different, even opposite, systems. The failures of China and the successes of Taiwan have made their economic systems different not only in degree but in kind. In turn, they must have great impact on the political culture and behaviour, and the political systems of the two Confucian states. Thus, successful capitalism must have helped a great deal the democratization process in Taiwan, while failed socialism has been a great hindrance to the democracy movement in China. The miraculous economic growth in Taiwan certainly strongly supports the Rostowan theory of "Non-Communist Manifesto", although the causal relationship between high economic growth and democratic development, as shown in the Taiwanese case, is much more complicated and uncertain than the Rostowans would like to acknowledge.

Although still infested with flaws and problems, democracy is by far the best political system in human history, particularly in light of the total collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Moreover, basic democratic principles should be the same everywhere, be it called socialist democracy or capitalist democracy. On this, I agree with Professor Fang Lizhi. Theoretical debates on democracy can, and probably will, go on forever, but the Schumpeterian "technique" of democracy is quite succinct and straightforward and just as, if not more, convincing than other more complex treatises on democracy. It has been generally accepted as the basic, necessary feature of democracy in practice. It is in the area of "technique" that major differences have occurred on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. Democratization efforts as made in China from 4 May

1919 to 4 June 1989 and in Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990, by the intellectual political elites, as studied by this book, have taken two very different directions and approaches. Although it would be too simplistic and probably wrong to argue that had Chinese intellectuals and students taken a similar institutionalist approach to their Taiwanese counterparts, they could have achieved a similar democratization result, it seems reasonable to assume that it would have made some fundamental difference.

In China, it was culturalist democratization that most of the intellectuals, the mandarin scholars, the democracy activists including the students, had chosen to reform and transform the 2000-year traditional Confucian political culture. They believed they had to change Chinese political culture before they could change Chinese political behaviour and system. They fought valiantly for freedom of speech and the press, but fought very little for meaningful elections, even less for true oppositionist parties and a two- or multi-party system. In the end, most of them had become just another Qu Yuan, a Confucian scholar remonstrator, who tried to reform the authoritarian system from within, to create democracy in one-party, even one-man dictatorship. They were thus doomed to failure. Still, it must be reiterated that had they adopted the insitutionalist road, the socio-political as well as economic obstacles might have been still too many and too difficult for them to overcome, thus the responsibility for the failure to democratize China should not be borne solely by the intellectuals and students.

In Taiwan, after the 28 February massacre, maybe in a similar way to what the experience of defeat in the Second World War did to the Japanese, the Taiwanese intellectual political elite seemed to have undergone a major divergence from their counterparts, the May Fourth generation intellectuals on the Chinese mainland. From the *Free China* days to the *Formosa* demonstrations, eventually to the formation of the DPP and the convention of the NAC, in addition to the fight for freedom of speech and the press, such as the publications of *tangwai* journals, it seems the Taiwanese oppositionists had been primarily, some even obsessively, occupied with the "technical" questions of winning elections. Especially, the central concern with, even obsession in, their continuous struggles had been to break the Nationalist one-party control and to form opposition parties that were intended to seize power from the KMT, at times even by means of "outside the system" activities. In the end, from the "technical" point of view, when the DPP was formed in September 1986, then "won", in a moral rather than a real electoral sense, the December 1986 and December 1989, and then the post-NAC 1992 elections, they had in essence won

their institutionalist democratization battle and brought Taiwan to a "primary" stage of structural-functional democracy.

Thus, in the Schumpeterian "technical" sense, the success of Taiwan's institutionalist democratization and the failure of China's culturalist democratization have produced two different political systems, different in kind rather than just in degree. In this case, means and goals do meet and become one. This is probably one of the most difficult things for Chinese Confucian mandarin scholars to comprehend and accept. To them, goals have to be elevated to the land of great virtues, while means are just means, not important and beneath them. Unless they change their attitude and approach totally and become willing to deal with "technical" institutionalist questions, rather than remaining stuck in their tight culturalist straitjacket, they will probably continue running in their 4 May–4 June vicious circle, and will be unable to attain real democratization in China.

Although some scholars still believe that Confucian culture has many positive features and good points, most Chinese intellectuals now agree that Chinese traditional authoritarian culture is in great need of modernization, just as most of them would also see the importance of a rapid development of the Chinese economy. But it seems strange that very few of the Chinese intellectual political elite have, in the past seven decades, actively argued and pushed for democratizing Chinese political institutions, destroying old despotic political organizations, and setting up modern democratic political systems. Almost exactly the opposite has been the case in Taiwan. Since the 28 February Uprising more than forty years ago, the Taiwanese intellectual political elite have chosen to pay less attention to the "new culture" movement and much more attention to winning elections, forming one kind or another of oppositionist political organizations, and eventually gaining power through elections. From Lei Chen's 1960 aborted Chinese Democratic Party, to *Formosa's* radical *tangwai* quasi-party associations, to the 1986 formation of the DPP, and finally to the quasi two-party system of the NAC, Taiwan's political dissidents and oppositionists have gone a long way in doing exactly what their counterparts on the Chinese mainland have by and large failed to do. By doggedly applying democratic technology, rather than being constantly bogged down by perennial debates on, and fights for cultural, theoretical and ideological democracy, in the mid-1990s Taiwanese democratic technologists are on the verge of making their political miracle a relatively peaceful and smooth "great transition" from Confucian oriental despotism to modern functional-institutional democracy.

Notes

Note to Chapter 2: The May Fourth Movement

1. After the defeat of Germany in World War I, the Versailles Peace Conference decided to give German concessions in China's Shandong province to Japan. Enraged by the decision and the ineptitude of the Beijing government, on 4 May 1919 students in Beijing demonstrated against the government and Western imperialism. The intellectuals and students used the protest to promote an anti-Japanese campaign and a vast modernization movement to build a new China through intellectual and socio-cultural reforms. They stressed primarily Western ideas of science which they called "Mr S" and democracy which they called "Mr D." For more details see Chow (1960).

Notes to Chapter 4: The "River Elegy"

1. From a report by *China Spring*, 67 (December 1988) p. 77.
2. The chronology and documentation for this section are primarily based on Han (1990).
3. At the 1991 annual ceremony to present the 1990 "Democracy Man of the Year" Award, sponsored by the Chinese Democratic Education Foundation, San Francisco, 24 March 1991, as a former award winner, Fang Lizhi attended the ceremony and gave a keynote speech. After the speech, many Chinese democracy activists asked him why he did not want to lead the Federation for a Democratic China. He insisted that he would not join the organization but would continue to fight for human rights in China.
4. Wang Ruowang was allowed to leave China for the US in late 1992 and immediately became involved in the bitter "power struggles" in the merging attempts of the two major pro-democracy organizations, the Federation for a Democratic China (Paris) and the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (the US), at the first congress of the new Alliance for a Democratic China in Washington, DC, January 1993. The split between Wang and Yan Jiaqi was acrimonious with Wang leading his supporters in boycotting the meeting *en masse*. Wang, Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan held a "world-wide united conference on Chinese human rights and democracy movements", in May 1993 in Los Angeles, resulting in the formation of a "coordination committee on Chinese democracy movement organizations". Wang Ruowang also advocated the formation of a "Chinese Democratic Party", that was not supported by Liu Binyan and Fang Lizhi. Wang stressed that the reasons for him to organize the Chinese Democratic Party overseas were to end the CCP one-party dictatorship, establish a multi-party system and make China into a true democratic country based on three-power checks-and-balances and pluralist political system. For details on these post-Tiananmen events, see Yan Jiaqi's articles in *Cheng Ming*, 185 (March 1993) pp. 66-7; *Quest (Tan-So)*, 112 (April 1993) pp. 34-8; Wang Ruowang's articles in *Cheng Ming*, 186 (April 1993) pp. 83-5; *Quest*, 112 (April 1993) pp. 39-41; and Mo Liren's report in *Cheng Ming*, 188 (June 1993) pp. 70-1.

5. Lincoln Kaye, "Learning New Rules: Released Dissident Wei Jingsheng Tries to Catch UP", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (4 November 1993) pp. 20–1. For details on Wei after his release, see special-feature articles published in *The Nineties*, 285 (October 1993) pp. 24–9. The editor of the journal, Lee Yee (Qi Xin) names his article "From Democracy Fighter to Human Rights Fighter", that aptly describes the culturalist essence of Wei's struggle for "fifth modernization" in China and that also matches well the image of another "human rights fighter", Fang Lizhi.
6. Yan Jiaqi told me at the 1991 Berkeley meeting that because of my 1986 interview, he was called before the party disciplinary committee to explain why he had said that humanism is universal and superior to Marxism–Leninism. The interrogation was carried out at Zhao Fushan's office and lasted many hours. In the end, Zhao was sympathetic and helpful, and thus got Yan to sign a fairly watered-down version of his "confession". In 1988, Yan did not avoid me because of that. He met me and discussed with me at length the political reform being pursued then in China. In our 1992 gathering in Paris, Yan again explained to me the details of the interview incident. He was thankful and full of praise for what Zhao had done.

Notes to Chapter 5: The 28 February Uprising

1. In addition to my article, "The Uprising of 28 February 1947 on Taiwan: The Official 1992 Investigation Report", *China Information*, VII-4 (Spring 1993) pp. 1–19, which documents the main points of the official report authorized by the Executive Yuan in 1991, Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers and Wei Wou's book, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (1991) is also quite useful. However, as my review of the book in *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 38 (July 1992) pp. 206–9, points out, the book makes a number of critical errors on facts as well as on interpretations.
2. These few forerunners of Taiwan's democracy movement were typical members of the Taiwanese landlord gentry class in the 1940s and 1950s. Li Wan-chu and Wu San-lien were publishers of independent newspapers. Both had studied in China before 1945. Kuo Yu-hsin and Kuo Kuo-chi were Taiwanese native politicians with strong local followings who could fight the KMT government because of their mass support at the grass-roots level. Kao Yu-shu has lasted longest of them all. He was the first Taiwanese oppositionist elected to the Taipei mayor's office. After serving three terms, he was recruited by Chiang Ching-kuo to be minister of communications. As of 1994, he was still a senior advisor to President Lee Teng-hui. He has consistently maintained his nonpartisan status.
3. I took Professor Yin's courses in logic and philosophy in the late 1950s. Our generation of university students was profoundly influenced by Yin's ideas and thoughts. He was widely regarded by us as the "Mr D" of the National Taiwan University. After the *Free China* affair, he was not allowed to teach any more, neither was he allowed to leave Taiwan to take up a research fellowship at Harvard. He died of cancer on 16 September 1969, at the young age of fifty. He had to wait another twenty years before an open commemorative symposium on his thought was allowed. See Wei *et al.* (1990).

4. The six were Wu San-lien, Li Wan-chu, Yang Chin-hu, Hsu Shi-hsien, Kao Yu-shu and Wang Ti.
5. Also Chiang P'eng-chien, the first DPP chairman, Su Chen-ch'ang, former Pintung county magistrate who lost the 1993 election and became the DPP secretary-general in early 1994, and legislators Chang Chun-hsiung and Hsieh Ch'ang-t'ing.
6. The winners included Chu Kao-cheng, Wang I-hsiung, Chou Ch'ing-yu (Yao Chia-wen's wife), Hung Ch'i-ch'ang, Hsu Kuo-t'ai (Hsu Hsin-liang's younger brother), Hsu Jung-shu (Chang Chun-hung's wife), Chang Mu-kuei and Fan Cheng-chung.

Notes to Chapter 6: Institutionalizing the *Tangwai*

1. The "*Formosa Eight*" were Huang Hsin-chieh, Chang Chun-hung, Yao Chia-wen, Lu Hsiu-lien, Shih Ming-te, Ch'en Chu, Lin I-hsiung and Lin Hung-hsuan.
2. Ironically, Professor Feng, a former English interpreter for Chiang Ching-kuo and an ideologue for the KMT non-mainstream faction led by Hau Pei-ts'un, after having mounted a number of anti-Lee Teng-hui activities, was disciplined by the party. Refusing to accept the party discipline, Feng quit the KMT in early 1994.
3. Huang was a political science professor at Soochow University, who was sacked because of his anti-KMT views and who later became the first secretary-general of the DPP and won a legislative seat in the 1992 elections.
4. Lin as a mainlander became a DPP legislator in the 1989 elections but, unable to accept the party's increasing pro-independence stand, left the party and won the 1992 elections as a "nonpartisan".
5. After helping form the DPP, Chu won a popular parliament seat in the 1986 elections and became an influential radical legislator. He, however, quickly turned moderate after winning his second term in 1989, left the DPP soon after to form his own party, the Social Democratic Party, and barely squeezed through to hold his seat in the 1992 elections. He has since become irrelevant in Taiwan's oppositionist politics.

Notes to Chapter 7: The National Affairs Conference

1. The "body language" politics in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly has really developed into a sort of art form. The DPP used it to force the KMT into concessions, while the KMT through its mass media, particularly the television, used it to make the opposition look wicked, violent and anti-democratic. The interesting thing about it was that the body language was used only in the two chambers of the parliament, never outside in the streets or in public. I personally have seen the DPP and KMT parliamentarians shake hands and go to many Taipei night spots together immediately after a violent session. It was much more a political "show" than a real physical confrontation as seen on the television screen.
2. Under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership, Lin Yang-kang in many respects was politically senior to Lee Teng-hui. Most people in Taiwan felt that it should

have been Lin rather than Lee who should have become Chiang Ching-kuo's successor. Lin had served as mayor of Taipei, governor of Taiwan, minister of the interior, and vice premier, an officialdom record much superior to Lee's. He had wide popular support among the Taiwanese people. Thus, the tense relations between the president of the ROC and the president of the Judicial Yuan at times flared up to upset the power balance in Taiwan's fragile political environment. Since the 1993 elections, he has openly expressed his ambition to contest the next presidential election, thus openly challenging Lee Teng-hui's rumoured intention – rather than his reported promise – not to run for a second term. Lin's presidential ambition has rocked and threatened to split the KMT further.

3. On 16 February 1990, Premier Lee Huan invited Kang Ning-hsiang and me to a dinner at the Grand Hotel at which we talked for about three hours. In the conversation he expressed his thoughts on current political crises and reforms, his premiership, his wish to step down after the coming presidential election and the inevitability of the Taiwanese taking over the KMT leadership.
4. Although Hau Pei-ts'un was generally regarded as a member of the non-mainstream faction, he had maintained a more detached attitude and expressed strong loyalty to President Lee Teng-hui throughout the 1988 succession and the early 1990 political crises. However, in mid-1991, clearly the president and the premier were no longer seeing eye to eye on a number of important political issues, particularly in the area of mainland China policies. Hau has since become the leader of the KMT non-mainstream faction and continued to frustrate Lee Teng-hui's reform programmes. In the aftermath of the 1992 legislative elections, in which the DPP "won" while the KMT "lost", Lee wanted Hau to resign. Hau refused and caused a furious power struggle between the president and the premier, resulting in an explosive showdown during the Chinese Lunar New Year, in which without a popular base as the president had and with a split KMT, Hau was in a no-win position, both in terms of constitutionalism and power politics. Lee won the struggle, appointed his men, both Taiwanese, to be premier and KMT secretary-general, thus further "Taiwanizing" both the party and Taiwanese politics.
5. The "New KMT Alliance" led by Chao was to become militantly against President Lee's "Taiwanization" of the KMT and the ROC political system. In mid-1993, they learnt from the experience of the earlier split of the Japanese ruling Liberal Democratic Party, fashioned after Hosokawa's Japanese New Party, left the KMT, and formed their Chinese New Party, thus creating a third force between the KMT and DPP. They performed badly in the November 1993 elections, winning no seats and only about 3 per cent of the vote. They try to represent the 13 per cent mainlanders in Taiwan; however, their future is uncertain.
6. As a visiting research fellow at the Institute in 1990, I was involved in some of the research projects there and was very impressed by the quality of the researchers and the works they produced. The policy papers on constitutional reform written by Professors Hsu Chung-li, Chu Yun-han and their team of young scholars were extremely useful.

7. Since the 1992 legislative elections, the winning of the power struggle against Hau Pei-ts'un in early 1993, and leading the KMT to win an impressive victory in the 1993 county-chief and city-mayor elections, Lee Teng-hui seems to have increasingly retreated from his earlier promise not to seek a second term. Within and without the KMT there have been strong popular demands and support for him to contest the next presidential election that would be directly voted on by the people.
8. From my own recollection and the report by *China Times* (10 January 1989).
9. The first-hand information in the following two sections is from my own personal experiences, contacts and interviews with members of the Taiwanese intellectual political elite, particularly leaders of the *tangwai* and DPP.
10. For the 1990 elections, see *China Times*, 22–23 December 1990. For the 1992 elections, see *Chinese Times*, 20–21 December 1992; Linda Gail Arrigo, "A Brief Report on Taiwan's National Legislative Yuan Elections, 19 December 1992", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 25:1 (January–March 1993) pp. 34–41; Julian Baum, "The Hollow Centre: Poll Result Undermines President's Power", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (7 January 1993) pp. 14–15; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Taiwan Election Helps Opposition: Governing Party's Majority Sharply Pared in Vote – A 'New Era' Is Seen", *New York Times* (20 December 1992).
11. For the 1993 elections, see *China Times* (28–29 November 1993); Julian Baum, "Democracy Banquet: President Lee Leads Ruling Party to Victory", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (9 December 1994) p. 21.

Notes to Chapter 8: Two Diverging Political Systems

1. Thailand's elected but corrupt Chatichai government was overthrown in a military coup by General Suchinda Kraprayoon in February 1991. After the March 1992 elections, although not elected as a member of the parliament, Suchinda moved into the prime minister's office and caused a public uprising resulting in massive student demonstrations and the forced resignation of the general. Popular and fairly democratic elections were held in September, that elected the civilian Chuan Leekpai government. In 1993, Pakistan also saw some serious political struggles between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Premier Nawaz Sharif and the opposition party, the Pakistani People's Party, leader Benazir Bhutto, resulting in the downfall of both the president and the premier and bitter elections that resulted in Bhutto being voted into power again. In 1992, Corazon Aquino successfully served out her seven-year term and new elections gave her defence minister, Fidel Ramos, a narrow win, thus a smooth democratic succession was accomplished. Although violence and other forms of undemocratic behaviour were abundant in all these three countries' elections, few doubt the basic level of democracy, especially in terms of multi-party system, fair and open elections, and free speech and a free press, they have reached.
2. For the Singapore election, see N. Balakrishnan's reports, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (29 August 1991) pp. 21–2; (12 September 1991) pp. 10–12.

3. Huang Hsin-chieh, the third chairman of the DPP, was an exception. He was from a rich landlord family and thus much more like the “five tigers” of the previous generation. He has generously used his family wealth to support the *tangwai* and the DPP. During his chairmanship from 1989 to 1991, he single-handedly financed many of the party’s major activities including the 1989 election campaign.

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